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Political Affairs

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Political Affairs

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CONTENTS

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NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Voting To Put Article 6 on Congress Agenda [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY; No 48, 2-8 Dec]	1
General Arutyunov Scores Civil Defense Performance in Armenian Quake Aftermath [R. S. Arutyunov; KOMMUNIST, 23 Dec 89]	2

REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Joint Armenian-NKAO Decree on Refugee Resettlement Progress [KOMMUNIST, 10 Dec 89]	5
Azerbaijan CC Department Notes Official Use of Azeri Lagging [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 17 Dec 89]	7
Azerbaijan CC Forms Social Analysis, Prognosis Institute [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 27 Dec 90]	7
Azerbaijan Develops Contacts With Foreign Countries [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 28 Dec 89]	8
Azerbaijan Komsomol Plenum Resolutions on Party, NKAO, Youth Policy [MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA, 26 Dec 89]	9
Kazakh Supreme Court Plenum Held [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 29 Dec 89]	13
Kazakh Party Control Commission Meets [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 21 Dec 89]	13
Comparison of Kazakh Language Law [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 28 Sep 89]	15
Tajik Supreme Soviet Presidium Announcement on Elections [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 29 Dec 89]	16
Tajik CP CC Buro Report on Crime, Navruz Holiday [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 29 Dec 89]	17
Tajik SSR Presidium Ukase Abolishes Public Services Ministry [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 5 Jan 90]	18
Tajik CP Central Committee on Socioeconomic Development [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 1 Jan 90]	18
Tajik Press Conference Cites Progress, Problems in Earthquake Reconstruction [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 20 Jan 90]	20
Tajik Union of Lawyers Elects Chairman, Forms 7 Commissions [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 7 Jan 90]	20
Turkmen SSR Preelection Issues Examined [B. Otchertsov; PRAVDA, 30 Dec 90]	21
Turkmen Supsov Presidium Chairman on Republic Problems [R. A. Bazarovoy; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA 20 Dec 89]	22
Plenum Meeting of Turkmen SSR Supreme Court [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 12 Dec 89]	23
Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Mirkasymov Profiled [M. Mirkasymov; PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK, Dec 89]	24
Uzbekistan Takes Measures to Deal with Unemployment Problem [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 30 Dec 89] ..	25
Uzbek CP Authorities Score Pace of Republic's Education Reforms [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 30 Dec 89]	25

NATIONALITY ISSUES

MVD Official on Fighting Ethnic Conflicts [S. Vanyushkin; SOYUZ No 3, Jan 90]	27
Azerbaijan Forms Society for Refugees [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 6 Jan 90]	29
Journalist Recounts 11-13 January Lenkoran Events [Z. Dzhabbarov; BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 17 Jan 90]	30
OGONEK Considers Future of Meskhetian Turks [M. Salykova, S. Yanovskiy; OGONEK, 9-16 Dec 89]	32
Status of Gagauz Language, Culture Viewed [G. Gaydarzhi; SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA, 10 Jan 90]	37
Analysis of Public Reaction to Draft of Uzbek Language Law [V. Nazarov, S. Zinin; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 2 Sep 89]	39
Uzbek Political, Religious Leaders View Republic's Nationality Tensions	43
Tashkent Obkom Secretary Fazylov [E. Fazylov; NAUKA I RELIGIYA, Nov 89]	43

Central Asian Muslim Chairman [M. Mukhammad-Sodik; <i>NAUKA I RELIGIYA</i> , Nov 89]	49
Removal of Previous Muslim Leader Detailed [O. Brushlinskaya; <i>NAUKI I ZHIZN</i> , Nov 89]	52
Central Asian Orthodox Bishop [N. Tserpitskiy; <i>NAUKA I RELIGIYA</i> , Nov 89]	56

LAW AND ORDER

Kazakh Justice Ministry Explains Law on Demonstrations [<i>KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 17 Jan 90]	61
Correspondents Investigate Narcobusiness in KaSSR	62
Correspondents' Actions Annoy Local Authorities [V. Ardayev; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 17 Oct 89]	62
MVD Responds to Report [A. Illesh; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 23 Oct 89]	63
Counternarcotics Operations in Kazakhstan's Chu Valley Detailed [Yu. Lushin; <i>OGONEK</i> No 46, 11-18 Nov 89]	65
Military Counterintelligence Narcotics Operations Detailed [S. Turchenko; <i>KRASNAYA ZVEZDA</i> , 24 Jan 90]	68

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Motives, Activities of 'Free Journalists' Union Criticized [A. Nikolayev; <i>EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN</i> , Jan 90]	71
Soviet Copyright Agency Chairman on VAAP Policies, Author Rights [N. Chetverikov; <i>PRAVDA</i> , 4 Jan 90]	73
Glavlit Deputy Chief Comments on Draft Press Law Censorship Issue [N. Glazatov; <i>TRUD</i> , 13 Jan 90]	76
KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA Deputy Editor Views Draft Press Law [V. Srybnykh; <i>KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 21 Dec 89]	77
Soviet Legal Expert Analyzes Draft Press Law Content [G. Maltsev; <i>SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA</i> , 10 Jan 90]	78
KGB General Outlines Function of New GRANITSA Publishing Organ [G.V. Martynov; <i>PRAVITELSTVENNYI VESTNIK</i> , Jan 90]	80
Belorussian Soyuzpechat Official on Republic Subscription Trends [G.I. Panfilovich; <i>SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA</i> , 4 Jan 90]	80
Moldavian Gostelradio Chairman on Republic Radio Broadcast Changes [A.P. Usatii; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA</i> , 13 Dec 89]	82
New Moldavian Weekly Aimed at Rural Audience [A. Bessarabov; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA</i> , 4 Jan 90]	83
New Moldavian Cultural Weekly Profiled [A. Bessarabov; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA</i> , 6 Jan]	83
Moldavian Militia Weekly Published in Moldavian, Russian [V. Narozhnyy; <i>SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA</i> , 14 Jan 90]	84

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Sakharov's Exile in Gorkiy Examined [S. Leskov; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 27 Jan 90]	85
Estonian Procurator Reports on Rehabilitation Proceedings [L. Urge; <i>SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA</i> , 7 Jan 90]	89
Kazakh Central Committee Commission Reviews Stalin-Era Decrees Against Writers [<i>KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 9 Dec 89]	89

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Solution To Georgia's Demographic Problems Explored [G. Pirtskhalava; <i>ZARYA VOSTOKA</i> , 1 Jan 90]	92
Kazakh Komsomol Plenum Held	93
KazTAG Report [<i>KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 29 Dec 89]	93
Nazarbayev Speech [<i>KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA</i> , 29 Dec 89]	93
Latvian Health Official Interviewed on Suicide Statistics [V. Kondratenko; <i>IZVESTIYA</i> , 4 Jan 90 Morning Edition]	97
Uzbek Education Minister on New Cotton Harvest Student Labor Rules [M. Zaidov; <i>PRAVDA VOSTOKA</i> , 30 Sep 89]	98

Voting To Put Article 6 on Congress Agenda

Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 48,
2-8 Dec 89 p 8

[Unattributed report]

[Text] Today we publish for the first time, at reader request, results of voting by name in the USSR Supreme Soviet. We are already getting accustomed to the fact that members of the Supreme Soviet may have a variety of opinions on various issues. No matter what these views may be, their points of view must be treated with respect.

Put to a vote was a proposal to include the issue of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution in the agenda of the Congress of People's Deputies.

Soviet of the Union. "FOR":

V.V. Antanaytis, L.Ye. Bliznov, I.M. Bogdanov, M.A. Bocharov, M.I. Vlazneva, I.S. Vnebrachnyy, V.A. Volkov, V.V. Volodichev, V.I. Voskoboynikov, N.S. Glazkov, A.V. Gorbunov, N.P. Grachev, A.V. Grib, V.A. Gubarev, V.G. Gudilina, N.I. Gutsnalov, V.N. Danilov, A.A. Denisov, T.N. Dudko, O.M. Yegorov, A.S. Yezhelev, I.A. Zhdakayev, Yu.I. Zubov, I.M. Ivchenko, M. Kanoatov, V.A. Katrinich, G.Sh. Kvaratskhelna, V.I. Kisin, M.V. Klimov, M.R. Kontselidze, A.V. Kopylova, N.M. Kopysov, A.A. Korenev, N.N. Koryugin, B.I. Krasnokutskiy, N.A. Kryuchenkova, V.V. Kublashvili, V.G. Kulikov, V.Ye. Kurtashin, V.A. Leonchev, K.D. Lyubenchenko, V.A. Lunev, V.P. Lushnikov, V.A. Mayboroda, O.I. Markov, N.M. Mgaloblishvili, A.D. Menshatov, V.M. Minin, A.G. Mukhtarov, S.Ya. Naumov, Yu.V. Neyelov, I.A. Nikanorov, B.N. Nikolskiy, V.A. Nozdrya, V.A. Opolinskiy, A.P. Orekhov, I.B. Pavlevich, E.A. Pamfilova, N.V. Pan-teleyev, A.N. Penyagin, Z.S. Prikhodko, G.I. Revenko, A.V. Reshetnikov, S.M. Ryabchenko, N.S. Sazonov, S. Saydaliyev, T.V. Sidorchuk, V.V. Skvortsov, S.Ye. Sleptsov, D.G. Smirnov, A.A. Sobchak, N.I. Sotnikov, G.I. Stoumova, L.I. Sukhov, V.M. Timchenko, M.A. Timchenko, V.V. Finogenov, V.N. Fominykh, S.N. Khadzhiyev, Yu.S. Tsavro, A.L. Tsarevskiy, S.A. Tsy-plyayev, V.A. Tsyurupa, Yu.M. Chichik, N.V. Shashkov, P.V. Shetko, V.A. Shekhovtsov, V.A. Shishov, Yu.Ya. Shmal, A.S. Shukshin, Yu.N. Shcherbak, V.D. Yudin, A.N. Yakimenko, V.A. Yarin, O.P. Yarovaya.

"AGAINST":

Yu.T. Akbarov, S.S. Alekseyev, M.B. Amanova, S.G. Arutyunyan, S.F. Akhromeyev, N.I. Babchenko, Ye.F. Bobyleva, V.A. Borovkov, Yu.I. Borodin, B.S. Breurosh, A.N. Vasilyets, N.P. Vasilchuk, G.M. Voskanyan, N.F. German, A.I. Golyakov, N.N. Gritsenko, V.I. Gross, F.M. Demchenko, Ya.A. Donchak, P.A. Druz, G.M. Yermolayev, N.V. Yefimov, T. Zhurabayeva, I.P. Zelinskiy, V.V. Kasyan, T.A. Kerimbekov, A.B. Kirakosyan, T.B. Kirgizbayeva, G.V. Kolbin, P.I. Konkov, V.A. Kravets, Ye.V. Krivoruchko, V.G. Kucherenko, N.I.

Kucherskiy, I.M. Luchenok, A.M. Masaliyev, S.I. Matveychuk, V.I. Matviyenko, L.T. Matiyko, S.A. Militenko, A.K. Miloserdnyy, D.K. Motornyy, A.Ya. Neumyvakin, V.I. Ogarok, V.A. Ostroukhov, A.A. Pavliy, A.S. Pavlov, O.M. Pal, N.D. Pivovarov, N.M. Piryazeva, V.A. Plyutinskiy, V.I. Postnikov, G.S. Pokhodnya, Ye.M. Primakov, Z.P. Pukhova, A. Rakhimov, M.G. Rakhimov, M.N. Rakhmanova, B.N. Rogatin, V.A. Rogozhina, S.Ye. Savitskaya, K.S. Salykov, A.A. Sapegin, A.M. Sbitnev, V.V. Svatkovskiy, A.V. Semenikhin, V.I. Semukha, Ye.Ye. Sokolov, Yu.Yu. Sokolova, B.I. Sushko, V.A. Tetenov, N.A. Usilina, N.S. Feskov, G.P. Kharchenko, V.I. Tsybukh, A.I. Chabanov, M.A. Chepurnaya, N.F. Chernyayev, V.M. Shabanov, D. Shaklycheva, G.I. Sharyy, A.A. Shust, V.S. Yakutis.

"ABSTAIN":

A.M. Amanov, A.K. Arslonov, Ya.Ya. Vagris, D.G. Gilalzade, A.K. Grudinina, A.T. Dzhanasbayev, Yu.V. Drunina, B.S. Iskakova, Ye.K. Malkova, A.D. Melikov, G.S. Moskalenko, M.N. Moskalik, G.P. Piskunovich, A.R. Rzayev, A.Kh. Salimov, A.T. Sarakayev, N.I. Chentsov.

The remaining deputies were absent.

Soviet of Nationalities. "FOR":

S.B. Aguzarova, V.S. Advadze, Ye.D. Aypin, Ch. Aytmatov, V.A. Ambartsumyan, Sh.A. Amonashvili, V.G. Ardzinba, L.A. Arutyunyan, E.T. Arutyunyan, R.A. Arshba, L.V. Afanasyeva, R.S. Akhmetova, N.U. Badzhelidze, O.B. Batorov, L.I. Batynskaya, E.V. Bichkauskas, I.O. Bisher, S.V. Boykov, V.S. Bolbasov, I.N. Botandayev, T.P. Buachidze, G.V. Buravov, V.T. Byazyrova, L.F. Valentinov, R.P. Vardanyan, V.I. Vidiker, Yu.V. Vooglayd, M.G. Vulfson, A.I. Vyuchey-skiy, Ye.A. Gayer, B.K. Genzyalis, A.A. Genchev, A.R. Gogeshvili, V.Ye. Golovnev, A.G. Gorbachev, S.N. Danilov, M.V. Demidov, M.D. Dzhumatova, B.N. Yeltsin, G.A. Yenokyan, V.M. Yetylen, D.G. Zaynalkhanov, M.Z. Zokirov, G.S. Igityan, S.V. Ignatov, N.I. Ignatovich, G.N. Kamenshchikova, V.F. Karpenko, V.A. Karpochev, K.Z. Kakhirov, Yu.Kh. Kakhn, V.A. Kiseleva, V.V. Korobkin, A.A. Korshunov, V.V. Kosygin, S.Y. Kudarauskas, R.A. Kukayn, S.O. Kuliyeu, Yu.Y. Kuplyauskene, A.P. Kucheyko, T.R. Kyabin, V.P. Larnonov, S.G. Lushchikov, V.N. Maksimov, Z.K. Mateushuk, N.N. Medvedev, T.A. Minnullin, L.I. Mikhaylova, M.A. Mikheyev, B.G. Mnatsakanyan, T.V. Momotova, M.I. Mongo, T.V. Moshnyaga, V.K. Murashov, M.T. Mukhametzyanov, Sh. Navruzov, S.I. Nevolin, Ts. Nimbuev, R.G. Oganesyanyan, R.K. Odzhiyev, Yu.Yu. Olekas, S.Ya. Palchin, Ya.Ya. Peters, R.P. Rugin, I.B. Sakandelidze, R.G. Salukvadze, B.S. Safarov, G. Safiyeva, F. Sefershayev, G.S. Stepanova, N.V. Fedorov, K.S. Khallik, S.N. Khanzadyan, P.A. Khitron, A.I. Khomyakov, D.V. Khugayeva, D. Khudonazarov, M.A. Khusanbayev, V.I. Tso, M.I. Chimpyoy, K.S. Cholokyan, A.M. Shamikhin, V.V. Yakushnin.

"AGAINST":

Ya.I. Abbasov, V.T. Adylov, P.A. Azizbekova, G.M. Akmamedov, U.K. Akmatallyeva, T. Akmatov, R.M. Aleskerova, N.I. Aliluyev, S.V. Angapov, A. Aynamukhamedov, Kh. Atdayev, Ye.N. Auyelbekov, R.A. Bazarova, N.F. Baleshev, V.I. Barabanov, L.V. Barush-eva, Z. Beyshekeyeva, N.V. Bocenko, V.S. Venglovskaya, V.I. Vorotnikov, M.N. Gadzhiev, V.V. Gnatyuk, D.I. Guguchiya, Z.S. Gulova, Ya.P. Gundogdyev, N. Davranov, M.Yu. Darsigov, A.A. Dmitriyev, V.K. Yerelina, I.A. Zabrodin, G.R. Ibragimov, M.I. Ibragimov, G.D. Ikayev, I.I. Isakov, T.K. Ismailov, T. Kaipbergenov, V.Ya. Kalashnikov, A.S. Kapto, D.B. Karasal, S.M. Katilyevskiy, E.M. Kafarova, D.A.A. Kerimov, N.P. Kiriya, G.N. Kiselev, B.K. Kodyrov, I. Kozhakhmetov, Yu.T. Komarov, N.A. Kostishin, D.N. Kugultinov, Ye.A. Kulikov, Z.G. Kurashvili, A. Kurbapova, V.T. Kurilenko, V.A. Levakin, G.F. Lezhenko, G.N. Litvintseva, V.P. Lukin, V.G. Mamedov, L.I. Matyukhin, K. Meleyev, D.S. Mironova, R.Sh. Nagiyev, A.A. Namazova, Ye.I. Nemtsev, V.V. Nikolayev, R.N. Nishanov, A.I. Nyrkov, K.I. Nyuksha, B.I. Oleynik, V.N. Ochirov, B.T. Palagnyuk, G. Pallayev, M.K. Pashaly, S.V. Pilnikov, S.I. Platon, V.I. Prokushev, B.F. Rakhimova, K.Z. Romazanov, A.P. Rubiks, N.A. Samsonov, M.M. Safin, G.S. Tarazevich, S.Z. Umalatova, A.M. Umerenkov, M. Fatullayev, V.K. Foteyev, A.B. Shalyev, V.S. Shevchenko, G.G. Shtoyk, N.N. Engver.

"ABSTAIN":

R.A. Allayarov, A.D. Dikhtyar, M.F. Zamanyagra, A.Ya. Kangliyev, B.S. Klibik, M.S. Kuldyshev, N.M. Manko, A.P. Maslakova, T.N. Menteshashvili, T.M. Spanderashvili, L.R. Tedeyev.

Deputies P. Badalbayeva and K.K. Uoka did not vote.

The remaining deputies were absent.

Voting Results

Quorum for voting—362

Quorum for adopting a resolution—201

Deputies registered as of 2010 hours—401

Voting "for"—198

Voting "against"—173

Abstaining—28

General Arutyunov Scores Civil Defense Performance in Armenian Quake Aftermath

90US0406A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 23 Dec 89
p 3

[Interview with Maj Gen R. S. Arutyunov, chief of the Higher Central Courses for the Training and Improvement of Qualifications of the Civil Defense Management, by R. Ayrapetyan and G. Gevorkyan, correspondents of the Armenian Press Agency; Moscow, date not specified; first two paragraphs are KOMMUNIST introduction]

[Text] The lessons of Chernobyl, the lessons of Arzamas, the lessons of Armenia, the lessons of Ufa. . . . Already very often during the past years we have encountered various "lessons"—large-scale catastrophes and calamities. It goes without saying, such events occurred previously as well, only we did not know about them. Today glasnost opens up before us the sad picture of our lack of discipline, mismanagement, and irresponsibility. Do we always learn a lesson from these extraordinary events, and do we flexibly and effectively react to them? Are we able to liquidate their consequences, if we did not succeed in preventing them? Alas. . . .

What is the role of civil defense in this matter, what is being done for its development? This was the subject of a discussion of the correspondents of the Armenian Press Agency, R. Ayrapetyan and G. Gevorkyan, with the chief of the Higher Central Courses for the Training and Improvement of Qualifications of the Management of Civil Defense, Maj Gen Roman Sergeyevich Arutyunov.

[Correspondents] Comrade general, don't be offended if we begin our discussion with a question that is possibly unpleasant for you. For many, civil defense is a formal, bureaucratic organization, and the majority of people clearly do not know what it is engaged in and what its functions are. In the institutions, there are people who "are responsible" for civil defense, they sometimes demonstrate how to use gas masks, they show old, educational films, and that sort of thing. We understand that we are simplifying the thing a bit, but nevertheless.

[Arutyunov] If you think that I will now begin to energetically deny the formalism and the imperfection of the organizational structure of civil defense, you are mistaken. All of this does exist. And the population does in fact have an incorrect idea of our organization. The civil defense of the USSR is a nationwide system—it is a complex of national measures of economic, social and defense character, carried for the purpose of securing the protection of the population against possible accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters, and modern weapons. It relates to the most important functions of state, economic, military organs and projects of the national economy.

We can say without exaggeration that the role of civil defense is substantially increasing. The point is that the production projects created by man—nuclear power stations, chemical, metallurgical, and biotechnological enterprises, oil and gas pipelines, and others, in the case of an accident at them present great danger both to man himself and to the environment. The natural disasters that take a large number of human lives and inflict an enormous amount of economic damage serve as a constant reminder.

[Correspondents] You, comrade general, were one of the first to come to Armenia during the terrible days after the earthquake. Tell us, how did the civil defense forces and means taking part in the liquidation of the natural disaster cope with the difficulties.

[Arutyunov] For the urgent realization of measures for the conduct of rescue and restoration work, a special operational group of the USSR Civil Defense was created in the city of Yerevan, as well as operational groups in Leninakan and Spitak—directly from the staff of the USSR Civil Defense. First of all, work to rescue people and to provide medical assistance to the victims, the provision of housing, food, etc., was organized. This work was carried out around the clock.

The introduction of civil defense units into the earthquake center imparted a more organized character to the rescue work. Nevertheless, the efficiency of the rescue work was not high. The reason is concealed in the weak technical equipment of heavy engineering machinery and means of small-scale mechanization of our subdivision, in their lack of means for searching for people who are alive in obstructions and specially-trained dogs, specialized rigging, etc. But in order for my fellow countrymen to know what volume of work we carried out, I would like to cite a few figures. In the zone of the disaster, 39,795 people were pulled from obstacles, of them 15,254 people were alive, 119,318 people were evacuated, including 79,750 people outside the republic. In Leninabad alone, more than 50 areas were cleared independently or jointly with other organizations for the construction of new houses, more than 11,000 prefabricated were made available to the population, 735 tons of scrap metal and 130 tons of construction tufa were collected, 540,000 cubic meters of demolished buildings were removed, and 122 kilometers of roads were cleared. Comprehensive assistance was extended to the population of the regions that suffered in the provision of water, food, and everything necessary in their life.

Incidentally, foreigners pulled out and rescued a total of 60 people. I do not at all want to play down their services. We should give their efficiency and professionalism, as well as their equipment with effective search devices, special equipment, the presence of police dogs, etc. their due.

[Correspondents] You mentioned the low efficiency of the rescue operations, the newspapers also wrote a great deal about this. Tell us, what lessons did you learn from these grim experiences in regard to the improvement of your entire system?

[Arutyunov] In the course of the work, we again became convinced that the organizational structure of the civil defense units today does not correspond to the execution of the tasks in conditions of large-scale catastrophes. In America we were as unprepared as in Chernobyl. In our view, it is necessary to fundamentally examine the role, functions, and organizational and staff structure of the non-militarized civil defense formations and troops. Our proposals—it is necessary to equip the developed civil defense forces with highly-efficient machinery, devices, and equipment with regard to their arrival in the region of catastrophes within a 24-hour period nearby regions. In the next 24-hour period, the build-up of civil defense units should be carried out with regard to the special

features and character of the catastrophe. A part of these forces of constant readiness must be air-mobile, ready for operation in any regions, including abroad. In the subsequent stages, the involvement of the forces of the various ministries and departments must be carried out.

[Correspondents] And what can you say about the creation of quick-reaction subunits, whatever they would be called—rescue teams, specialized non-militarized formations, territorial formations of increased readiness, etc.?

[Arutyunov] Let us again note the fact that in Armenia the basic work of rescuing people was carried out by soldiers of the Armed Forces and by civil defense units jointly with specialists from organizations and departments of the country. But simultaneously we came to the conclusion that it is necessary for us to have rescue teams consisting of comprehensively-trained specialists and professionals, equipped with modern equipment, which could arrive in the shortest possible time at the place of the accident. Evidently, it makes sense to create special sub-units in the civil defense units and associations for the search for people in obstructions.

In our view, it is necessary to give the non-militarized civil defense units legislative [as published] status and to give the population that goes to make up these formations an economic interest.

[Correspondents] And how is the training of the civil defense leadership, the officials being conducted, what is their professional level?

[Arutyunov] It goes without saying, the civil defense leadership must be carried out by professionals, capable of assuming full responsibility and having the authority to implement the decisions adopted successfully. In our country, alas, one frequently encounters chiefs who have a vague idea of civil defense itself.

In the civil defense system we now have more than 150 courses on various levels, in which, along with leading officials, many specialists of the national economy, who are responsible for civil defense sections of one sort or another at the local level, are being trained.

The Institute for the Improvement of Qualifications, in terms of its organizational and staff structure, must become a unified scientific-methodological center for all courses.

[Correspondents] And what do you say about glasnost in civil defense?

[Arutyunov] Many of the troubles of civil defense, its—to put it mildly—unpopularity among the people are to a significant degree connected with the unfounded secrecy of many of the measures carried out by it. For this reason, our people does not know its tasks and its obligations with respect to participation in the measures for the protection of the population and the national economy in extraordinary circumstances during peace and war time.

The concealment, from the public, of the reasons for accidents and catastrophes, the names of the persons who are to blame for their origin, the scales of damage, etc. inevitably leads to the springing up of various rumors and conjectures.

Complete glasnost is necessary. Every person must have a completely clear knowledge of the civil defense structure, in the country, in his region and project, and the tasks of civil defense and his obligations with respect to civil defense.

At a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, a state commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for Extraordinary Situations was set up. In its work it will base itself on the ministries, departments, and the systems that are now functioning in our country. Among them the USSR Civil Defense, whose composition includes organs, forces, and administrative stations

throughout the entire territory of our state, will be of great help in the work of the commission.

[Correspondents] Comrade general, a few words about yourself.

[Arutyunov] I am from Artsakh. I completed secondary school there and enrolled in the Yerevan Polytechnical Institute. From the second course I was called into the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1958 I finished military school, and in 1966—the Military Academy imeni Frunze. I occupied a number of command and staff positions from platoon commander to deputy army commander. For 3 years already I have been in the position of chief of the All-Union Central Committee of Civil Defense.

At the present time enormous changes are taking place in civil defense, and my aim is to apply the maximum of my efforts and possibilities to this cause.

Joint Armenian-NKAO Decree on Refugee Resettlement Progress

90US0407A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian 10 Dec 89 pp 1-2

[Joint Armenian-NKAO Decree "On the Course of the Implementation of the Decrees Adopted by the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers on the Question of Making Arrangements for the Refugees and Additional Measures to Intensify this Work"]

[Text] The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Soviet note that certain work has been done by the government, the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies, and the ministries and departments of the republic, in regard to securing the implementation of the decrees adopted by the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers on making arrangements for the refugees.

Thanks to the measures that have been adopted, arrangements have already been made for 109,000 of the 218,000 of the refugees that have arrived in the republic. Jobs have been found for 40,000 of the 89,000 able-bodied refugees. Gradually the questions are being solved regarding the exchange of their apartments, the compensation of damage done to personal property, the granting of plots of land for individual building and credits, the payment of one-time grants and relief, and the preservation of length of service and registration.

At the present time the question of the pension guarantee for more than 20,000 refugees has been solved. The continuation of studies of all pupils and students has been organized.

Work has begun on the payment of a one-time allowance in the amount of up to three months' wages.

The government of the republic is searching for real ways of solving the housing problem of the refugees. In Bagramyanskiy and Ashtarakskiy rayons, as well as in Abovyan, Razdan, and Charentsavan, the planning and construction of cooperative apartment houses for 8,000 people. To those building individual houses, about 800 hectares of land and about 10 million rubles of advantageous credits have been allotted. Work in this direction is continuing.

Measures are being taken to create branches of industrial enterprises and the organization of a network of cooperatives in rural localities, gas supply, water supply, and road construction in villages.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Soviet at the same time note that in the matter of securing the implementation of the decrees adopted by the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers on the question of making arrangements for the refugees there are still quite a few unresolved problems and shortcomings.

A number of executive committees of rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies manifest a callous and irresponsible attitude to the acceptance, establishment, and solution of the social and everyday problems of the refugees.

There are serious difficulties, especially in the matter of the solution of the housing problem of the refugees. The questions of the exchange of apartments and the allotment of plots of land are being resolved extremely slowly. In some regions (Artashatskiy, Echmiadzinskiy, Kalininskiy), the provision of building materials for individual housing construction has been organized quite unsatisfactorily.

There are quite a few manifestations of red tape, a callous attitude, and cases of a bureaucratic approach in the matter of the organization of cooperatives for the construction of housing for refugees. The Gosplan, the State Construction Committee, and the State Agroindustrial Committee of the republic do not manifest the requisite effectiveness for the pressing solution of the questions of the choice of places, the composition of general models and plans, the development of planning estimates for cooperative housing construction in the projected cities and rayons.

The Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the executive committees of rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies manifest sluggishness in questions of the registration and job placement of the refugees. Today approximately 50,000 able-bodied refugees have not been involved in socially useful labor, more than 35,000 people have not been registered at all.

There are cases of the manifestation of indifference in the matter of the organization of trade, consumer, and other services in the places where refugees live. As a result of the unsatisfactory work of the board of directors of the Aykoop, the Ministry of Trade, the executive committees of Vardenisskiy, Kalininskiy, Krasnoselskiy, Yekhegnadzorskiy, and Azizbekovski rayons Soviets of People's Deputies, many prime necessities, food, etc., are lacking in the trade facilities of a number of cities and villages, which calls forth the justifiable discontent of the refugees.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Nagorno-Karabakh National Soviet decree:

1. To charge the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers with securing the unconditional implementation of the measures that have been developed to implement the decrees on the question of the accommodation of the refugees adopted by the Armenian CP Central Committee and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

2. For the executive committees and the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies to extend concrete assistance and cooperation to the refugees in the exchange of apartments, registration, job placement, and the solution of other social problems.

3. For the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies, the heads of the appropriate ministries, departments, institutions, enterprises, and public organizations of the republic to take the necessary measures for the speediest solution of the needs of the refugees, to surround them with daily concern. To devote special attention to invalids, the aged, single persons, and large families.

To create everywhere a moral-psychological atmosphere guaranteeing the normal spiritual condition of people, which will give them the possibility to actively engage in socially useful work.

4. To charge the State Agroindustrial Committee, the State Construction Committee, and the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies of the republic with solving, within a month, the question of the allotment of the necessary plots of land to all refugees who want to build individual and cooperative houses.

5. For the Gosplan, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Trade of the republic, the board of directors of Aykoop, and the Armenian Republic Bank of the USSR Savings Bank to secure the allotment of building materials, material-technical resources, credits, other means and materials necessary for the construction of individual housing for refugees, in accordance with the orders of the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets.

6. For the Gosplan, the State Construction Committee, and the State Agroindustrial Committee, to develop, within compressed deadlines, definitive solutions to the questions of the composition of general models and plans, the elaboration of planning estimates, and the appointment of contract organizations for cooperative construction for refugees in the projected cities and rayons.

7. For the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies to carry out, within the shortest possible time period, the repair and putting in order of houses that stand empty, and to create the conditions for the settling of the refugees.

To allot to the Ministry of Finance, the State Construction Committee, and the State Agroindustrial Committee the corresponding funds and materials for the implementation of this work.

8. For the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies, their departments of internal affairs, and the executive committees of settlement and rural Soviets to complete, within a month, the official registration of the refugees.

9. For the Ministry of Social Security of the republic to take concrete measures to obtain the pension files of the

refugees from the Azerbaijan SSR, and the acceleration of the official registration of the cases now in the examination stage.

10. To charge the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies, the Ministry of Social Security, and the Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, to take effective measures for the proper solution of the questions of pension guarantee, the giving out of allowances, the preservation of length of service, and other questions of the social protection of the refugees.

Together with the Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans to pay special attention to the timely solution of the social and consumer problems of invalids of the Great Patriotic War and labor.

11. To charge the Gosplan and State Agroindustrial Committee, jointly with the ministries and departments, with developing, within a month, a comprehensive program for the implementation, by way of top priority, of the supply of gas and water, the installation of a sewage system, as well as the planning and construction of public health care facilities, public education, and municipal and everyday services in the villages occupied by refugees.

12. For the board of directors of Aykoop, the Ministry of Trade, and the executive committees of the rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies to fundamentally improve the work with respect to trade services, the supply of industrial and food products, and the expansion of their assortment in the places where refugees live. For Gosplan to allot additional resources for these purposes.

13. To charge the city and rayon Soviets of People's Deputies to carry out the stock-taking of the available housing resources and, within a 2-month period, to submit a proposal concerning the occupation of houses that stand empty and have been abandoned to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers.

14. To charge the State Construction Committee and the State Agroindustrial Committee, within a month, to take concrete measures in regard to the strengthening and expansion of the base of the construction organizations, to increase the capacity of housing construction in Bagramyanskiy Rayon.

15. For the Gosplan of the republic, jointly with the corresponding ministries, enterprises, and executive committees of the local Soviets of People's Deputies, within a month, to examine and present proposals to the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers for the creation of industrial enterprises, branches of cooperatives, peasant farms and family farms, in places of massive residence of refugees.

16. For the republic Ministry of Education to organize courses for the study of native language for the refugees, to accustom to the culture of the Armenian people.

17. To charge the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, in order to involve the financial and material-technical possibilities of the labor collectives in the solution of the housing and social and consumer problems of the refugees, with allotting concrete farms to the ministries, departments, institutions and enterprises.

18. To charge the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, jointly with the union ministries, with examining the problems of the compensation of the value of state, cooperative, and individual houses and apartments, damaged personal property of refugees, their advantageous pension provision, one-time assistance, and other unresolved problems.

19. To charge the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers with examining the question of the formation of an Armenian SSR State Committee for the reception and accommodation of Armenians returning from abroad under the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers and an Administration for work with citizens who have abandoned their place of permanent residence, under the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers and with submitting proposals to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet. Chairman of the Presidium of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, G. Voskanyan Chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh National Council, V. Grigoryan Secretary of the Presidium of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, N. Stepanyan 1 December 1989, Yerevan.

Azerbaijan CC Department Notes Official Use of Azeri Lagging

90US0420A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
17 Dec 89 p 3

[AZERINFORM report: "Attention to Language Problems"]

[Text] Progress on carrying out the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Resolution, "On Measures for Ensuring the More Active Functioning of the Azerbaijanian Language as the State Language of the Azerbaijan SSR," was discussed at a conference at the Ideological Department, Azerbaijan CP Central Committee. Taking part in its work were scientific, literary and artistic figures in the republic.

During the exchange of opinions it was noted that in spite of the purposeful work carried out in this direction, the Azeri language is still not used well in the ministries and departments, at enterprises and organizations, and in Soviet organs. People are not taking sufficient advantage of opportunities to use the language as the state language, which hinders the conduct of a purposeful language policy in the republic. The intelligentsia and working collectives of Azerbaijan are justifiably disturbed by the fact that correspondence between the staffs of ministries and the subdivisions they have established, and enterprises, city, rayon and rural organizations continue to be carried on in certain instances in the Russian language only. The state of advertising, announcements

and means of visual agitation requires a great deal of improvement, especially in Baku.

Commissions have been set up to familiarize themselves with the process of carrying out the resolution in the ministries, at enterprises, and above all in the republic ministries of popular education, culture, and health-care, and at the Novo-Bakinskiy Oil Refinery. After careful study of the situation in the localities, working proposals and recommendations for ensuring the active functioning of the Azeri language will be brought up for extended debate. A proposal was also made to establish a unified commission made up of representatives of the republic's scientific intelligentsia in order to maintain public cognizance of the realization of the resolution.

Taking part in the work of the conference was R.A. Aliyev, chief of the Ideological Department, Azerbaijan CP Central Committee.

Azerbaijan CC Forms Social Analysis, Prognosis Institute

90US0420B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
27 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by AZERINFORM correspondent: "A Glance into Tomorrow"]

[Text] What awaits us tomorrow? How will the social processes in the Azerbaijan SSR develop? Which paths should we take to achieve our near-term and long-range goals in the economy and in science? Under today's conditions, an acute necessity has arisen for combining the efforts of scientists and specialists in a variety of areas for dispassionate, objective and independent research on the complex phenomena taking place in the republic, and for planning development models for various processes.

The Social Institute of Analysis and Forecasting, created by decision of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Bureau, will serve these ends. The institute is a spontaneous, creative organization of the intelligentsia for conducting scientific research work on the most important problems of development of Azerbaijan. Those who set up the institute drew upon the experiences of voluntary scientific societies, the largest of which is the "Roman Club [Rimskiy Klub]," a non-governmental association made up of prominent scientists.

Republic CP Central Committee Secretary T.Kh. Orudzhev conducted the session of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee which was dedicated to the opening of the institute.

R.A. Aliyev, corresponding member of the republic Academy of Sciences and chief of the Ideological Department, Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, delivered a report entitled, "Goals and Basic Missions of the Public Institute for Analysis and Forecasting." The activity of the new institute, he stressed, is oriented toward creating an intellectual bank of objective scientific knowledge

about the past, present and future of the Azerbaijan SSR. Its products will consist of social projects, recommendations and research, which will be brought to the attention of the public, and to the appropriate administrative structure. The institute will offer broad opportunities for everyone to realize his civic position in fact. Its doors are open for original ideas, bold social projects, and audacious scientific designs. The institute's sphere of activity includes questions of demography, migration of the populace, the rational employment of labor resources, restructuring the educational system, foreign relations, and others.

Republic Academy of Sciences Academician A.Kh. Mirzadzhanzade, chief of the Azerbaijan Institute of Petroleum and Chemistry imeni M. Azizbekov, spoke at the session of the responsibility of a scientist for the events which have taken place, and his position is society.

Republic Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member A.G. Kasymov, director of the Caspian Biological Station, delivered his prognosis on the ecological state of the Caspian. The state of the world's largest lake is cause for very great alarm: not only is the level of the Caspian changing, but also the vital environment of its inhabitants.

R.G. Mamedov, director of the Azerbaijan Scientific Research Institute on Hydraulic Engineering and Land Reclamation, examined the Apsheron [Krasnodar Oblast] water supply problem.

Sh.A. Muradov, chief of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences' Institute on the Economy, presented several aspects of the development of the demographic situation in the republic. F.V. Agayev, chief of the Azerbaijan State Institute for Qualifying Physicians, dedicated his presentation to infant mortality in Azerbaijan, its level, causes and prognoses.

Z.A. Samed-Zade, chief of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Socio-Economic Department, spoke on the necessity for a systematic approach to the solution of economic problems.

Also speaking at the session were F.F. Kasim-Zade, corresponding member of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences and department head at the Azerbaijan State University imeni S.M. Kirov; republic Academy of Sciences Academician A.S. Sumbat-Zade, and F.Sh. Badalbeyli, a professor at the Azerbaijan State Conservatory imeni Uz. Gadzhibekov.

Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Secretary G.A. Gasanov also took part in the session.

It was decided to hold future sessions of the Institute of Analysis and Forecasting, on the order of the Baku "Roman Club," on the evenings of the first and last Mondays of every month, in the assembly hall of the Presidium of the republic Academy of Sciences.

Azerbaijan Develops Contacts With Foreign Countries

90US0420C Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
28 Dec 89 p 3

[AZERINFORM report: "Contacts are Expanding"]

[Text] Under the conditions of perestroika and the increasing sovereignty of our republic, its international contacts are expanding more and more. In this respect, the outgoing year of 1989 was a record year: USSR Days featuring the Azerbaijan SSR were held successfully in five countries—Denmark, Iraq, the Republic of Cuba, India and Cambodia. Meetings of the Azerbaijan and American public took place in the USA, and Mongolia Day and Cambodia Day were held in Azerbaijan in response.

A session of the presidium of the Azerbaijanian Society for Friendship and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries was devoted to summing up and analysis of the results of holding these large-scale measures. In their speeches, Presidium Chairman Habi Khazri and other speakers emphasized the growing interest of people in various countries toward Azerbaijan, its history, culture and present-day life. Representatives of various strata of the populace—figures from political, religious, cultural, commercial and social organizations remarked on the high level of all the measures, and expressed their desire to establish direct contacts with the corresponding institutions of our republic.

Meetings in Denmark and the USA between emissaries and fellow-countrymen living there were both emotional and fruitful. In Cuba, Cambodia and India representatives of our republic met with graduates of Azerbaijanian VUZ's who are actively occupied in developing the economy of their own countries. They expressed their gratitude to our republic for the knowledge they acquired. And everywhere Azerbaijan's masters of the arts were greeted with warm applause at their concerts, which were attended by tens of thousands.

At the same time we should be more demanding and thoughtful in putting together the programs for such Days, taking into consideration the specific features of each country, and re-examine the practice of putting on exhibitions abroad in order to more completely present Azerbaijanian art—both ancient and modern. The need was stressed to make more active use of foreign mass information media, and to establish personal contacts between members of the public of Azerbaijan and foreign countries, and for direct exchange of specialists in the areas of culture and science, and youth and women's delegations.

Next year the geography of our contacts will expand to 120 countries, with whom permanent cooperation is maintained, and new ones will be added—including the states on the Latin-American continent.

The presidium approved the results of the major, comprehensive measures carried out by the Azerbaijan Friendship Society in 1989, both in the republic and abroad.

Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Secretary R. Ya. Zaynalov also spoke at the session.

Azerbaijan Komsomol Plenum Resolutions on Party, NKAO, Youth Policy

90US0402 Baku MOLODEZH AZERBAYDZHANA in Russian 26 Dec 89 p 1

[Resolutions of 7th Plenum of Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee Plenum]

[Text]Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee

1. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] notes that today the republic Komsomol is in one of the most difficult stages of its development. This is brought about, on the one hand, by the modern sociopolitical condition of our society, which is characterized by sharp dynamism, sharply increasing political activity of the masses, and the ambiguous and sometimes contradictory course of perestroika, and on the other hand by the lack of receptivity of the existing Komsomol structure to decisive self-renewal. Now the last role in the slow renewal of the republic Komsomol is played by the events in the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] and those surrounding it which distract immense forces and attention from the crucial problems of perestroika.

The lack of its own clearcut political line and the desire to be all-embracing and indefinite in priorities significantly reduce the effectiveness of the work of Komsomol organizations. A number of Komsomol committees and Komsomol workers and activists, under the conditions of the sharp aggravation of the political situation, have shown their incompetence, confusion, and indecisiveness, they have been unable to promptly analyze and predict events, and they have taken a wait-and-see position. On the one hand the proclaimed independence of all units of the Komsomol is perceived by certain of its committees as the possibility of an inactive existence without initiative and, on the other, one can still see the ossified stereotypes of waiting for readymade formulas from above.

We frequently lag behind in the development of a clearcut policy for action and we do not always promptly express our attitude toward various processes taking place in the republic, bureaus, and secretariat of the Azerbaijan Komsomol.

All this has led to a growth of crisis phenomena in the republic Komsomol.

2. The Azerbaijan Komsomol thinks that only involvement in active political work, further democratization of life within the union, expansion of glasnost in the work of Komsomol organizations, and increased independence and responsibility on the part of all Komsomol organs, personal, and aktiv will make it possible to accelerate the processes of radical renewal of the republic

Komsomol. This process should be based on increased independence and militancy of the local Komsomol organizations which are the basis of the Komsomol.

It is necessary to accelerate the processes of the development of goals, tasks, and the content and forms of the activity of Komsomol organizations, the improvement of the organizational structure of the republic Komsomol, and the determination of the principles of interaction at various levels.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol considers it necessary to develop program documents for the Azerbaijan Komsomol that are based on a material and dialectical perception of the society, new political thinking, organizational independence, and the traditions and specific features of Azerbaijan.

Interrelations with the party, state organs, and various social organizations are in need of considerable improvement.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol is decisively in favor of adopting an integrated state youth policy in the republic, which will make it possible to create the socioeconomic, political-legal, and organizational conditions and guarantees of the development of the young person and the realization of his creative potential in the interests of the society.

3. The Azerbaijan Komsomol notes that the objective processes of democratization of the society have contributed to awakening civic initiative in youth and have evoked widespread interest among the boys and girls in the social life of the republic. Ideas of youth organizations as alternatives to the Komsomol have appeared.

At the same time it should be emphasized that the report and election campaign that took place in the republic Komsomol clearly confirmed that the majority of young people have determined their position with respect to the Komsomol as the only organization capable of representing and defending the interests of youth at the present time.

The plenum thinks that the Azerbaijan Komsomol as a sociopolitical organization is striving to express the interests of the youth of the republic, above all its members, without claiming to have a monopoly on the youth movement, and at the same time it recognizes the inalienable right of youth to join into youth organizations and movements and is in favor of political pluralism, dialogue, reasonable compromise, and a readiness for joint constructive work with youth formations that are working for revolutionary renewal, democratization and humanization of the society, and realization of the rights and interests of youth if the activity of these formations does not go against the Azerbaijan SSR Constitution.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol considers it possible for Komsomol members to participate in youth organizations and movements whose goals, tasks, and activity do not go against the Komsomol regulations.

At the same time it clearly and unambiguously states that it will take a fundamentally uncompromising position with respect to organizations and groupings that try to impede the process of perestroika in the republic, that have an antisocialist leaning, that call for disorder and anarchy, or that profess a lack of spirituality.

4. The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol emphasizes the special role and responsibility of the republic mass media in developing a high political culture among boys and girls, developing their initiative and creativity, and increasing the degree to which youth are informed.

It thinks that the mass media for youth should actively participate in the process of perestroika and contribute in all ways to the discussion of all problems facing the republic and the boys and girls of Azerbaijan. The editorial boards must clearly determine the basic directions of their work and achieve increased objectivity, timeliness, and constructiveness of the articles in the youth press as well as increased responsibility of journalists for the materials they publish and convey.

Realistically evaluating the tense sociopolitical situation that has developed in the republic, the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol calls upon all Komsomol members, boys and girls, Komsomol committees, social organizations, and independent associations to join together and direct their efforts toward perestroika, democratic renewal, and stabilization of the political situation in the republic.

Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, "On Interethnic Relations in the Republic in Connection With Events in and Around the NKAO"

The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol, expressing its serious concern about the state of affairs in the NKAO and the events taking place around it, thinks that the groundless claims of the Armenian extremists to the land of their neighboring sovereign republic are nothing other than a deeply premeditated blow to perestroika.

The disturbance of the normal rhythm of the life of the two neighboring republics, the thousands of crippled young lives poisoned by nationalism, the expulsion of all Azerbaijanis from Armenia, the hundreds of thousands of refugees from both sides, the dozens of fatalities, the Askeran, Gugark, and Sumgait tragedies—these are the price of the embodiment of the fatal idea of separating the NKAO from Azerbaijan which, according to the intention of its authors, was to serve as the basis of the revival of the so-called "Great Armenia."

The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol decisively condemns the unconstitutional, invalid decree of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet of 1 December 1989 which envisions an unprecedentedly overt and aggressive encroachment on our republic's territorial integrity—the annexation to Armenia of Nagorno-

Karabakh and also other population points of Azerbaijan—and it perceives this as a desire to sabotage the measures of the central and republic organs for normalization of the situation in the region.

The Central Committee of the republic Komsomol regards the nationalistic position of the Nagorno-Karabakh obkom of the Azerbaijan Komsomol concerning withdrawing from the republic Komsomol organization, which was expressed in a number of decisions of obkom Plenum which were rescinded by the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol, as an attempt to encroach upon the unity of the Komsomol and the grossest violation of the Komsomol regulations.

The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol thinks that the aggravation of interethnic relations in the region, the situation of fear and mutual mistrust, and the direct confrontation between the representatives of the two nationalities only plays into the hands of antisocialist, anti-perestroika, corrupt forces who try to play with the fates of entire ethnic groups.

The Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol expresses extreme concern about the recent aggravation of the situation in the regions of our republic that border on Armenia which have been the cause of frequent armed attacks by extremists on Azerbaijan population points.

Taking into account that the measures taken by central and republic organs for normalizing the situation in the region have not yet led to the desired results and that their implementation is being drawn out excessively, the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Komsomol considers it necessary at the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet to put an end to the infinite whitewashing of the so-called "Karabakh question" and is in favor of complete restoration of the sovereign rights of the Azerbaijan SSR on its territory.

There can be no alternative to national reconciliation.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee calls upon Komsomol members and all youth in the republic to have a profound understanding of the situation when the undertake the tasks for normalization of the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and the restoration of good-neighbor relations between the Azerbaijani and Armenian people and peace and tranquillity in the region.

There should be no place in our life for national egoism, attempts to degrade the dignity of people of a different nationality, extremism, or violence.

It should be a matter of honor for all Komsomol organizations of the republic to render practical assistance to families of refugees from Armenia and Turk-Meskhetines, especially boys and girls who have been driven away from their homes.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee expresses its conviction that Komsomol members and

youth of the republic, educated in the spirit of internationalism, will make their contribution to the implementation of the CPSU platform concerning the party's national policy under modern conditions and the improvement of interethnic relations in the USSR based on complete equal rights of citizens of any nationality and friendship among nations.

Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Azerbaijan SSR Central Committee, "On Interrelations With the Party"

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee notes that questions of interrelations between the Komsomol and the local party organization have been among the most critical problems discussed in the youth environment.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference came out in favor of complete restoration of Leninist principles of interrelations between the party and the Komsomol, the observance of its organizational independence and its right to participate in political activity and the development of policy, and to resolve independently all issues of life within the union without exception. But the restructuring of relations between the party and Komsomol organizations has been unjustifiable drawn out. Outdated forms that do not promote a creative attitude toward the cause still prevail. Frequently principles of interrelations are determined by the position of the party leaders and depend on their personal business and political qualities and style of leadership. At the same time life demands a more decisive updating of interrelations between the party and the Komsomol and the Komsomol's determination of its own place in political processes as an organ that expresses the interests and defends the rights of youth.

Based on what has been said and also in view of the fact that recently certain forces have been attempting to drive a wedge between the party and the Komsomol, the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee considers it necessary to state:

its belief as a youth communist organization in the principles of ideological unity with the party;

its support of the party as the initiator and organizer of perestroika;

its complete organizational independence in resolving all issues of the life activity of the republic Komsomol within the framework of the republic constitution and existing legislation;

that the Azerbaijan Komsomol reserves the right to develop and express its own position with respect to the events and phenomena occurring in the country and the world and the domestic and foreign policy of the party and the state.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee also considers that the party's attitude toward the Azerbaijan Komsomol should be based on:

unconditional confidence in the Komsomol as the communist youth organization;

observance of the Leninist principle of friendly criticism of the mistakes of Komsomol committees;

rendering of ideological, theoretical, methodological, and other assistance to the Komsomol and its organs on the part of party committees;

a decisive rejection of administrative-command methods of leadership of the Komsomol as equal partners in solving political, socioeconomic, and other problems.

The Plenum Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee considers it expedient to consider questions and adopt documents pertaining to the work with youth and their problems in conjunction with party and Komsomol organs.

Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, "On the State Youth Policy in the Republic"

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee notes that the social tension in the youth environment caused by unemployment, the housing shortage, the problem of the migration of youth from rural areas to the cities and outside the republic, the poor economic protection of the interests of young people employed in public production, and the ecological problems are becoming very crucial.

Alarm and concern are caused by the violations of labor legislation concerning young specialists which has already become a system. Thousands of young teachers, agricultural specialists, and graduates of vocational and technical schools and specialized secondary educational institutions are unemployed or employed in unskilled labor and are not provided with work in keeping with their specialties.

Many questions of self-management of enterprises and organizations continue to be the prerogative of the administration, which, as a rule, steers them clear of youth and Komsomol organizations.

The Plenum thinks that in order to eliminate the situation that has been created and implement the youth policy in the republic effectively, it is necessary to create a system of socioeconomic, political-legal, and organizational conditions and guarantees of the development of the young person and the realization of his creative potential in the interests of the society. This system could be created within the framework of a unified state youth policy and directed toward:

provision of real equality of political, economic, and social opportunities for youth along with other social groups;

constant expansion of the social benefits offered to youth in proportion to the growth of economic well-being of

the society, taking into account the low level of the starting conditions for the life and activity of youth;

employment of youth in all branches of the republic national economy and various areas of science and culture in order to eliminate unemployment among youth; unwavering observance of labor legislation with respect to young specialists;

realization of the right for youth to obtain housing, provision of opportunities equal to those of other social categories of the population to create the minimum necessary housing conditions, and assistance in questions of independent improvement of living conditions (granting loans, plots of land, and so forth);

making sure that youth receive the bare educational minimum with a subsequent selection of the content, form, and place of education both within the state public education system and outside it;

provision and improvement of conditions for the formation and realization of the political interests of youth, particularly representation of their interests in organs of state power and the creation of an effective system of state and social control over the activity of state organs of the republic in the area of the youth policy;

the creation in soviets of people's deputies at all levels of organs or commissions that especially deal with questions of the formation and implementation of the youth policy.

The Plenum thinks that a youth policy implemented on the basis of accounting for the interests of young citizens in the republic is necessary not only for youth themselves as a concrete sociodemographic group of population but also in order to provide for the normal development of the entire society.

Resolution of the 7th Plenum of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, "On the Results of the Gathering of Students of Azerbaijan"

From 2 through 5 November in Baku there was a gathering of students of Azerbaijan with delegates selected from all higher and secondary specialized educational institutions participating in its work. The course of its work clearly showed the growing sociopolitical activity of the students youth. The deputies adopted substantiated, constructive decisions which were reflected in the summary resolution. The gathering considered the creation of a republic student soviet to be premature.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee notes that the broad participation of students in the social life of the republic shows their devotion to the ideas of perestroika and their desire for active influence on the perestroika processes.

Taking into account the attitudes and the processes occurring among student youth, we consider it important

to state the position of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee regarding certain issues reflected in the resolution of the republic gathering of students of Azerbaijan.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee:

considers that democratization in educational institutions has undoubtedly begun but it is proceeding slowly and in a contradictory fashion;

supports the activity participation of students in social life and the implementation of the political and economic reform in the republic. It is necessary to expand their representation in the organs of state power, social organizations, and councils of educational institutions. The most important political task for the students today is to participate actively in the elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR;

is in favor of expansion of the organizational and financial independence of Komsomol organizations of educational institutions and their cooperation in keeping with principles of equal partnership with all associations operating within the framework of the constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR and holding socialist positions. It is necessary to wage a resolute battle against formations that hold antisocialist and nationalist positions;

supports the process of improvement of the organization of voluntary labor and the changeover of all detachments, associations, and cooperatives of students to economic independence. It is necessary to preserve and develop the best that has been accumulated by the student detachment movement—voluntary work in all stages of development, the selection of partners, the conclusion of agreements, and the determination of the direction and forms of sociopolitical activity.

The Plenum is categorically against taking the students away from their studies to perform agricultural and other work;

it thinks that one of the most important factors in improving the quality of education is observance of educational discipline and increased mutual responsibility of teachers and students for the results of the educational process. Sovereign Azerbaijan cannot exist without highly skilled specialists in all areas of knowledge, and therefore the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee resolutely condemns inflammatory appeals directed toward interrupting the educational process. Through the councils of educational institutions and other organizations the students must more actively influence the organization of the educational process: the introduction of free class attendance, educational and noneducational activity according to individual plans, differentiated material incentives for students, and so forth;

it appeals to the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the Ministry of Public Education, and other ministries and

departments to take immediate measures for a radical improvement in the material and technical position of educational institutions and the housing and general living conditions for students. To these ends it is necessary to sharply increase financing of public education and to develop and implement a comprehensive program for the development of the education system, particularly for student dormitories, and to increase student stipends, in the future bring them up to the official subsistence level.

The students are a sensitive and responsive social group of youth. They want to act and display initiative and they respond to all that is new and advanced.

The Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee thinks that the student youth have a right to count on help from the society in solving their social and economic problems.

Kazakh Supreme Court Plenum Held

90US0417A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 2

[KazTAG report: "Kazakh SSR Supreme Court Plenum"]

[Text] At its regular plenum, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court examined the practice of applying the Law on Language to legal proceedings; the topic was brought up to ensure legal guarantees and a respectful attitude toward all the languages spoken in the republic.

The judges' attention was called to the fact that the language of legal proceedings is one of the most important principles of the civic, criminal and administrative processes, as established in the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR. Any limitation on the rights of the plaintiff, the defendant, the accused, the prisoner in the dock, or the victim, associated with lack of knowledge of the language in which the court proceedings are conducted, or failure to provide these persons the opportunity to use their native language at any stage of the process, is a significant violation of the law. It entails mandatory reversal of a judicial decree.

It was noted at the plenum that instances of gross violation of the law on the language of court proceedings still occur, and that in certain regions of the republic the sphere of use of the state language is unjustifiably restricted. Frequently the question of the choice of language for court proceedings is decided without consideration of the majority of the populace of one language or another, which dwells in a given locality. And this is explained primarily by the judicial examiners' insufficient level of knowledge of the language of the populace, or by their preference for another language that is more convenient for them.

It was deemed necessary to provide the courts a complete supply of the legal documentation, typewriters, blank forms, and examples of documents on legal procedure in the Kazakh language; and to provide intensive

training in other languages to officials of law enforcement organs. This will facilitate consistent application of the Law on Languages which was adopted, and will help improve inter-ethnic relations.

The court also discussed the question of the republic courts' carrying out the decree of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum of 5 September 1986, "On Judicial Practice in Cases of Crimes Against Personal Property." The courts were advised to beef up the citizens' legal protection from criminal encroachment on their personal property, and to strictly observe the requirements of the law and the interpretive guidance of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum and the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court Plenum on this question.

Also examined was the practice of court appointment of expert witnesses in civil cases. The judges recommended that they recruit more highly-skilled specialists on the national economy and experts from scientific-research institutions for this purpose.

Taking part in the work of the plenum, under the leadership of Kazakh SSR Supreme Court Chairman T.K. Aytmukhambetov, were Kazakh SSR Procurator G.B. Yelemisov, republic Minister of Justice D. Dospolov, and responsible officials from law-enforcement organs.

Kazakh Party Control Commission Meets

90US0417B Alm-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "In the Party Control Commission at the Kazakh CP CC: "Extremes Shall Be Eliminated"]

[Text] During its session, the Party Control Commission at the Kazakh CP Central Committee thoroughly analyzed the work of the party control commission at the Dzhzhkazgan party obkom on examination of appeals to party gorkom and raykom decisions on expulsion from the CPSU, and party reprimands. It was noted that under the guidance of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and the subsequent CPSU Central Committee Plenums, the commission is carrying out certain work aimed at strengthening party and state discipline, and at ensuring communists observe the requirements of the regulations and norms of communist morality. In consideration of the process of perestroika taking place in the party, the oblast party control organs are striving to objectively analyze, adhering to principle, all instances of violations committed by CPSU members and candidate members. During the years 1987-1989 the party commission brought up for discussion by party committees 1,475 personal cases concerning communists. According to the results of their examination, 803 persons were expelled from the party and have departed; 426 were given reprimands with an official entry in their records, and another 167 without an official entry. During this period, the party obkom received 45 appeals to the decisions of gorkoms, raykoms and party committees

with the rights of raykoms. For the most part the appeals were checked out by visits to the scene, and most were examined in the presence of the deponents.

At the same time the party control commission at the party obkom (V.V. Vorobyev, chairman) is slow to restructure its work, the level of which does not yet fully correspond with contemporary requirements. In examination of the appeals, there were as before instances of superficiality and a careless attitude toward the people's fate; and oversimplification, not taking into consideration the nature of the constructive changes brought about by the development of democracy and glasnost in the life of the party and society. These important cases were approached systematically with the precision required, and accounting and analysis were lacking. At times the commission did not delve deeply into the essence and reasons for the deeds of the appellants, took a superficial approach to studying the materials in personal matters, and lost its sense of objectivity. This was exactly what occurred in the appeal of R.K. Kulatayeva, former director of the Bosaginskiy Secondary School in Agadyrskiy Rayon. Without looking into the essence of the question, the commission agreed with the unfounded decision of the party raykom to expel her from the CPSU for violation of financial-economic discipline. While she did draw up a fictitious labor contract for carrying out major repairs on the school building, at the same time Kulatayeva did not do so for her own personal gain. Nevertheless, the raykom and the rayon procuracy termed what she did to be subject to criminal punishment. The obkom bureau did not accept the recommendation of the party control commission, and directed the oblast procuracy to investigate further. It was found that there was no criminal wrongdoing in Kulatayeva's actions, and her CPSU membership was reinstated.

The unobjective, formal bureaucratic and inattentive attitude toward the appellants has led a number of them to appeal to higher party authorities. And that is just what happened in the course of examination of the appeal of P.E. Tsymbal, a former office chief at the oblast teacher-qualification institute, to the decision of the Dzhezkazgan party gorkom issuing her two groundless reprimands for gross violation of party discipline and a careless attitude toward her official responsibilities. As a result the party obkom bureau was misled, and refused her request. It was only upon the insistence of the Party Control Commission at the Kazakh CP Central Committee, to which she appealed, that the party obkom overturned the previous decision of the Dzhezkazgan gorkom, and its own decision on issuing her severe reprimands and making an official entry on her report card. Tsymbal was also reinstated to her previous position.

At the same time, the party control commission, and the party obkom bureau as well, occasionally show unfounded lenience toward those communists who have been punished by primary party organizations for serious breaches.

There are frequent instances of the commission displaying unnecessary haste in preparing recommendations on

personal cases. The fallacious practice of holding a commission session on appeals the day before they are to be examined by the oblast party committee bureau has become deeply rooted.

Commissions are also slow to carry out and implement the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee on completing work on rehabilitation of persons groundlessly repressed in 1930-1940 period and in the early 1950's. During 1989, the commissions brought up for examination by the party obkom bureau only 29 cases on party rehabilitation, which comprises only 10 percent of those presented by the administrative organs.

The party control commission at the party obkom is devoting very little attention to examination of personal cases at gorkoms, raykoms and their party commissions and in the primary party organizations. They are not rendering proper assistance to them, nor are they displaying the necessary demandingness for raising the level of this important sector of activity. Nor have they drawn the practical conclusions from the memoranda of the Party Control Commission at the Kazakh CP Central Committee on the Balkhash city party organization, sent by the Central Committee Secretariat on taking measures to eliminate the serious shortcomings and neglect found in it. In the year and a half since this, the work of only one party commission at the Agadyrskiy party raykom on the given question has been studied. At the same time certain party commissions are doing poor work; they do not study in-depth the reasons for the breaches by the communists. Meanwhile, analysis of disciplinary practice shows that the majority of the personal cases came about as a result of their violation of party and state discipline, criminal actions, waste, mismanagement, bribe-taking, moral decay, drunkenness and hooliganism.

Certain party committees are still making a practice of punishing communists while by-passing the primary party organizations; moreover, their decisions are not made public. This applies especially to the Dzhezkazgan gorkom, the Agadyrskiy and Ulytauskiy party raykoms, and the party committee of "Dzhezkazgantsvetmet," the Dzhezkazgan Scientific-Industrial Association. Occasionally, in examining breaches by communists, unscrupulousness and indulgence is displayed. A liberal attitude toward violators of discipline is especially characteristic of many primary party organizations. During a three-year period, 119 persons were expelled from the CPSU by virtue of overturning their decisions by gorkoms raykoms and other party committees. In some places the period for examination of personal cases is dragged out. Illustrative of this was the case of V.S. Andreyeva, former bookkeeper at the Dzhezkazgan High-Voltage Electrical Circuitry Enterprise. She had not paid her party dues since 1982, failed to provide the party the address of her new place of work, and in effect severed her contacts with the party. However, it was not until 1989 that the Dzhezkazgan party gorkom decided the question of her party membership; that is, seven years later.

Work with communists who have received party reprimands is at a low level, and their role is in a number of cases diminished. The Karazhal party gorkom not only took a liberal attitude toward the drunken, rowdy behavior of N. Ya. Korolev, chief of Special Mining Construction Administration No 4; scarcely 18 months later it also lifted two reprimands from him on the eve of the city party conference, where he was chosen a candidate for membership on the gorkom.

The session noted that the party control commission at the party obkom often fails to delve into the substance of the control activities of gorkom and raykom party commissions on examining cases of accepting persons for party membership, and also ignores other tasks they are to decide. The work of party commissions at the Dzhezkazgan and Balkhash gorkoms and the Dzhesdinskiy party raykom does not come up to the standards of perestroyka. The observed shortcomings and lack of initiative by the party commissions are a result of poor leadership by the party committees.

The obkom and certain party gorkoms and raykoms are not devoting proper attention to strengthening the organs of party control with experienced and principled cadres. Incompetent people who lack initiative, people who have not proven themselves in other sectors of work, are at times recommended as chairmen of party commissions. K.G. Aysin, former party commission chairman at the Balkhash party gorkom, was such a person. But instead of beefing up this commission, the party obkom approved as its chairman V.G. Litvinov, lifting from him a severe reprimand due to his actions as first secretary of the Priozerskiy party raykom in misusing his official position and serious blunders in his work. The resolution on this matter described Litvinov as unprincipled, inert, indecisive, careless, and incapable of working with people.

Since 1985, the party commission chairmen at the Dzhezkazgan party gorkom have been replaced every year. Training of party control cadres is poorly organized, and the experiences of the best of them are not studied and assimilated.

The session indicated the necessity for major improvements in all aspects of the activity of the party control commission at the Dzhezkazgan party obkom; beefing up its influence over the state of affairs in the party organizations, and strengthening its discipline and state of organization. Emphasis was placed on systematically ensuring timely and objective examination of appeals, and stepping up work on party rehabilitation of persons groundlessly repressed in the 1930-1940 period and in the early 1950's.

The commission took cognizance of the serious shortcomings in the work of V.V. Vorobyev. His statement was taken into consideration, that the party control commission at the party obkom would reach the proper conclusions from the discussion; that the shortcomings and neglect exposed would be eliminated; and that

concrete measures are planned, aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the work of all party control organs of the oblast party organization.

Comparison of Kazakh Language Law

905A0017A

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 28 September 1989 carries on page 1 the "Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on Languages in the Kazakh SSR." Comparison of this version with draft law carried in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA on 22 August 1989, which appeared in JPRS-UPA-89-063, dated 5 December 1989, reveals the following variations:

Section I, Article 2, paragraph one, first sentence reads: "The Russian language will be the language of inter-ethnic communication in the Kazakh SSR" (changing word order and providing alternate translation); second sentence corresponds to earlier paragraph two and reads: "The Kazakh SSR will guarantee the free functioning of the Russian language on the same level as the state language" (providing alternate translation);

Article 2, paragraph two reads: "A knowledge of the Russian language will correspond to the vital interests of members of all nationalities in the republic" (adding new paragraph);

Article 3, paragraph one, and Article 4, paragraph one substitute "...languages of national groups..." for "...languages of other ethnic and national groups...";

Article 5, paragraph one substitutes "...development of national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism..." for "...development of bilingualism..."; omits second paragraph;

Section II, Article 8, paragraph one substitutes "...Kazakh language, the Russian language, and the languages of national groups..." for "...Kazakh language, as well as the language of inter-ethnic communication and the languages of ethnic and national groups...";

Article 9, paragraph two reads: "...local official language, depending on the language customarily used in legal proceedings in the region" (adding all words following comma);

Articles 12-33 correspond to articles 13-34 in earlier version, omitting earlier Article 12 about official correspondence;

Article 13, paragraph one, and Article 14, paragraph one substitute "...in the Kazakh or Russian languages or in the language..." for "...in the state language, in the language of inter-ethnic communication, or in the language...";

Article 14, paragraph two reads: "...language of the proceedings, will be provided with an interpreter" (omitting "if necessary");

Article 16, paragraph one reads: "Employees of organs of governmental power and administration, law enforcement agencies, social security agencies, institutions of public education, culture, and health, enterprises in trade, consumer services, communications, transportation, municipal services, and the communication and news media will greet citizens and speak with them in the language in which they are addressed, and as the appropriate conditions are established, will master the Kazakh and Russian languages, and in locations..." (omitting reference to administrators, changing punctuation, and providing alternate translation);

Article 16, paragraph two reads: "With a view to the prospects for a higher level of professional training and education in the Kazakh, Russian, and other languages, provisions should be made for a maximally objective, sequential, and strictly differentiated personnel hiring and certification procedure with a mandatory emphasis on the professional, moral, and political qualities of employees" (adding new paragraph);

Article 17, paragraph one substitutes "...and administration, enterprises, establishments, and social organizations will encourage and secure, with the aid of budget allocations and the personal funds of enterprises, the study of..." for "...and administration will secure the conditions for the study of...";

Section III, Article 19, paragraph one reads: "In general educational schools, vocational and technical..." (omitting "and" after comma); substitutes "...Kazakh and Russian languages will be required subjects..." for "...Kazakh language will be a required subject..."; substitutes "... (for the completion of the full course of study)" for "... (secondary school certificate and diploma from secondary specialized and higher academic institution)";

Article 20, paragraph two substitutes "...examinations in languages will be determined by the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Education" for "...examinations in Kazakh and Russian languages will be determined by the academic institution"; paragraph three omitted;

Article 21, paragraph one ends: "...languages of other national groups" (omitting references to ethnic groups and population density);

Article 22, paragraph one reads: "...in the Kazakh, Russian, or other language..." (adding "Russian");

Article 22, paragraph two ends: "...of the USSR Council of Ministers in the Russian language" (omitting phrase following "language");

Article 25, paragraph one ends: "...pedagogical personnel and the establishment of the necessary material and technical base" (adding all words following "personnel");

Section IV, Article 29, paragraph two begins: "The text of forms, signs..." (adding "forms"); substitutes "...other national groups..." for "...other ethnic and national groups...";

Article 29, paragraph five substitutes "...transmitted in the Kazakh and Russian languages" for "...transmitted first in the state language and then in the language of inter-ethnic communication";

Article 34 begins "Section VI. Support, Enactment, and Enforcement of Law" (new section heading);

Articles 34 and 35 correspond to earlier articles 36 and 38 of Section V, omitting earlier articles 35 and 37;

Article 34, paragraph one reads: "The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers will be responsible for providing the personnel, material and technical supplies, financial resources, and instructional-procedural materials required for the enactment of the provisions of this law" (providing alternate translation);

Adds signatures of Chairman of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium M. Sagdiyev and Secretary of Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. Zhusupov and place and date: Alma-Ata, 22 September 1989.

Tajik Supreme Soviet Presidium Announcement on Elections

90US0437A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 1

[TadzhikTA report: "Announcement by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium On the Results of Elections to the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Tajik SSR 21st Convocation"]

[Text] Elections to local Tajik SSR Soviets of People's Deputies of the 21st Convocation were held on 24 December 1984.

The balloting was conducted in full compliance with the requirements of the Tajik SSR Constitution and the law of the Tajik SSR "On the Election of Deputies to the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Tajik SSR."

Elections were held for a total of 443 Soviets of People's Deputies, including two oblast soviets, one soviet in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBO), 39 rayon soviets, 19 city soviets, 4 urban rayon soviets in Dushanbe, 48 soviets in settlements, and 330 soviets in rural kishlaks.

Of the total number of persons on election rolls, the following cast their votes: 1,472,226 or 94.50 percent in oblast elections; 75,429 or 99.58 percent in the GBO; 1,373,021 or 95.07 percent in the rayons; 892,524 or 85.49 percent in city soviet elections; 254,821 or 75.03 percent in Dushanbe; 208,452 or 90.59 percent in the

settlements; and 1,453,072 or 95.38 percent in the kishlaks.

Election results for the candidates that were selected to run are as follows:

	Votes For Candidates		Votes Against Candidates		Elected
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Soviets					
Oblast	778,387	52.87	424,772	28.85	294
GBAO	51,988	68.92	22,252	28.50	74
Rayon	914,647	66.62	417,373	30.40	1,906
Urban Rayon	512,305	57.40	238,042	26.67	1,297
Dushanbe	133,415	52.36	60,996	23.94	325
Settlement	127,292	61.07	59,453	28.52	1,358
Kishlak	1,016,215	69.94	369,949	25.46	9,746

Fifteen thousand deputies in all were elected to Tajik SSR Soviets of People's Deputies. Among them, 3,315 or 22.1 percent are blue-collar workers and 2,902 or 19.3 percent kolkhoz workers, totaling 6,217 workers or 41.43 percent; 6,873 or 45.8 percent are members of the CPSU; 1,304 or 8.7 percent are members of the All-Union Komsomol; 2,595 or 17.3 percent are women; and 2,490 or 16.6 percent are under 30 years of age. The proportion of new deputies in the soviets is 69.76 percent.

Under the provisions of Article 52 of the Tajik SSR Election Law, repeat elections must be held in 507 voting districts where votes were cast for more than two candidates and no one of them was elected.

In compliance with Article 53 of the Election Law, repeat elections will be held in 11 districts where elections were declared invalid, in 51 districts where results were inconclusive, and in 806 districts where one or more candidates for office failed to receive the required number of votes.

Tajik CP CC Buro Report on Crime, Navruz Holiday

90US0437B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 1

[TadzhikTA report: "In the Tajik CP CC Buro"]

[Text] At its regular session on 27 December, the Buro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan considered taking additional measures to check once and for all practices of account-padding and fraud. It was recognized that in spite of measures taken previously, the underlying causal conditions of fraud and deceptive practices by Soviet organs as well as republic ministries and departments have yet to be eliminated. The amount and scale of the falsification of official accounts continues to be of considerable proportions at organizations and enterprises within the agro-industrial complex, Gosstroy, and the ministries of light industry and consumer services, as well as in Khatlon and Leninabad oblasts, in Dushanbe, and in Fayzabadskiy Rayon.

There is serious cause for concern over the reliability of reporting practices in the field of capital construction,

where the practice of padding accounts persists in the building of industrial facilities and projects in the social sphere. Instances of fraud continue to occur in the areas of motor vehicle transport, paid public services, trade, and municipal services.

The Buro noted further specific shortcomings in law enforcement, reflecting a failure to fully carry out the measures required to cope with violations of this kind.

The resolution on this subject outlines specific steps needed to eliminate the conditions that give rise to account-padding and fraud. Obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms are instructed to thoroughly review each instance of these practices. The purpose is to raise the standards required of communists and managers and thereby improve organizational accountability and the discipline of state accounting practices.

In the course of reviewing ways to step up the campaign to curb criminal practices, the meeting endorsed the proposal of the Interim Committee to Combat Crime to establish during 1990 a local militia in Dushanbe through the the local soviets of people's deputies together with the enterprises and organizations. It is proposed to include in this body all services presently in operation with the exception of the criminal investigation services and OBKhSS [department of defense against speculation and misappropriation of socialist property]. The proposal underscores the necessity of establishing within the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs a special detachment of militia designed to deal promptly with all kinds of mass disturbances of public order.

The resolution adopted recommends that the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers Supreme Soviet Presidium take the additional measures required to provide for a stepped-up campaign to combat crime.

With regard to the activities of the courts, the Buro considered it advisable to try to upgrade the selection of candidates for judicial work in order to attract better representatives of labor collectives and the public. Party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms were advised to undertake jointly with the Tajik SSR Ministry of Justice the measures necessary in terms of party political, propaganda, and agitation efforts to safeguard democratic

principles and glasnost during the period of preparing for and conducting the election campaign for judges and public assessors.

The Buro reviewed the outcome of the republic socialist competition for the successful wintering of livestock and for increasing production and deliveries in livestock farming during the period from October 1988 through July 1989. The Tadzhikselkhozvodoprovodstroy design and construction association and Rushanskiy, Vakhshskiy, Zafarobodskiy, and Gissarskiy rayons were recognized as the winners. In addition, the collectives of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, industrial enterprises, organizations, and other institutions winning the competition in each oblast and group of rayons of republic subordination were designated. It was deemed appropriate to continue the republic competition through the winter of 1989-1990. A resolution to this effect will be published.

The Buro also endorsed measures to comply with criticism and proposals directed at the departments of the republic CP Central Committee and republic organizations at the 15th Plenum of the Tajikistan CP Central Committee in the resolution entitled "On Practical Steps to Implement in the Republic the Decisions of the September 1989 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Regarding National Party Policy Under Present-Day Conditions."

A ukase in draft form by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium calling for the elimination of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Domestic Services and the establishment in its place of the Khizmat Concern for the purpose of converting to cost-efficient methods of managing the economy was approved.

A proposal by the republic Union of Writers for celebrating in May 1991 the 80th anniversary of the birth of M. Tursun-zade, the Tajik poet, Hero of Socialist Labor and winner of the Lenin Prize and USSR State Prize, was supported. The Buro also approved the composition of the republic committee for organizing and conducting the anniversary celebrations.

The decision was made to declare 21 March a non-working day on the occasion of the Navruz holiday, and it was suggested that the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers should make some Sunday a working day.

Other matters pertaining to party leadership of the economic and social development of the republic were also reviewed at this session of the CP Central Committee Buro.

Tajik SSR Presidium Ukase Abolishes Public Services Ministry

90US0503A Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 5 Jan 90 p 1

[Ukase of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On Abolishing the Tajik SSR Ministry of Domestic Services to the Public"]

[Text] In order to improve the system of administering the national economy, make the transition to economic methods of managing associations and enterprises, and further improve domestic services being rendered to the public, as well as in connection with the formation of the Tajik republic-level concern entitled "Khizmat," based on the Tajik SSR Ministry of Domestic Services to the Public, the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium hereby decrees the following:

1. That the Tajik SSR Ministry of Domestic Services to the Public shall be abolished.
2. In connection with Article 1, the words "Ministry of Domestic Services to the Public" shall be eliminated from Article 25 of the Law of the Tajik SSR on the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

G. PALLAYEV, chairman, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

A. KASYMOVA, secretary, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

3 January 1990,

City of Dushanbe.

Tajik CP Central Committee on Socioeconomic Development

90US0503B Dushanbe *KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "In the Bureau of the Tajik CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The regularly scheduled session of the Bureau of the Tajik SSR CP Central Committee examined the issue of serious shortcomings in the work of recruiting, selecting, deploying, and training personnel in the central apparatus of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. A decree was adopted regarding the problem under discussion. It noted that the checkup which was conducted by a commission consisting of members and candidate members of the Tajik CP Central Committee has revealed serious shortcomings with regard to personnel work in the central apparatus of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The collegium, political department, and partkom of this ministry have frequently manifested a lack of principles and a superficial approach in solving personnel problems. As a result, there are cases whereby the central apparatus has accepted persons with inferior businesslike, political, and moral qualities, and even staff associates who have been fined. Moreover, facts have come to light concerning the selection of personnel by the central apparatus in accordance with the principles of protection, relatives, and coming from the same geographical area. Quite a few persons without prospects and incompetent staff members are employed particularly in the services of the BKhSS [Struggle Against Theft of Socialist Property and Profiteering], the GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate], and safety regulations. There is a great

deal of formalism in working with reserve personnel and in conducting their certification. Thus, for example, there are too many instances of persons being nominated for leadership positions who have not been in the reserves. Nor is there any precise system for winnowing out candidates for studying at the USSR Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Sometimes staff members have been sent there at random, persons who are not prepared for independent supervisory work. And, as a rule, after completing their studies, they are not entrusted with responsible positions.

The process of democratization and glasnost is having a hard time of it in the sub-divisions and services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Not enough is being done here to raise the overall cultural standards of the staff members. There are instances of self-conceit, crudeness, and a soulless attitude toward citizens.

One of the reasons for such a situation with regard to personnel work is the lack of a precisely coordinated point of view on the part of the leadership in the political department and the partkom of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The political department of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has been extremely remiss in the task of enhancing the personal, individual responsibility of the leading officials in the administrations and services of this ministry's apparatus for the quality of the personnel, for their ideological and moral tempering, and their professional standards.

The ministry's partkom takes the position of an observer on the sidelines; it does not provide a principled evaluation of the existing facts concerning the recruitment, selection, deployment, and training of personnel. The demand and requirements expected of communists for their specific contribution to the cause of perestroyka have been slackened.

All this is exerting a negative influence on the moral-psychological climate, as well as on the service activity of the subordinate organs. As a result, for the republic as a whole, the efficiency of preventive and operational work has remained unsatisfactory, the solved-crime rate has become worse, and there has been no reduction in the number of violations of socialist legality and discipline among the personnel staff of the police.

The bureau acknowledged that the work regarding the recruitment, selection, deployment, and training of personnel has been unsatisfactory. It pointed out that the collegium of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs has manifested a lack of principles in a number of cases in deciding the ministry's personnel matters. The bureau drew attention to A.Kh. Khabibov, chief of the political department of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and to K.V. Kosenko, the partkom secretary, for their serious shortcomings and lack of the necessary strict requirements with regard to leading officials who are communists, as well as for their slack work with personnel and the liberalism allowed them in this matter. Furthermore, the bureau demanded that the collegium, the political department, and

Minister M. Navzhuvanov personally adopt urgent measures to eliminate the shortcomings involved. They must elevate the principles and requirements in the matter of recruiting, selecting, deploying, and training personnel.

The bureau examined the results of the elections to this republic's local Soviets of People's Deputies. The decree which was adopted draws the attention of the party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms, as well as that of the primary party organizations to the need for activating work connected with ensuring the preparation and conduct of elections of Tajik SSR people's deputies. Such elections constitute an important step toward implementing the political reform directed at renovating and strengthening the Soviets as organs of true people's power. At the same time, however, this document notes that in the newly elected local Soviets there is an insufficient representation of workers, kolkhoz members, women, Komsomol members, and young persons, as well as other social groups. The bureau obligated the communists who were elected to membership, in the republic-level, okrug, and district electoral commissions for the elections of Tajik SSR people's deputies to utilize their activity to facilitate a rigorous observance of the new Election Law.

The bureau adopted a decree regarding the contents of the work to be done by republic-level courses for upgrading the skills of party, Soviet, and ideological personnel of the Tajik CP Central Committee. It assigned to the leading officials in charge of the course, the department of organizational-party, and personnel work, and the Central Committee's Administration of Affairs the task of adopting the necessary measures for eliminating the above-noted shortcomings, for upgrading the quality and deepening the contents of the educational process.

The bureau acknowledged the need to considerably strengthen the teaching staff from among the responsible officials of the Central Committee apparatus, the Institute of Party History under the Tajik CP Central Committee, as well as scholars and leading officials of the ministries and departments, leading enterprises, and the creative intelligentsia, who have experience in working with people. The bureau recommended that the work of the teaching-methods council be put in order. The bureau obligated the obkoms and the Dushanbe party gorkom to constantly conduct an effective study of the freed-up secretaries of the primary party organizations, recruiting from among them educational groups in accordance with the sectorial principle.

The bureau examined and approved a statistical report concerning the composition of the republic-level party organization as of 1 January 1990 and the results of acceptances into the party during 1989.

The results of subscriptions to newspapers and journals in the current year were summed up.

Also examined at this bureau session were other issues of party leadership concerning this republic's leadership in the field of socioeconomic development.

Tajik Press Conference Cites Progress, Problems in Earthquake Reconstruction

90US0503C Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 20 Jan 90 p 2

[TadzhikTA report: "Gissar One Year After the Tragedy"]

[Text] The date 23 January marks the first anniversary of the memorable events in Gissar, events which have become part of the record of the world's catastrophes and tragedies. What has been accomplished during this elapsed time to reconstruct the devastated settlements? What kinds of aid have been rendered to those 30,000 persons who were made homeless and without shelter? What lessons has this republic's government drawn from what happened? The answers to these and many other questions were at the center of attention of participants in the press conference which was held in the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers for staff members of the republic- and union-level mass media. It was opened by I.Kh. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers.

"The news of this misfortune resounded like a sharp pain in the hearts of millions of people," the head of this republic's government stated. "Rescue and reconstruction operations got underway literally on that very same day. A special decree of the USSR Council of Ministers earmarked 50 million rubles to eliminate the consequences of this earthquake. Also allocated were additional material and technical resources, consumer goods, medicines, and medical equipment. A movement of compassion arose, as a result of which the country's labor collectives, public organizations, and individual citizens sent 18,124,000 rubles in contributions. Moreover, 109,000 rubles were sent in from abroad, including 93,500 in freely convertible currency.

"These funds were channeled into organizing food and medical services, as well as paying for incoming carts, shepherds' huts, yurts, tents, and deliveries of other items. They also were used to pay for the restoration of utilities, the construction and reconstruction of health-care and public-education institutions and other facilities. At the present time 5.1 million rubles remain in the account. As regards the "hard" currency, it has been set aside to obtain medical equipment for the rayon-level hospital which is now under construction in Gissar.

"All the families who suffered have been given one-time, ad hoc monetary assistance and have been paid insurance benefits for the destruction and damage to their structures, as well as for their losses of other belongings. The total amount paid out for these purposes came to 13 million rubles. Payments continue to be made as residents are resettled from emergency housing.

"The Gissarstroy Planning and Construction Association was created in the disaster zone by decision of the government," Izatullo Khayevich continued. "And use is being made here of the forces of this republic's specialized construction sub-divisions of the Ministry of Highways and Roads, the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water

Resources, the Ministry of Residential Public Utilities, Gosagroprom, the Ministry of Communications, the Tadzhikenergo and Tadzhikselkhozvodoprovodstroy production associations, and others. Fraternal participation in these operations has been engaged in not only by elements from all of Tajikistan's regions, but also by those from other union republics. For example, our neighbors from Surkhandarinsk Oblast, working together with their Tajik colleagues, have erected an up-to-date settlement which has been named "Uzbekistan." Five new, well-laid-out settlements continue to be built in the Gissar zone. Housewarmings have already been celebrated here in 511 apartments with a total living space of 47,000 square meters. And 561 houses have been erected by individual builders.

"New stores, dining facilities, and pre-school institutions have likewise been constructed; new roads and electric-power lines have been laid.

"On the whole, 93.8 million rubles have been spent to eliminate the consequences of the earthquake; this figure includes 80 million rubles of capital investments.

"Unfortunately, the course of operations has been delayed by shortfalls in the delivery of material and technical resources allocated to this republic by decision of the USSR Council of Ministers for the purpose of eliminating the consequences of the earthquake. In particular, there have been shortfalls in the delivery of a considerable amount of cement, lumber, DSP [wood-chip slabs], structural and ordinary-quality steel, as well as pipes of various diameter. Therefore, the government of this republic has redistributed some of the resources which had previously been earmarked for the city of Dushanbe, and Khatlonsk and Leninabad oblasts," I. Kh. Khayeyev stated.

It was noted at the press conference that the completed work had facilitated the normalization of the socio-economic situation in the disaster zone.

The following persons also participated in the press conference and gave detailed responses to questions from the journalists: O. Latifi, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers; G. Kasymov, first secretary of the Gissar Party Raykom, and Dzh. Mansurov, chairman of the Gissar Rayispolkom.

(TadzhikTA) [Tajik News Agency]

Tajik Union of Lawyers Elects Chairman, Forms 7 Commissions

90US0503D Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Plus Seven Commissions"]

[Text] A session of the Tajik SSR Union of Lawyers Central Council was held, and it examined organizational matters. It elected the Presidium of the Central

Council and a presidium chairman—N.Kh. Khuvaydulayev, chief of the State-Law Department of the Tajik CP Central Committee, and chairman of the Union of Lawyers.

The Central Council formed the following seven permanent commissions: on preparing proposals for improving legislation; on matters of applying the law and preserving the law; on organizational-charter matters, legal propaganda, and universal legal education; on matters of social and legal protection of lawyers, etc.

A plan was approved for the principal measures to be carried out in 1990.

This same session of the Tajik SSR Union of Lawyers Central Council nominated as a candidate for the office of Tajik SSR people's deputy Ashurboy Imamov—deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Union of Lawyers and deputy dean of the Law School of the TGU [Tajik State University] imeni V.I. Lenin.

Turkmen SSR Preelection Issues Examined

90US0377A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Dec 89 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with B. Otchertsov, chief of department for organizational and party and cadre work, Turkmen CP Central Committee, by correspondent M. Volkov: "Toward the Elections"]

Not in the Silence of Offices

[Text] The preparation for elections to the republic supreme and local soviets, planned for 7 January, is taking place in a calm, practical atmosphere in Turkmenia. This is explained to a great extent by the business-like participation in the election campaign of the same "apparatchiks" whom we, it seems, have not yet tired of carelessly criticizing. Our PRAVDA correspondent met with B. Otchertsov, chief of the department for organizational and party and cadre work of the Turkmen CP Central Committee, and asked him to answer a few questions. The first is: How was the nomination of candidates to republic and local soviets; were there problems or difficulties?

[Otchertsov] Above all, I would like to say that the nomination of candidates took place directly in the labor collectives, not in the silence of offices. Sharp discussions were held in the collectives concerning the candidacies of the claimants and their programs. In this regard, we did not keep anyone from standing up for his position. The people themselves examined to whom to give preference. Nonetheless, I will not conceal that we did help the communists orient themselves in the situation and, perhaps, that is why no problems arose on ethnic grounds and not a single of the numerous ethnic groups has been insulted at this stage. This time, we expected somewhat more candidates to be nominated

from among the creative and scientific intelligentsia. And so it turned out: about 60 percent of the candidates have a higher education.

It should be noted that, strange though it may seem, our work was far easier in this preelection campaign. Why? The socioeconomic situation that has taken shape in the republic, apparently, contributed to this. The growth rates for national income have increased considerably, and social problems are being solved fairly well. Suffice it to say that, compared to the last 5-year period, the amount of residential housing commissioned has increased by one-third, the construction of kindergartens and schools is greater by a factor of almost 2, and that of hospitals—almost 3. The population is being steadily provided with basic foods and goods of prime necessity.

The moral atmosphere has also become far cleaner. The development of glasnost and democracy is of great help in this, along with the decisive renovation of the party and leading corps. Today, not a single leader is appointed from above. The party organizations and labor collectives have received the opportunity to elect their own leaders independently. Recently, the TuSSR Supreme Soviet deputies even elected the republic council of ministers chairman, based on the principle of alternatives—from three candidates—by secret ballot. The entire republic discussed the candidates' programs, published in the local newspapers, for 2 weeks before the session. Kh. Akhmedov, an energetic, exigent person and, incidentally, a former party official, became head of the government.

The preelection campaign demonstrated the growing authority of the republic communist party. Judge for yourselves: 78.2 percent of the nominees are communists, and one-tenth of them are party officials. True, the basic struggle lies ahead, since the elections will be held on the basis of principles of alternatives in all okrugs.

What is alarming? Among the nominated candidates, including to the TuSSR Supreme Soviet, there are people whose reputation is not beyond reproach and some who achieved nomination by relying on the support of numerous relatives or demagogically speculating on well-known problems. There are not many of these, but they do exist. Characteristically, they are all nominated by place of residence. Thus, our shortcomings are clearly illuminated: with great difficulty, we are directing the most ossified organizational structures toward work with people and at places of residence.

[Correspondent] Did the new Law on Elections play a positive role, and how were its shortcomings telling?

[Otchertsov] I should immediately stipulate that the republic Supreme Soviet studied the experience from the elections of USSR people's deputies, as well as all the pluses and minuses of other republics' draft laws on elections. Our law, understandably, is not beyond reproach, but, as the first stage of the election campaign has shown, the new legislation is yet another step toward

democratizing the election system. So, social organizations are now participating in the elections, according to territorial okrugs, on common and absolutely equal grounds.

The republic legislation also calls for holding okrug preelection meetings, although these are not popular with the people and are associated with a kind of filter for weeding out inconvenient candidates. In discussion of the draft law, I myself spoke out against holding these meetings, but the decision was made. It is comforting that "called for" does not at all mean "mandatory." I believe that the deputies of the new soviets will think about that after the elections.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what have the primary party organizations succeeded in doing in the preelection campaign, and what new things have been introduced in it?

[Otchertsov] For the first time, the republic party organization entered the preelection struggle with its own platform of actions. It was drafted and passed openly. They proceeded from a firm conviction: The people should be persuaded that the republic communist party lives by their interests and needs, and acts for the further intensification of restructuring and the revival of the Leninist interpretation of soviets as the agencies of popular power. We intended the party committee platform for the elections to be a basis for uniting all healthy forces.

Serious attention was devoted to forecasting the election processes and studying public opinion. With the help of scientists and specialists, surveys and polls were made of different categories of voters. Time has shown that such preparatory work is useful. The party organizations have succeeded without a hitch in being included in the preelection campaign. On the whole, they are mastering the situation and correcting actions in a sufficiently timely manner. However, a certain fear of debating with opponents is observed, for example, in Kazandzhikskiy and Darganatinskiy rayons and in the city of Chardzhoy.

[Correspondent] How do you see the further preelection struggle and the place of communists in it?

[Otchertsov] I think that the heating of passions, sharpness, and competitiveness inherent in the first stage of the election campaign will not weaken, but constantly grow. In our opinion, this is entirely normal, but we must be ready to act in such a politically charged atmosphere. The main task is to ensure the election of people to the soviets who are capable of advancing restructuring.

Turkmen Supsov Presidium Chairman on Republic Problems

90US0377B Ashkabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 20 Dec 89 p 2

[Speech by deputy R.A. Bazarovoy, chairman, TuSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Kunya-Urgenchskiy National-Territorial Electoral Okrug, TuSSR)]

[Text] Respected comrade deputies! In continuing the discussion that began at the plenary conference yesterday, I would like, above all, to say that, in evaluating the USSR Council of Ministers report, we should not reduce to naught all the measures stipulated for improving the economy. I think the USSR Council of Ministers report has outlined broad steps to bring the country out of a serious position. However, it is another matter that the individual clauses of the draft program require refinement and further development, taking specific regional features into account. One of the main problems, on the solution of which depends the growth in standard of living and well-being for the people of the entire Central Asian region, including Turkmenia, is solving the population employment problem. However, the program for improving the economy, including the 13th 5-Year Plan, does not stipulate centralized measures to solve this problem. One-fifth of the republic's able-bodied population is not employed in the sphere of social production. The low level of employment has led to serious social consequences. Virtually one-third of republic residents have an aggregate income of up to 75 rubles a month.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that production intensification and the introduction of new methods for economic management inevitably entails reducing the number of workers. Thus, the sectorial interests require decreasing the number of jobs, but regional interests require creating new ones.

Moreover, an investment policy in favor of substantially reducing capital investments in industrial production is now being reconsidered. Reducing the construction of projects of a production purpose, as well as imposing a tax on new construction sites, entail a reduction of the number of construction workers and halts the creation of new jobs.

A significant part of the population of Turkmenia and of all Central Asia, which is not participating in social production, is deprived in fact of the most important social guarantee—implementing their right to work. Therefore, we believe that the country should have a unified state policy for employing the population. Its implementation should be entrusted to the USSR Gosplan and USSR Goskomtrud, since it is impossible to solve this task through the forces of a few republics alone.

We repeatedly raised the question that, along with the construction of large enterprises in raw material regions, we must develop small industries in labor-intensive sectors: branches of Union enterprises.

Here, the creation of a highly developed cotton fabric industry is of particular significance, since cotton is the republic's leading agricultural crop. The solution to this problem is not only of economic, but also political significance. Enterprises in the cotton fabric industry, created jointly with the Russian Federation and other

Union republics, will work to further reinforce the interethnic friendship of peoples.

I especially want to emphasize that additional guarantees of employment should be established for socially unprotected population groups, such as graduates of general educational schools and women who have children.

Local soviets should be granted the right to establish protection for these categories of the population and to levy fines against those who do not fulfill the instructions of the local bodies of power.

We believe that the proposed measures will enable us, in brief time periods, to substantially lower the level of social tension related to unemployment.

Let me focus attention on another problem as well. We support the statements made by a number of deputies that the system of state orders on the whole is still imperfect.

The Turkmen republic, for example, received a 100-percent state order for the basic types of exportable production, which included petroleum processing and cotton fiber production. Natural gas, while not regulated by state order, is also practically 100-percent state order, due to the specific nature of its transportation.

Along with production that is delivered to the republic, somewhat less than 100 percent is covered by state order. This puts us in an unequal position. In our opinion, the level of state orders should be set for all types of production. Some have suggested setting it at 70-80 percent, but I believe 90 percent to be the most rational. The remaining 10 percent could form a commodity market to balance material and technical supply.

In the system of proposed measures on the country's socioeconomic improvement, a special place is reserved for developing the agroindustrial complex. We entirely support the principles and approaches to solving this problem set forth in Comrade Ryzhkov's report and Comrade Ligachev's speech. In the plan for the 13th 5-year period, the priority growth of the food sector in the republic is stipulated: intensive development of grain farming and the production of vegetables and melons.

However, the implementation of these structural changes is closely related to the water management situation in the republic, especially in the Aral rayons and Tashkent Oblast. When we speak of solving the problems of the Aral area, of course, we are referring to Kara-Kalpakia. I should say that Tashauz Oblast and especially its northern rayons—Oktyabrskiy and Kunya-Urgenchskiy (from whence I myself was elected USSR people's deputy)—in fact, in terms of ecology and the population's standard of living, do not differ at all either from Kara-Kalpakia, or from Khorezm. Regardless of the passing of the well-known government resolution on the Aral and our repeated appeals to the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Questions of Ecology and Rational Use of Natural

Resources, and the USSR Goskomtrud with a request to examine the problems of increasing the population's standard of living, raising the standard of farming, and improving the ecological situation, inadequate measures are being taken for the time being. We must turn again to the examination of these problems, having listed the questions of medical service for the population of Tashauz Oblast in a special column and taking this into account in forming the 13th 5-Year Plan.

I would like to note two more elements. The social tension in society is fairly high, and therefore any steps which harm the interests of the working people, albeit even temporary, may not always be correctly understood. We share the opinion that monetary reform and a ration card system may give impetus to a supercharging of tension in society. We need a cautious and well-considered approach here.

We support the proposal to review the time periods for implementing a comprehensive reform of the system for wholesale, purchase, and retail prices, to begin its implementation as of the second half of 1990, and to be entirely completed in 1991. Prolonging this to a greater time period will not give us an opportunity to fully develop and implement radical economic reform. A price-setting reform will enable us to more rapidly establish a real system of inter-republic and inter-regional economic interrelations under conditions of regional cost-accounting.

On the whole approving of the program proposed by the government, we ask the people's deputies to take our suggestions into account.

Plenum Meeting of Turkmen SSR Supreme Court

90US0377C Ashkabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 3

[Article: "Turkmen SSR Supreme Court Plenum"]

[Text] The regular plenum of the republic Supreme Court, chaired by N.M. Yusupov, Turkmen SSR Supreme Court chairman, was held.

The plenum examined the question of fulfillment by republic courts of legislation and of the guiding interpretations of the USSR Supreme Court Plenum in prosecuting cases of premeditated murder.

The plenum noted that the republic courts are basically applying the legislation correctly in resolving cases of this category.

Along with this, serious shortcomings and errors were revealed in the practice of the courts. Often, the courts prosecute a case for which the preliminary investigation is not fully finished.

In setting punishment, individual courts insufficiently take the seriousness and public danger of the crime or the personality data of the accused into account, in connection with which they groundlessly set mild punishments.

In this regard, the courts are not considering the commission of a crime in a state of intoxication to be an aggravating circumstance.

The plenum directed the courts' attention to the fact that, in recent years, the number of premeditated murders in the republic has increased sharply, in connection with which the courts must take all necessary steps to strengthen the struggle against this crime.

The plenum also examined the judicial practice of applying housing legislation in the republic.

The resolution that was passed noted that strict observance of legislation is an important guarantee of the citizens' constitutional right to housing and of protecting the interests of state agencies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations in the area of housing relations.

In accordance with the USSR Law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR," the plenum elected a qualified collegium for the TuSSR Supreme Court, which included the most qualified judges, capable of determining the degree of candidate judges' readiness for judicial work.

The qualified collegium will promote the expansion of democratic principles in the selection and placement of judicial cadres, the nomination of worthy candidates for judicial work, and strengthening the guarantees of judges' independence, of legality in the activity of justice agencies, and of defense of the interests of society and individual citizens.

The plenum considered the prosecutor's protests on cases relating to people, groundlessly repressed in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s. The overwhelming majority of them were convicted on the charge of carrying out anti-Soviet agitation. The plenum acknowledged that, since the statements of the condemned did not contain appeals for the overthrow, undermining, or weakening of Soviet power, the criminal cases in regard to their prosecution are closed and the convicts are rehabilitated.

L.V. Belousov, head of administration, USSR Ministry of Justice, and V. Vasilyuk, TuSSR prosecutor, spoke at the plenum conference.

Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Mirkasymov Profiled

90US0429A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 25, p 11

[Interview with Mirakhmat Mirkhadzhiyevich Mirkasymov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, by TASS special correspondent S. Fenyutin: "Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers Chairman Mirakhmat Mirkhadzhiyevich Mirkasymov"]

[Text] BIOGRAPHICAL PAGES. [Mirakhmat Mirkhadzhiyevich Mirkasymov] was born in 1941. He is an Uzbek and a CPSU member. He graduated from Tashkent Polytechnical Institute with a specialty in mechanical engineering. He began his work activity in 1962 as a design bureau

engineer. He has been engaged in party work since 1973, working as an instructor, sector chief of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, and chief of the heavy industry section of the Tashkent party obkom. In 1984 he was elected first secretary of the Alma Ata gorkom and in 1986, the first secretary of the Khorezm party obkom. Since September of 1988 he has headed up the Tashkent oblast party organization. He is a USSR people's deputy and member of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee bureau.

[Mirkasymov] I am by nature an optimist and, believing in the diligence of the Uzbek people, know that we will achieve a radical breakthrough in the republic's economy, even though its economic and financial state is today difficult. Uzbekistan, having sufficient raw material and labor resources at its disposal, is not yet able to satisfy the needs of the population in that which is most necessary. There are many problems here.

The first step toward their solution has been taken. Mark-ups have been introduced on the raw cotton which has been submitted, and the labor wage of the dekhkans has increased somewhat. Material stimulation of the labor of cotton pickers has this year helped them to get by with their own efforts. Starting next year, a stable plan for fiber procurement is being established in the volume of 1.5 billion tons. This will help to eliminate the single-crop system of the cotton growers.

...We are in every way hindering the manifestation of initiative by the workers and the spirit of healthy entrepreneurship. Here is an example. In one of the kolkhozes of Tashkent oblast they have developed what in essence is a new concept of interrelations between the producers of the raw cotton and the cotton refiners. Before it was done as follows: The kolkhoz submitted the production to the cotton factory, which determined the grade and output of fiber, and after processing settled accounts with the raw material producer. The initiators concluded an agreement with the plant for processing the cotton, and took back the fiber, seeds and all the by-products, using it in accordance with their own plans. And as a result—there has been a stable fulfillment of the state order and 60-70 additional rubles of profit from each ton of raw cotton.

[Correspondent] What economic problems in Uzbekistan require immediate solution?

[Mirkasymov] The state of affairs in Uzbekistan is complicated by a number of factors, and the main one of them is demographic. The growth rate of the population is very high. It turns out that when the country takes one step forward, we must make three—and not to surpass it, but simply to stay even. However, we are as yet unable to do this, and as a result almost 9 million people, or 45 percent of the republic's residents, have a per capita income of less than 75 rubles a month. In this connection, we are now working on a governmental program to speed up the socio-economic development of the republic in the 13th Five-Year Plan. At the same time, we are developing a state program to provide for employment of the population.

The distortions in the structure of the national economy are alarming. We understand that we cannot correct the matter in a short time, but we cannot drag our feet. This largely determines our life under conditions of self government and self financing. This is the basis on which we are building the conception of the 13th Five-Year Plan.

[Correspondent] All these problems are closely tied with improving the life of the people and with implementing in practical application of a strong social policy...

[Mirkasymov] Yes, the main thing today is to turn the economy toward the individual, toward his demands. The outline of the plan for 1990 which we introduced to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet has been developed with a decisive social re-orientation of the economy. It is aimed at raising the living standard of the people, maximally involving labor resources in social production, accelerating the realization of the housing program, and improving the supply of food products and consumer goods to the population.

[Correspondent] Please tell us about your family and your ties...

[Mirkasymov] We were raised by our mother, who is now 83 years old. Our father worked as a bookkeeper. We had a hard life, but all of us—three brothers and a sister—received a higher education. My oldest brother is an agronomist, my middle brother is a philologist, and my sister is a pedagog. My wife is a doctor. My son is a student at the institute of the national economy, and wants to be an economist, and my daughter is still going to school.

Everything I have achieved I owe to my mother, whose motto in life has been, "Do not be afraid of difficulties! And believe in people—they will not let you down". I try to live and work according to my mother's teaching.

Uzbekistan Takes Measures to Deal with Unemployment Problem

90US0412A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
30 Dec 89 p 1

Unattributed article: "Who Needs Work and What Work?"

[Text] To answer this question correctly, complete information, above all, is needed: How many people are not working in our republic? In what cities and kishlaks do these people live? Who are they—in terms of age, sex, specialization, and professional qualification?

It is precisely at the elucidation of these data that the first concrete step in regard to the implementation of the decree adopted recently by the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers on the development of the state republic program "Zanyatost" [Employment].

The government of the republic has published an order, according to which the organs responsible for the registration of manpower are receiving an additional—and solid—base.

In the oblasts, cities, and rayons multiple employment agencies are being created. To finance them, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems already in 1990 is being allocated 2.2 million rubles from the republic budget and additional staff—750 people.

The post of inspector for the registration and organization of labor employment of the population will be introduced in the staffs of kishlak and settlement Soviets. In the territory of the Makhallin committees in the cities and city rayons, the secretaries of these committees are made responsible for individual registration and job placement. The housing and operation organs are also obliged to organize the registration of the population and its employment.

The government has charged the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the State Committee for Statistics with conducting already as of 1 January the individual registration of the population by age for the purpose of rational job placement. The associations, enterprises, and organizations of union and republic subordination, as well as the housing-construction cooperatives henceforth will have conduct the same work in the housing resources within their jurisdiction.

Coordinating their actions, the ministries of education, housing and municipal services, internal affairs, and justice, and the republic military commissariat must also take part in the creation of the multiple employment agencies.

A very strict time limit has been allotted to all of this work. Already in January, the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the Scientific Research Institute of Economics of the Uzbek SSR Gosplan must submit to the Ministry of Finance proposals for the further financing of the "Zanyatost" Program. Gosplan and the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems are obligated, within the shortest time period, to examine questions of the allotment of computers for the individual registration of the movement and employment of the republic's population.

Responsible officials of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the State Committee for Statistics are being sent to the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, the oblasts of the republic, and the city of Tashkent for the organization, as of 1 January, of the work of the multiple employment services for the population.

Uzbek CP Authorities Score Pace of Republic's Education Reforms

90US0412B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
30 Dec 89 p 1

[Report on Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro session]

[Excerpt] On 28 December a regular session of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro took place. The Buro examined the question of the role of the communists and executives of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education in

the implementation of the reform of the school, the provision of the training and education of cadres for the national economy.

At the session it was noted that the reorganization of the structure of the management of the republic's education, carried out in 1988 without the broad advice with specialists and the consideration of public opinion, proved to be ineffective. A cumbersome system, difficult to direct, developed, a system not capable to secure cardinal changes in this area. The unsatisfactory course of the reform is conditioned also by serious shortcomings in the activity of the newly-created Ministry of Education and its executives. A business style in work and an atmosphere of exactingness toward cadres for entrusted work have not become firmly established in the ministry. There is no system of analysis of the state of affairs in the sector, the available positive experience is not being generalized and disseminated, and the organization of professional business trips has an unplanned character. Frequently secondary questions are brought up at the sessions of the collegium, the hearing of reports about the work of the executives of the ministry, its administrations and departments, and the organs of education at the local level is not practiced.

The minister and his deputies assess their work without self-criticism, they do not show the proper adherence to principle in the overcoming of the shortcomings in the activity of the ministry. They do not have sufficient initiative, there is a lack of new, non-ordinary solutions of the problems that have accumulated in public education. The communists-executives of the ministry do not manifest the party and civic position in the eradication of the negative phenomena that have become widely

disseminated in the walls of educational institutions—corruption, protectionism, attachment to family life, machinations in the admission to VUZ's and institutions of secondary specialized education. The party organization of the apparatus has not found its place in the formation of the ministry. The party buro accepts cases of the infringement of party discipline and the passiveness of communists.

Having recognized the work of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Education in regard to the training and education of cadres for the national economy as unsatisfactory, the Buro directed the attention of the minister, CPSU member M. A. Zaidov, to the fact that he and his deputies insufficiently guarantee the course of the reform of education in the republic, the implementation of the decisions of the February (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and were unable to create in the apparatus of the ministry an atmosphere of efficiency, organization, and discipline, exactingness toward cadres, and orientation to the achievement of real changes in the sector.

The Buro charged the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers to submit, within a month, proposals about the division of the ministry and the strengthening of its leadership. Taking into account the fact that the situation that has developed in education requires new approaches and cardinal changes in the level of the education and vocational training of the young people, the Buro at the session ordered the republic's Council of Ministers to create a commission and to develop a conception of the development of education in the republic to the year 2005, as well as a program for the creation of a state-public system of identification and selection of talented young people and the work with them.

MVD Official on Fighting Ethnic Conflicts

90UN0795A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 3, Jan 90
p 15

[Interview with Colonel S. Vanyushkin, USSR MVD personnel inspectorate chief, by SOYUZ correspondent Aleksandr Nikolayev: "The Law of Duty and the Law of Blood"]

[Text] We are getting used to the fact that units of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are put on the alert in "hot spot" the moment an interethnic conflict arises. The militia and the internal troops are really facing tasks now unknown to them just a year or two ago. How do the militia officials behave in such a complex situation when neighbor turns against neighbor and old people turn against young people ignoring all traditions and ages-old ideas of mutual respect?

Our correspondent talks to the USSR MVD personnel inspectorate chief, colonel of the internal service, S. Vanyushkin. It is his duty to analyze the "misdeeds" of the militiamen and to define the degree of their guilt.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Vasilyevich, let me start not with a question but with an account of something I witnessed quite recently. Last year I happened to be in the capital of Azerbaijan. In one of the downtown streets I noticed a group of rather excited young people who were crowding by the door of a manufactured goods store. One might think that the store was selling something rarely available but no, the reason for the crowd was different. In spite of it being a regular hour, the door was locked with a thick bar. It turned out that an old woman, an Armenian, had walked into the store a few minutes before. The store employees sensed trouble and locked the door, then they summoned the police. By then the crowd was shouting threats not only to the old woman but to the Azerbaijani sales girls as well. Two sergeants appeared soon. They were let into the store without any problem. After a minute or two they very calmly came out into the street "forgetting" to close the door. The excited crowd naturally burst into the store at once. Frenzied shrieks were heard from the store and a bent, gray-haired old woman was not led but kicked out of the store. There were not even any clothes left on her; she was just trying to cover herself somehow with some miraculously saved shreds of clothing. It is horrifying to talk about it but it did happen: Her ear was bleeding, her lips were smashed, there was a scratch on her cheek. The unfortunate woman was chased down the street, with people whistling and hooting and screaming: "Get out of here and go to your Armenia!"

What did the two characters in the militia uniforms do? They were watching the events very calmly, I would even say, with a smile.

[Vanyushkin] This is, unfortunately, a familiar situation and not only for that republic. Recently I had to mediate another conflict and go to Abkhazia and Georgia as a member of the USSR MVD group. As you know the

events there were particularly tragic: There were pogroms, assassinations, mass riots, and attacks on the internal force officials.

The moment I arrived in that long-suffering area I saw the depth of the division there with my own eyes. A bottomless abyss has opened not just between the people but even between the militia officers.

The first, still unofficial, conversation in Abkhazia took place near the hotel between me and a militiaman. His treatment of the problem amazed me: "I am glad you came. Sort it all out properly and punish them!"

You might have guessed that he meant the people of a nationality different from his own. A few hours later another conversation occurred; it was in a different place and with a different officer but the position was the same. But this time we talked to a person of another nationality, so all the blame was put on the other side.

It transpired that many officers and enlisted personnel had determined their unwavering positions in the still ripening conflict in advance and later acted according to them and not according to the law. The division split sectors, departments, administrations, and even the Ministry. Some situations were close to a paradox—some officers and privates decided: As an Abkhazian I am going to defend only my own people; if I am a Georgian, I will only stand for the people of the same nationality, of the same blood.

We started a detailed examination of where this mentality was rooted. Then we understood that it had not arisen when the person put on his uniform and shoulderstraps, it had been growing in him since his childhood—for years and years.

Such were the unofficial conversations on the very first day. What did I feel? I was shocked and perturbed. I could not understand: What was happening, my dear colleagues? Instead of consulting with the representatives of the Ministry on how to stabilize the situation, how to safeguard the constitutional rights of the people, how to maintain public order, the people we talked to were thinking only of settling scores with someone.

Later this absurd attitude expanded more and more as we talked at any official level. The first conclusion drawn after just a preliminary analysis of the events was: If, God forbid, there had been no control of the situation from Moscow, if they had been counting only on the local militia, if the internal troops had not been introduced urgently, there could have been a much bigger disaster.

[Correspondent] If I understood correctly, many militiamen could not rise above the "law of blood" and that included their chiefs, with lots of responsibilities and powers. Were there examples of this?

[Vanyushkin] Unfortunately, quite a few. The following are considered violations: failure to observe socialist laws, failure to do your duties, abuse of power or of the

official position. All of these phenomena are out of the ordinary. But then there is treason. What happened in Abkhazia and Georgia went beyond the idea of "out of the ordinary". Actions of some officers blended into a single, unattractive picture; they became a system. To date several officers have been arrested for overstepping their duty, for committing crimes and actively illegal actions. One of militia lieutenants, for instance, was arrested for murder. As part of his duties he was supposed to ensure proper functioning and order in the airport where the extremists tried to interfere with operations. But he did quite the contrary—he detained those who wanted to do their job. First he made undisguised threats against the honest militiamen; later, at the instigation of the crowd, he pushed one of his former colleagues, another officer, into a bus and shot him to death with a handgun. What can be more horrible than this slaughter of a comrade, of a coworker?

Another example: One officer was supposed to ensure the safekeeping of the smoothbore hunting weapons confiscated from the population. In addition to disclosing their location to the extremists, he personally escorted them there and handed them the weapons and ammunition. The ensuing investigation proved that his actions brought about more killings.

We cannot but draw the following conclusion from all these facts: In these and, evidently, in some other republics hidden conditions built up over dozens of years for the rejection of some ethnic groups by others. These opposing sides ignored the national cultural traditions, the interests of the people, the facts of their histories, or customs. The nationalistic forces kept suppressing more and more people, infused them with criminal ideas about the superiority of one nationality over others. And when they started to realize their concepts, the militiamen appeared to have been under this "outside" influence for a long time. Not all of them, of course, but some shared those ideas completely and inwardly obeyed them. That was how "nationalistic fanaticism" spread among the militiamen. Naturally, such people could not perform their honest and just duty: Those who lose their minds cannot evaluate their actions.

Here is one more example. The deputy commander for political affairs in one of the rayon militia departments came to conduct the political information hour which had been scheduled in advance. When he entered the meeting room who do you think he found there? Not another political officer or a militiaman urging everyone to stand up for the defense of the people, but the leader of an obviously nationalistic organization. And everybody in the room was listening to him in awe and treated his "sermons" with understanding. As you might have guessed already, the political officer represented a nationality different from that of the majority of the people present in the room. And they invited the "sermonizer" without thinking it necessary to even inform the political officer about it. The political officer, of course, started a passionate argument but the militiamen had decided on their attitude toward the political leader long before.

[Correspondent] Where were the commanders of this subunit, the communists, in this case?

[Vanyushkin] It was their "goodwill", as a matter of fact, that allowed the "sermonizer" into the meeting room. And I think that is where our colleagues—the republican leaders—made a mistake: They should have instilled in their subordinates a feeling of duty and internationalism, they should have proven, achieved, and convinced them that one's bloodline is not of the most importance in modern society but instead they limited themselves to pronouncements about the popular internationalism and the rich traditions of the entire country. They did not look around, as the saying goes, to see the realistic situation in the republic. In my opinion, a correct approach from the political point of view is as follows: An international public council should be created under the militia units of every kishlak, village, and settlement. The council should include workers, kolkhoz [collective farm] farmers, and the local intelligentsia—a doctor, a writer, a journalist—whoever lives there. And then in case of a conflict someone would stand up and say, for instance, "I am a doctor, I aim to cure people of any nationality. They all hurt. I treat all of you but I also want you to defend us all. And you, my dears, that keep fighting—half of them Georgians, half-Abkhazians—you should know that the militia will not let you off easy, not our People's Militia!"

I think that a baker could say the same as he feeds the village and does not take into account the ethnicity of those eating his bread. Anyone could.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Vasilyevich, maybe there a possibility of resolving problems here. But what will the "leaders" of the nationalistic movement say? And I do not mean only those that came to the militia from outside, but also those who "were born" to the militia itself.

[Vanyushkin] If they have not entirely lost their ability to think coherently, they will heed the voice of reason. With such an arrangement similar antagonism will not be possible. Just think, who does he have to answer to? To Georgians? To Abkhazians? No, never. He will have to answer to the interethnic group of his own region, to a doctor, a journalist, a kolkhoz farmer, a baker, a hairdresser, a bus driver—to the people.

I must admit that not all the leaders were, so to say, "negative". Of course, there were quite a few of those too, but in similar cases the situation itself has bred leaders capable of understanding the reality and their own actions correctly. And then the people loyal to their duty, law, and their oath gather around such leaders. There are many examples of this! Such people undertook some very serious responsibilities, sometimes even outside their field; they were punched and insulted by a furious crowd, people would spit in their faces but they continued in the right direction. They skillfully organized a real all-round defense of the rayon militia departments: They posted guards, secured the safety of confiscated guns. If they could not keep the guns in the

given place, then they took them away to hide in a secure location once they sensed future attempts to seize the guns back. They would even hide the weapons in the forest. Somebody would break into their house and demand: "Give the guns back!" The response was: "Search us—we don't have them." And the extremists would leave empty-handed.

Unfortunately, there were different people too—in positions higher than that of rayon department commander. Such a person would come, with all his militiaman's rights, and he would order that the guns be returned. What would you call such a person, a commander, an officer? Would you call him a traitor? A coward? Confused? You decide for yourself.

That rayon department commander had managed to protect the smoothbore weapons and ammunition but then he learned that all of them had been given back. He could not bear the treason and started crying. These were bitter tears of a man. He could not comprehend how one found it possible to do this.

I can sense your question and here is the answer. Many of those so-called commanders are not in the MVD system any more. They were not only fired, but they also will have to answer for everything, if not to the court then to their people. We are not going to keep silent about such things. But nothing of this kind took place in the internal troops units. They acted really well.

[Correspondent] Speaking of internal troops, I would like to ask you a question that is not related directly to the personnel inspectorate of the USSR MVD. But it is quite an appropriate question to a citizen.

In recent years our country has been troubled by many events. They happened in Fergana, Moldavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Nakhichevan. Each time internal troops were urgently deployed to those "hot spots" and immediately one could hear very unflattering remarks about the MVD which, seemingly, was suppressing the signs of democracy in the people's lives. Maybe it is reasonable to consider the creation of a different type of force, similar, for instance, to the forces of the UN Security Council. They would include the best of the best, they would represent all of our republics, have their own uniform, but they would be subordinate to the government and not to the MVD. See how it works: For instance, there is a conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia and they would send a national guard with a special, all-union status to stand between the conflicting sides.

[Vanyushkin] It is a reasonable idea that I would have supported. And you are right, they should not wear the army uniform. As for the ethnic representation in today's internal troops, it is quite extensive. And our men serve there with dignity, many people are indebted to them. But such a national guard should be subordinate only to the government. And it should be deployed only on the decision of the Supreme Soviet.

The militia will not idle meanwhile. The main thing is to fight crime and maintain public order and that is for them!

Azerbaijan Forms Society for Refugees

90US0451A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
6 Jan 90 p 2

[Azerinform interview with Professor N. M. Godzhayev, chairman of the republic Society for Refugees: "Alleviating the Lot of the Refugees"]

[Text] Care and concern for the fate of the refugees who were forced to abandon their permanent homes in Armenia was the keynote of the founding congress of the Azerbaijani Society for Refugees. Those in attendance established the program and charter of the society and chose its executive council, board of overseers, and auditing commission.

Professor N. M. Godzhayev, chairman of the society, was asked by an Azerinform correspondent to describe the initial steps of the privately sponsored organization and its plan of operations for the near future.

[Godzhayev] Almost two years have passed since the time that, as a consequence of events that are well known—in point of fact the attempted genocide of two hundred thousand persons, representing virtually the entire Azeri population of Armenia—these refugees were forced to abandon their lands, their houses and belongings, and flee with their lives in wintertime, through snow-filled mountain passes, in search of protection and shelter in Azerbaijan.

The entire republic rose to the assistance of these victims in distress. Under at times extremely difficult conditions, the republic leadership, including party and Soviet organs, the ministries and departments, the enterprises and voluntary organizations, as well as residents on their own initiative, took active measures to provide the settlers with temporary accommodations in the cities and rayons of Azerbaijan, providing them with a roof over their heads, food, medical attention, and work. Jobs were found for many of them, and parcels of land were allotted to refugee families for residential housing. Attention was also paid to children with the provision of additional space in kindergartens and schools.

We are very grateful to the leaders of party and Soviet agencies in the republic for the fraternal assistance they rendered to the refugee families. Unfortunately, refugee problems did not receive everywhere the care and attention they deserved. Decisions with regard to even very simple matters within the jurisdiction of local organs were frequently delayed. Allotments of land were not made in all rayons, nor were loans and building materials always provided. Out of the 69,000 persons in need of work, even today 23,000 persons have not been placed in positions. And 70,000 refugees are still without permanent dwellings. We are aware of the fact that all of these difficult problems cannot be solved at one time. It was to

expedite this work and coordinate the efforts of all interested parties that the republic society for refugees was formed.

[Correspondent] Specifically, what activities will the new organization be engaged in?

[Godzhayev] I have already mentioned the principal task. Additionally, we plan to establish in the very near future a single center for all refugees, including those who have abandoned permanent dwellings in the NKAO as well as those who have come to Azerbaijan from Armenia and Uzbekistan, and to try to determine their exact number for the purpose of resolving as soon as possible the priority problems. These are the relocation and job placement of the settlers, together with creating the conditions necessary for them to live in their new surroundings. Many abandoned their homes in a hurry, leaving their belongings behind, and not even taking their official records with them. It is necessary also to determine the total amount of material losses suffered and try to obtain compensation. In addition, we intend to raise before republic, union, and international bodies the issue of calling to account the individuals responsible for carrying out extremist and terrorist acts against the Azerbaijanis in Armenia. We believe it is important also to arrive at a political assessment of these illegal and inhuman activities.

From the outset we intend to keep the public informed of our activities. Specifically, the society will publish a newspaper. It will also issue a number of books and documentary videotapes revealing the work of party and Soviet organs and private organizations as well as our own efforts to resettle the refugees. At the same time, we shall continue to make every effort to have the refugees return to their native places of residence with proper guarantees for their security.

[Correspondent] A considerable number of refugees—about 80,000—are now in Baku. As you know, the city is experiencing a good deal of difficulty with providing housing, and there are other problems as well. With the arrival of the refugees, of course, these problems have become even more acute.

[Godzhayev] Actually, the situation is not a simple one. The truth is that many of the settlers have found new homes, registered for employment, and been placed in jobs. A considerable number, however, have still not been resettled.

The overwhelming majority of the settlers relocated in the republic capital were formerly engaged in farm work or raising livestock. It is possible—and it is necessary—to return them to work by speeding the reclamation of the Altyagach-Khyzinskiy zone of Apsheronskiy Rayon with construction there of housing together with social, cultural, and domestic service facilities. Right now, I am sorry to say, the work is moving ahead at too slow a pace. Secondly, it is necessary to devote some thought to the organization of professional training. The city alone has about 15,000 positions open in industrial enterprises,

organizations, and institutions. Clearly, it is feasible to provide short-term courses of training for refugees designed to bring them into the work force.

I want to mention one more thing. Occasionally I happen to hear the opinion expressed that the arrival of the refugees has made the solution of the city's problems and the overall situation much more difficult. These problems, however, are ours in common, and we need actions in the form of persistent, painstaking effort rather than words to solve them.

Comparable difficulties exist in other cities and rayons of the republic. Not everywhere, however, are they being addressed. The leaders of Khandarskiy and Akhsunskiy rayons, for example, as well as certain others, have been treating the problems of the refugees with negligent disregard, virtually forcing them to move in with relatives in Baku.

In conclusion, I should like to report that the Yardym Fund, which was previously under the supervision of the Gayga Society, has been transferred to our organization. In addition, we have opened special banking accounts (No. 700,156 and No. 700,237) in the Baku branch of USSR Zhilsotsbank.

Journalist Recounts 11-13 January Lenkoran Events

90US0451B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
17 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Z. Dzapparov, BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY special correspondent, Lenkoran: "Dreadful January in Lenkoran"]

[Text] The few scant lines of a report issued by the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers on events in Lenkoran, which were published in the republic press, seized the interest of journalists not only in our country but abroad. At 6 a.m. on 11 January, the report stated, representatives of the People's Front in the city engaged in unconstitutional acts by carrying out a blockade of Soviet and law enforcement organizations, seizing the communications center, and announcing a halt in the activities of local organs of power.

On that day, 11 January, I tried to reach Lenkoran by telephone, but the operator told me that communications with the city had been cut off. There was unrest also in Astara, Masally, Lerik, and Yardymly. Everywhere public meetings were being held in connection with an unconstitutional decree by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, calling for the incorporation of the plan for the social and economic development of the Azerbaijan SSR's Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Armenian SSR's 1990 socio-economic development plan. This decree was in violation of sovereign rights of our republic. On that same day republic and central newspapers published a decree issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, entitled "On the Incompatibility with the USSR Constitution of Legal

Statutes Pertaining to Nagorno-Karabakh Promulgated by the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet on 1 December 1989 and on 9 January 1990."

After Dzhalilabad, where I had been to collect material, the hot spot was now Lenkoran, where I headed on assignment. The passengers in the bus en route held an animated discussion of the NKAO conflict, recalling the early days of it, the first Azerbaijani casualties, and the arrival of the Turkic Meskhetintsy from Uzbekistan.

After a snowfall the movement on the road had become more difficult, hampering operations of the snowplows. Some of the vehicles left the roadway and parked by the side of it. It was dark by the time we reached the city. Ahead of us moved armored personnel carriers. On the streets of Lenkoran when we arrived there was not a single member of the militia, and not a single motor vehicle inspector.

In the Hotel Lenkoran I learned for the first time what had been going on here from as an announcer on the local radio reported the news of the republic to the residents of the city. That evening I tried to talk with rayon leaders, but they were not in their offices, nor could I locate them in their homes. At 8 p.m. the lights in the area were turned off. At such a moment a malevolent darkness reigns over the city, leaving only a lurid blue light on the snow. After 15 minutes, however, the lights were turned back on.

To learn more about the details of what had been going on, I contacted by telephone a party gorkom official, F. Akhundov, with whom I was acquainted.

"On the morning of 11 January," he said, "it was announced on Lenkoran Radio that all activities of party, Soviet, and law enforcement agencies had been suspended. I could not believe it. But when I got to work, I could not get into my office. At the door to the party gorkom stood a man with a rifle who was a member of the Popular Front."

"How do you keep in touch with the primary party organizations?"

"Actually, the party gorkom has not ceased its activities for a moment. Secretaries, department heads, and instructors are going on these days with their ideological work in the various industries and with the population as usual. A proposal, however, that we made to representatives of the People's Front to resume the activities of the local party organs met with a refusal."

From short conversations such as this one, I pieced together the following summary of the news.

In Lenkoran a Provisional Defense Committee had been formed which had taken over full power and started to implement measures of its own. At 2 p.m. on 11 January the activities of the local militia and the communications center came to a halt. At 5 p.m. of the same day members of the People's Front (PFA) met with representatives of the party management aktiv in the House of Intellectuals. In view of the extraordinary circumstances, it was

decided to form detachments of armed vigilantes, authorized to act in support of the committee's operations as a nocturnal police force.

Twelve January witnessed the arrival in Lenkoran of a group that met with members of the Popular Front. It consisted of A. Rasizade, first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers; A. Dashdamirov, a department head of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee; Rear Admiral V. Chernavin; and M. Dzhalvazade, an academician and doctor of medical sciences who was a native of Lenkoran. On the same day, the publication of the local newspaper *Leninchi* was halted. In its place a bulletin called "Elin sesi" was issued. The printing house was also seized and placed in the custody of the People's Front. I learned about this that evening.

On the morning of 13 January, a Saturday, I walked the streets of Lenkoran. Snow lay on the streets, but taxis and the mainline buses remained in operation. School children, medical school students, and those attending the Subtropics Teknikum hurried off to their morning classes. Domestic service shops and stores were opening their doors. At the market known to city dwellers as the Beyuk Bazaar a brisk trade had been going on since early morning. Here, people gathered from Lachin, Lerik, Kubatly, Kelbadzhar, Shusha, and Agdam. After a while, the flow of traffic became blocked by the number of vehicles. In a crowd by the side of the road the local residents talked and exchanged news—the main topic of which was Nagorno-Kabarakh.

A young fellow whose name I am not at liberty to disclose spoke to me as follows: "There are disturbances in Lachin, Kubatly, Kelbadzhar, Shusha, and Agdam. In the areas bordering Armenia, the blood of two peoples is being shed. How can our Soviet State stand idly by and watch what is going on? We need to ask A. N. Girenko, the CPSU Central Committee secretary, and R. N. Nishenov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Why is it that they could not visit Stepanakert? Why is it they were obliged to go back to Moscow? One thing is clear. Armenian blackbeard extremists are interfering in the matter. Lenkoran may not border on the NKAO but the land is one. That is why there is unrest among us here as well. We find the activities of the People's Front, suspending the activities of party, Soviet, and law enforcement organs in the area, justifiable as a way of attracting the attention of Moscow to finding an answer to the NKAO question as soon as possible."

Some of the local leaders in Lenkoran are of the same opinion. Aslan Kaslanteri, a veteran of the Komsomol, who was born in 1898, and who played an active role in the establishment of Soviet power in Lenkoran, said: "I respect the People's Front movement. But other ways could have been taken to counter the provocations of the Armenian extremists."

People with arms stood by the building of the rayon procurator, and others like them could be found at the building where the city ispolkom of the Soviet of People's Deputies was located.

I walked to the building of the party gorkom, having already made an appointment to meet with Ya. Rzayev, the gorkom party secretary. But young fellows with rifles stood at the doorway. They would not let me in. One of them came up and said: "The raykom no longer exists. Nobody works here. And nobody can enter."

Then I set out for the city Department of Internal Affairs. Here, by the building, members of the militia stood about talking with representatives of the People's Front on duty by the entrance. At the door I met M. Aliyev, chief of militia, along with other militiamen, and I asked him about the situation. "Since the start of PFA activities on the night of 11 January," he said, "we have not taken part in the conflict. Our entire unit is confined to quarters."

An acquaintance told me that for three days officers and men had been spending their nights in heating plants and mess halls. There had been no contact with the republic MVD. Their main task at the time was to keep incarcerated prisoners from gaining their freedom or acquiring weapons. Meanwhile, the militiamen demonstrated poise and self-restraint as they maintained a dialogue. For the purpose of carrying out particularly vital objectives, the militia was serving alongside the People's Front.

That day I met with V. I. Ilishev, an officer. "I believe that everything must be done on legal grounds," he told me. "The situation is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, we are staying in contact with the enterprises and institutions, helping to plow out the snowdrifts, restoring electrical service as soon as possible, and since the snowfall we have been distributing bread to the stores along with the city residents."

Despite the fact that it was Saturday, life in the city continued on its usual course, while the people complained of certain breakdowns in domestic services. G. Mamedov, who shoulders the duties of chairman of the provisional defense committee, received petitioners and issued instructions. His reception room was full of people. Armed guards were posted on each floor. G. Mamedov described the decisions taken by the People's Front.

"On the first day" said Mamedov, "I began with the snow clearing. In the past day or two there has not been a single crime or infraction of the law. Detachments of volunteers, which we formed, made up of PFA members, are maintaining order. They are changed every five or six hours. We have prepared an appeal to workers of the area, communists, and primary party organizations, clearly setting forth the demands of the People's Front. They consist of three points. So long as Moscow does not react to events as it should, we will not relinquish authority, and we will continue to demand an end to the so-called question of Nagorno-Karabakh. We are not conducting public meetings. We are reporting the situation in the area by local radio, which broadcasts every half hour, under the supervision of PFA members."

The staff of the People's Front is located in a building that served for many years as the ideological center. On Saturday there were many people here. I was escorted into a

room where members of the executive body of the People's Front were seated, including I. Dzhabarov and I. Ragimov. Here, a noisy, heated discussion was going on about the unauthorized occupation of an empty apartment by one of the citizens. Last year the residents of the city were due to receive, but did not receive, 250 residential units. Thus the Provisional Defense Committee was taking over the functions of Soviet organs. But even for the time being it was in no position to execute such decisions. And, generally speaking, was it competent to cope with the many complex questions that the party, soviet, and management bodies normally deal with?

"We make no claim to be able to take over the role of party and Soviet organs of power," said I. Ragimov. "But we will return power to the local bodies only after a final and complete resolution of the NKAO question."

In the course of my conversation with I. Dzhabbarov and I. Ragimov, I requested certain documents that had been published in the bulletin "Elin sesi" and was told that they were at the printing house. Accompanied by a young man in a camouflaged jacket and a rifle slung over his shoulder, I headed for the printers. On the way the young man told me about what he had been doing, about his sleepless nights, and about the part he had played in maintaining public order in the city with his comrades. He expressed his indignation at the waiting game played by party and Soviet organs in the republic.

At the printing house, as everywhere else, there were people armed with weapons. But they let me enter. Here, I met with E. Akhadov, associate editor of the newspaper *Leninchi*. "Publication of the newspaper is a decision that is now up to the Provisional Defense Committee," he said. "A total of five issues have come out in 1990. The circulation is 20,000 copies. "Hard, intense work awaits us in the future, naturally. Maybe we should bring out the newspaper on a daily basis to make up for the issues omitted."

Saturday for the citizens of Lenkoran was crowded with cares. At the food store a long line formed to buy meat. People made purchases, then scurried homeward to visit with their friends. Everyone appeared preoccupied, as if contending with the question: What will become of us tomorrow? Will the situation in the NKAO be over soon? And will life go on as before? Meanwhile, on the streets and squares of Lenkoran, increasingly one's eye is caught by the presence of a fellow with a rifle.

OGONEK Considers Future of Meskhetian Turks

90US0428A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 50,
9-16 Dec 89 pp 30-33

[Article by Mayra Salykova and Semyen Yanovskiy:
"Land, Where Is Your Son?"]

[Text] The 2nd session of the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the USSR Supreme Soviet Declaration acknowledging the unlawfulness and criminal nature of all repressive acts against peoples subjected to forced

re-settlement, and the unconditional restoration of their rights. The declaration must become a legal statute which provides a guarantee that such actions will never be repeated.

Even a year ago they were not always mentioned when listing the peoples who had been subjected to deportation during the period of the cult of personality and still not returned to the place where they historically lived. But today, after the sadly notorious Fergansk events which have shaken the entire country, one more consequence of Stalinist national policy which remains unresolved to the present day has become known to broad community circles. For the 45th year now this small people who call themselves the Meskhetian Turks has wandered over our great country.

HOW IT WAS

Only the men came to OGONEK. It is evidently a tiresome lot—to go from one institution to another for tens of years, re-living everything all over again. How many times have they recounted that which is best forgotten, like a terrible nightmare? Yet this testimony must be preserved. Without it, it is impossible to imagine in full volume that which is behind this people's desire to return to their native places. We cannot solve current problems without knowing about that which not only the Meskhetians, but all the peoples who shared their fate of deported "non-returnees" have had to endure.

Tayfur Abuzer:

I was 10 years old when they exiled us. I myself am from Aspindzskiy rayon of Meskhetiya, the village of Khertvezi. They chased us out into the street at 12 midnight, kept us there until 4 in the morning, and then they told us: "We are temporarily taking you away". My mother told me: "Go to your grandmother's". Our grandmother lived in another village. I had to tell her that they were taking us away somewhere. But as soon as I walked out onto the road, they grabbed me and tossed me into the first cattle car that came by. Separated from my parents and relatives, I was taken to Alma-Ata oblast. I barely survived the trip. I simply do not have the moral strength to tell you what happened along the way in the cattle cars in which we were being transported... I did not see my relatives from 1944 through 1948. Then one day my aunt happened to see me at the market, and then my father and brother came. And later my uncle returned from the army. They called him in to the commandant's office and told him: "Take off your medals and shoulder straps!". All this, as well as his documents, they took away from him. After that he lost hope, was sick for a year, and then died.

I am a jurist by education and graduated from the Moscow Academy. I do not want any official duties. I will go and work on the farm, in the kolkhoz, as a cattle farmer, whatever you like—just so I can return to my homeland. I do not need anything else!

"...WE ARE VERY MUCH COUNTING ON YOUR HELP"

...wrote the members of the Temporary Organizational Committee of Meskhetian Turks [VOK] to the chairman of the Soviet Culture Fund governing board, Academician Dmitriy Sergeyevich Likhachev. In their letter they were referring to the unlawful deportation in November of 1944 of the citizens of Turkish, as well as Kurdish, Khemshin, and Azerbaijani nationalities from the territory of five rayons in south Georgia: Akhaltsikhskiy, Adigenskiy, Aspindzskiy, Akhalkalakskiy and Bogdanovskiy—with the general geographical name of Meskhetiya- Dzhavakhetiya. They told about how, deported to the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, these peoples found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Out of 115,000 old men, women and children, one-fourth perished during the month-long trip in the overcrowded railroad cars and during the first winter spent in plywood structures and earthen huts. This occurred at the time when 40,000 Turks were fighting in the ranks of the Soviet Army from the first days of the Great Patriotic War. Of these men who fought, 14,000 remained alive. All who returned from the war—the Heroes of the Soviet Union, the medal bearers, and the invalids—found themselves in the same situation as the deportees. They found themselves in the position of camp residents with a strict commandant regime, which did not ease until 1956.

Wanting to be closer to their homeland, a large portion of the Turks settled in Azerbaijan, Kabardino-Balkariya, Krasnodarsk Kray, and other regions of the country. The process of gradual assimilation is being observed everywhere. There were efforts to create Turkish schools, but the great territorial dispersion of the minor people makes it unrealistic under the given conditions to create a single center of culture. "This question," they say, "may be resolved only with the compact settlement of our people".

The members of the Temporary Organizational Committee noted that the return to their historical homeland—the Akhaltsikhskiy region of the Georgian SSR, would allow them to resurrect their disappearing national culture. The reality of such a return, as the VOK members believe, is confirmed by the presence of several tens of destroyed and abandoned villages on the territory of Meskhetiya-Dzhavakhetiya.

To this day, the problem of the ethnic origins of the Meskhetians remains unresolved. Some representatives of this people—the majority of them—consider themselves to be Meskhetian Turks. Others consider themselves to be Meskhs—a part of the unified Georgian nation. Emma Panesh, a scientist from Leningrad, presented a speech on this topic at a meeting of the council for development and preservation of the culture of minor peoples at the USSR Culture Fund. Here is her point of view:

"Meskhetiya-Dzhavakhetiya is a border area. If we imagine that over many centuries there were contacting

ethnic groups of Turks and Georgians living and neighboring each other on this bordering territory, then, turning to the world history of any border area, the situation may be rather typical. If this territory had been Turkish, then the Georgians, as was usually done in such cases, would have been moved to the depths of the country, and military settlements would have been built on the border territory. If the territory had been Georgian, then the same thing would have been done, only from the other side. That is what was done in 1944. The Muslim peoples were resettled out of the border area. The Meskhetian Turks were deported, and Georgians were settled in the territory which became available. Although, undoubtedly, there were also some deported Georgian Muslims. We believe that the question of origin must be resolved calmly. And it is very important that in resolving this question there is no pressure exerted on the self-awareness of the Meskhetians, since the question is a sensitive and delicate one".

There is also another point of view. Georgian historian Guram Mamulia:

"This problem is among the most complex for Georgians, and for the entire republic. That group of people which are referred to as Turks are in reality Meskhs. Since the population of that kray was exclusively Georgian since ancient times, Turks as such, and I am referring to Osman Turks, never lived there. Even in the official statistics of the past there was no such concept as "Turks". As a result of the expansion of the Turkish Empire, the process of muslimization of the Meskhs took place in these areas for almost three centuries. In connection with this, there was a loss of the language, with all the consequences stemming from it. However, to say that Turks have lived in Meskhetiya from time immemorial and that this is a Turkish land is a total absurdity. Meskhetiya was the center of Georgian culture. Yet even if we look at this region from the standpoint of the material monuments of culture, it is specifically here that we find the largest Christian churches. It is only later that we may trace through historical documents how, as the kray became depopulated, mosques appeared as a result of this Muslimization. Part of the Meskhs converted to the Catholic faith as a result of persecutions. The self-awareness of the Meskhs as a result of this became divided into three parts: Part were secretly Orthodox, who were classed with the Georgians; part were Catholics, and were called French, and part comprised the muslimized population which called itself Tatars, and not Turks.

I can say, looking back at the history of this region and the history of the Meskhs, that this part of the Georgian population was for ages the victim of state politics. They lived on the border and constantly experienced pressure from the states. Even in the Soviet period they were classed both as Azerbaijanis and as Georgians, and in 1944 they were deported as Turks. And the so-called Turkish-Meskhetian nation was formed on the basis of religious rather than national self-awareness. Unfortunately, in recent history here have been events which still

remain in the memory of the people. When the Turks attacked through Meskhetiya in 1918, the Muslim population of the region staged a revolt. This led to bloodshed—of Christians and Muslims. In places where Christians and Muslims lived side by side, often the Muslims saved and sheltered the Christians. But there were also terrible scenes. And this lives in the consciousness of the people to this day.

Today among the Meskhs there is a significant portion of them who understand and recognize their Georgian origin. They ask to be given the opportunity of returning to their homeland—to different rayons of Georgia, including also Meskhetiya. We have understood that this is the faction on which we can rely in resolving this question. Yet the situation is difficult not only with the Meskhs, but also with the Georgians. After all, when the Meskhs were deported, appropriate propaganda was conducted among the people. It was necessary to populate the border territory which had been vacated. The Georgians did not want to move there. Therefore, the settlement was performed in an obligatory order, primarily from the rayons of Western Georgia. Troops would march in there, destroy houses, literally put people by force into cars, and in this way populate the Meskhetian villages.

All this occurred in the winter. The climatic conditions were entirely different. Now they have built houses in Meskhetiya, but at that time they lived primarily in earthen huts. Almost all the babies perished. A commandant regime was set up to keep people from fleeing to their native areas. In order to somehow keep the people there, it was pounded into their heads that traitors had been deported from these villages. The people were told that we, supposedly, have freed your land of the Turks, and you do not want to live here because you are not patriots. In this way, the entire ideological and propaganda machine was set in motion for appropriate treatment of the population. For a long time it was practically impossible to remove one's name from the list of residents and to leave there.

That is why the population today has a cautious attitude toward the return of the Meskhetians. Very great difficulties may arise and indeed do arise with improper behavior of certain people who allow immature and imprudent comments when coming to these areas for the purpose of viewing the places of future settlements.

Rasul Mamedov:

"The Soviet state trusts us to guard the border at any place in the Soviet Union, except in our native land—Meskhetiya. It is a paradox. Why is this so? My son, for example, served in Afghanistan. My neighbor's son was killed by a Dushman bullet. How does it happen that we can serve everywhere, even outside the boundaries of the country, and the national question does not arise? Where is the fairness in this? Yet as soon as the question of our return comes up, suddenly the problem of our origin arises. Who are we—Turks or Georgians? Here is what I

want to say to those who are so involved in this question: Our Constitution guarantees us the right to freedom of conscience. If I wish, I will be a Muslim. If I wish, I will be a Christian. If I wish I may register as a Georgian, or if I wish—as a Turk. No one has the right to force me or coerce me into registering as a Georgian. And here is what else I want to say. If many scientists in Georgia believe that we are muslimized Georgians, why have they not sounded the alarm for these entire 45 years? That their brother Georgians are perishing in exile? Why has the Georgian government not invited us back in all these long and painful years? Why has the question of whether we are Turks or Georgians arisen only when there was talk of our return to Meskhetya?"

Ismail Gunyashev:

"Everywhere in our country there are monuments to soldiers who have died in the Great Patriotic War. On them it is written who died and when. You can learn everything from them. So how is it that the 40,000 Turks who fought during those years, 26,267 of whom perished, do not deserve such a monument or obelisk in their homeland? When they were dedicating an obelisk to the villagers who died from the village where we are now living, I asked: "Why are our fellow countrymen not included in these lists?" The chairman of the rayispolkom told me that, supposedly, we were erecting the obelisk to those soldiers who left our village and did not return, but your soldiers did not leave from our village. You must erect a monument to them in your native village". But how can I do this if I cannot even go there myself? For a long time the entire territory on which we officially lived was part of the border zone. Entry into it was by special pass only..."

WHAT IS IT LIKE, MESKHETIYA?

In the memory of all Meskhetians—those who consider themselves to be Meskhs as well as those who consider themselves to be Turks—this was a land of happiness, the happiness of life in one's homeland. Only people who have paid too dearly for this bitter knowledge can fully sense everything that this means.

Along the road to Meskhetya, in the village of Khashuri, lives Bakhadyr Matanov, who returned to Georgia from Central Asia. He was 11 years old in 1944. He lived in Aspindzskiy rayon, in the village of Oshora. He remembers all this horror from beginning to end. Later, after removal of the commandant's regime, he served in the army, completed the institute, and worked.

In 1973, having received a travel pass, he went to vacation in Borzhomi. Suddenly an excursion came up, and they were planning to go to Vardzi. The road there led right through his native village. He knew that according to his passport, where it was stated who he was and where he was from, no one would let him past the checkpoint. He knew that. And nevertheless he signed up. When they got to the checkpoint, everyone got out of the bus. They were checking the documents. He said that he had forgotten his passport, but that he had his

deputy's certification and documents showing that he was a rayispolkom deputy cheif in Central Asia. The border guards spent a long time making calls to their superiors, until finally, waving him through, they said: "Go ahead!" But when the bus came to Oshora, he could hold back no longer. He asked the bus driver to stop in the center of the village, ran out into the street, and shouted at the top of his lungs: "I was born here! This is where my father lived! I am here, and now you can do whatever you want with me!" It seemed that his whole life up until that moment had been for the sake of these few minutes. He thought they would run up to him and begin to drag him back, but the tour guide, understanding the matter, simply begged him not to yell so loud. Many of the people on the bus were crying...

Many years have passed since that time. He met the Georgian family which today lives in the house that used to be his. They became almost like kin. Since that time the burning desire to return never left him. And he did return. It is true, he does not live in Meskhetya, but nevertheless in his homeland, in Georgia. He believes that they, the Meskhs, are of Georgian origin. He is studying the Georgian language. He wanted to register as a Georgian in his passport and to take back his Georgian surname. And, as we recently learned, he was able to do so. Today his passport bears a new name—Badri Metonidze.

Koshali Aliyev:

"I myself deported my own father... I was serving at that time in the army and found myself among those soldiers who were assigned to resettle the Turks. And I myself deported my own father from his native home. My father died on the road, and I do not even know where his grave is. My mother died of grief. They left four brothers and two sisters. I searched for them for 2 years, wrote to Moscow, and found them in Kazakhstan. That is how it was. You understand, I myself loaded my own family into the boxcar, four families per car..."

HOW DOES THE HOMELAND BEGIN?

How does Meskhetya begin for those who have decided to visit this ancient Georgian region? It begins with a checkpoint at the entrance to the most extensive border zone on the territory of the Soviet Union. The Meskhetians believe that this zone was created especially for them, so that not only could they not return, but could not even visit the graves of their ancestors. At the same time, the Georgians who were forcefully resettled here believe that this border checkpoint is intended for them, so that they would not be able to leave Meskhetya for their native lands then, in the terrible 40's.

Quite recently the checkpoint at the entrance to the territory of Meskhetya-Dzhavakheti was removed. Yet the problem created in the far-off 40's has still not been resolved.

We asked: "How many Meskhetians live today in Meskhetya itself?" We were told that the official count

is three families, but in fact only one Marat Baratashvili lives today in Akhaltsikhskiy rayon. He is the son of Lativshakh Baratashvili, who devoted his entire life to the cause of returning to his homeland. He considers himself a Meskh.

Marat works in the local area studies museum.

He has been working on this question for many years now. He was the only one who was able to return to his homeland. He brought his family there. Of course, it is not easy for him. At first people were wary of him. Many did not like the fact that, working at the museum, he had access to the archives. Nevertheless, his peaceable disposition, his desire to touch his own historical roots, and his politeness gradually led to a tolerable attitude toward him. For the time being.

Our conversation with Marat was lengthy.

"There is no more confusing question in the USSR—who are we? You figure it out! Professionals are wracking their brains, but here is a simple peasant. What does he need? He needs land. He needs a family. He needs to work and to raise his children. What does he care about politics? Give him the land where he was born, from where he is by birth, where his ancestors are buried. The question is not one of bringing everyone back to their old places. The matter is one of real rehabilitation of the Meskhs and the representatives of other ethnic groups who were deported along with them.

Marat Baratashvili speaks about this as the most important aspect of the question. He believes it inconceivable that now, 45 years after the deportation, he is the only Meskh who has returned to the land of his forefathers.

Vakhpi Akhmetov

"At 18 I was mobilized into the Soviet Army on 23 June 1942. Our 77th infantry division was formed in Derbent. After the demobilization, all the soldiers were greeted with music, but who greeted us? We came back to our native village—there was no one there. It is true, after half an hour two militiamen arrived and said: "You have no business here. Go on, get out of here..." "Where to?", I asked. And they said—to Central Asia, that is where your whole family is. Cold and hungry, I searched for my family for 4 months... When I found them, almost no one was left alive, just one invalid brother and a daughter-in-law. All the rest had died. What had we fought for? Could it be that even now we do not have the right to live in our native land? After all, every year there are fewer veterans. They did not let us live in our homeland, then at least let us die there. Don't we have the right to this? While I was at the front, I knew nothing about the fate of my kin. After '44 I received no letters at all. Several times I went to the political unit, where I was told: "We don't know, there's a war going on..." Even though they all knew then, their conscience would not let them tell me the truth. After all, at that time we could all die any day. For our Homeland".

We visited all the rayons of Meskhetiya-Dzhavakheti. We saw how the people live there today. We read the reports stating that Meskhetiya today is an economically backward region living on subsidies. There are many problems. The people who live there do not have enough building materials and land. We were assured that it is impossible to restore the old destroyed villages of the Meskhetians, that the land is not suitable for the current level of farming. The people in many villages, when they learned where we were from and why we had come, gathered around and shared their thoughts with us.

The concern of the people is understandable. The difficult economic situation in the region places a burden on the shoulders of the local peasants. The return of the Meskhetians, even for now in insignificant numbers, may create, as many believe, difficulties not only of an economic character, but also psychological. Those who were forcibly resettled here into the homes of the Meskhetians told us: "How will they be able to forgive this injustice? How will they be able to reconcile themselves with the fact that we took their land? That in place of the mosque, for example, we built a school or something else? Will we be able to live peacefully side by side with them?"

The Meskhetian Turks who had illegally visited their villages in recent, calmer, times, told us just the opposite. They told about how warmly and heartily they were greeted, and about how the people there wept with them. Where, then, does the concern stem from? After all, we know that the Temporary Organizational Committee of the Meskhetian Turks has written in its Charter a rejection of claims to return to the houses abandoned as a result of the deportation of 1944. Yet the concern does not leave the people. In the village of Ude people recalled the events of 1918, which were recounted to us by Guram Mamulia. They took us to the village cemetery, where the remains of the victims of those years are buried.

And then I thought: If human memory retains for so long the recollections of perhaps a few, but such black pages in history, then will our contemporaries soon be able to forget the events of recent years in Armenia and Azerbaijan and other regions of the country. Will the Meskhetian Turks soon be able to forget the events in Fergansk? Can this be forgotten? Yet if we remember all this always and forever, then what can lie ahead for us? To go forward, looking backward, only to present the black pages of ancient and recent history as justification of our own intolerance?

WHEN WILL THE TIME COME?

An unofficial meeting of citizens of Georgian nationality with the representatives of the Meskhetian Turks was held in Moscow.

Accord was not reached on all questions. However, the main conclusion drawn by both sides was that we must build bridges between the peoples. Also, we must necessarily consider the difficult situation which has arisen in

Georgia. The representatives of the Georgian nationality announced that "the current public opinion in the republic is not in favor of returning the Meskhetian Turks to Meskhetiya. The reasons for this are the events of recent months: They are 9 April, the unrest in Eastern Kartlya, the tensions in Abkhazia and South Osetia. The Georgian people need time to understand themselves".

One thing is clear—these questions must be resolved calmly. We must consider the realities of the present day, as well as the situation in Georgia and the position of the people who for 45 years have been deprived of their native homeland. We must also remember that after the sadly infamous Fergansk events, tens of thousands of Meskhetians have become refugees. We cannot live without hope for a fair solution to this question. Yet hope alone is not enough. Time is passing. New generations are growing up. How will we answer their questions tomorrow? How will we look them in the eye?

While the material was being prepared for press, we received word from Tbilisi that Marat Baratashvili, who had recently settled in his homeland, no longer lives there. He had to leave the land of his forefathers—Meskhetiya.

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Status of Gagauz Language, Culture Viewed

90US0456A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 10 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by G. Gaydarzhi, candidate of philological sciences: "The Gagauz Language and Culture: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA introduction]

[Text] The Gagauz language is unique; it is related, but not identical, to Turkish. This has been corroborated by many respected scholars. Carrying its Turkic basis through the centuries, it functioned in oral form in foreign surroundings, and for many years it was only the language of folklore and of conversation in the home and in trade within the ethnic community. It belongs to the Oguz-Bulgar subgroup of the southeastern group of Turkic languages, which is part of the Oguz group of the Turkic family of languages along with the Oguz-Seljuk subgroup (Azeri and Turkish) and the Oguz-Turkmen subgroup (Turkmen and Trukhmen).

The distinctive features of the Gagauz language are the result of history: Turkic in its basis, it was influenced considerably by unrelated languages—Slavic and Romance languages, Greek, and Albanian. This occurred because the Gagauz people were mainly in contact with the languages of southeastern Europe up to the middle of the 18th century (and recently). As a basic component of the Gagauz ethnic community, the Gagauz language reflected the entire range of these intricate reciprocal influences over the centuries. Education in the native language, however, was not encouraged among the

Gagauz in the Balkans or in pre-revolutionary Bessarabia. Only church literature, through the efforts of renowned Bessarabian educator M. Chakir, was known to the Gagauz. Even on the eve of the liberation war in the Balkans, when the elevation of the national consciousness of the peoples of southeastern Europe was accompanied by the active inclusion of native languages in the educational process, not one national institute or gymnasium with instruction in the Gagauz language was opened in Bessarabia or in Novorossiysk Kray. Drawing no distinctions between the Gagauz and the Bulgarians, the tsarist administration allowed only Bulgarian academies to be opened in some places, and these could be attended by the Gagauz children. They learned Bulgarian instead of their native language.

The years of Romanian-boyar and Fascist-military occupation had a particularly pernicious effect on the status of the language and culture. People were forbidden to use the Gagauz language even in the home and in national ceremonies. This led to its degradation as a universal medium of communication and as an instrument of national culture. The Gagauz were allowed to obtain only the minimal vocational and technical education required for the augmentation of the substratum of craftsmen and agricultural workers.

The assimilation policy of tsarism and royal Romania precluded the development of a written Gagauz language in the pre-October period and in the years of Bessarabian occupation, although printed matter in the Gagauz language was already being distributed by scholars, educators, and missionaries.

The development of a written language and establishment of a national school were made possible only in the postwar years through the efforts of the Commission for Gagauz Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by the founder of Soviet Gagauz studies, Professor N.K. Dmitriyev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. On the commission's recommendation, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree in January 1949 "On Measures To Organize Cultural-Educational Work Among the Gagauz in the Moldavian and Ukrainian SSR's." Regrettably, these measures were never carried out, although the decree might have become a historic document and the most consistent program for the restoration of the Gagauz ethnic community and the Gagauz language.

A year later, following an inspection, a Soviet state commission gave the republic leadership a negative performance evaluation with regard to the implementation of this decree. On 28 February 1950 the Moldavian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee Buro adopted its first, historic resolution "On the Establishment of a Written Gagauz Language." It was essentially a repetition of the USSR Council of Ministers decree and, unfortunately, it also remained on paper.

It was not until 1957 that the republic government took up the "Gagauz question" again and adopted the decree

"On Measures To Improve the Education of Children of the Gagauz Nationality." The implementation of this decree began right away, without the necessary personnel, scientific-procedural, and material-technical backing.

A national elementary school was opened in 1958, but it lasted only two and a half academic years. Public education agencies in the republic did not even take the trouble to investigate the state of academic instruction in the Gagauz schools or the experience accumulated here. With just a stroke of the pen, the ministry closed the national school by issuing the 3 January 1961 order "On the Transfer of Schools with a Gagauz Student Body to Russian-Language Instruction." For many years this order was an insurmountable obstacle to the development and use of the Gagauz language.

The consequences of the closure of the national school were apparent almost immediately: The study of the native language as an academic subject soon ceased, although the ministry order said nothing about the status of the native language in the school curriculum.

Gagauz editions of newspapers and radio programs ceased to exist, the training of teachers in the pedagogical institute and VUZ stopped, and the scientific subdivision of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences for the study of the Gagauz language, folklore, history, and ethnography was dissolved before it had a chance to stand on its own feet.

It was not until 1986 that the native language was partially reinstated in the schools. Today we have to admit that only 30 publications, including one novel, two books of selected works, and two folklore anthologies in Gagauz have been published in the 30 years of the written language's existence.

The functioning of today's national school is impeded not only by the shortage of teachers, but also by the shortage of teaching aids and the absence of collections of Gagauz literature in libraries. Students have trouble studying the material of academic subjects because they are not sufficiently fluent in their native language. According to the findings of sociolinguistic studies, 30 percent of the children in the primary grades learn their native language only as a second language during the process of communication with their classmates. The reason for this is that their native language has been completely eliminated from the system of pre-school instruction.

The closure of the national school interrupted the development of the literary process, because literature cannot exist without a trained reader, and this training must begin in the general educational school. Our generation will have to perform the incredibly difficult task of restoring the prestige of the native language even in the sphere of public education, surmounting national indifference, and overcoming the degradation of the unique features of the ethnic community and the process of the rapid de-nationalization of the Gagauz people.

Members of the younger generation do not know Gagauz folklore and do not sing lullabies to their children and tell them stories in their native language. Children do not play the national children's games.

The state of the national culture is just as pitiful. Whatever field of culture we consider, we see that everything needs restoration, stimulation, and the institution of immediate measures to stop and surmount the crisis of the people's main ethnic features—language, culture, traditions, national consciousness, customs, rituals, etc. Delays in developing the native tongue of the children and their partial or complete loss of their native language will give rise to serious difficulties in the intellectual development of students, their mastery of the fundamentals of science, and the establishment of a bilingual balance.

The half-hearted measures taken to date cannot stop the de-nationalization process. Every 10 years, according to census data, more than 8 percent of the Gagauz lose their native language. If this depopulation continues, it is easy to calculate how little time it will take for the completion of the natural process of de-nationalization. This has already happened in other regions inhabited by the Gagauz—in the cis-Azov region, the northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece, where official statistics do not single out the Gagauz as a separate ethnic community. Only in Soviet Moldavia, where around 80 percent of all the Gagauz in the USSR live, and in some Gagauz rural communities bordering on Moldavia in Odessa Oblast, do they still think of themselves as a separate nationality.

The Gagauz have the lowest level of higher education in the republic and the lowest level of public participation in creative labor and in the system of public administration, public education, etc. The structure of the national intelligentsia is in a disastrous state, and this is corroborated by official statistics.

If we analyze the structure of the republic intelligentsia on the ethnic level, according to the 1979 census, the structure was not deformed among the Russians, Jews, Bulgarians, and Ukrainians in the republic. The Moldavian nationality's representation in various non-production spheres is close to the republic average. The situation with regard to the Gagauz intelligentsia, on the other hand, is so bad that even the establishment of completely equitable national representation in these socioprofessional spheres would not close the gap between the Gagauz and republic levels or eliminate the deformities resulting from violations of the Leninist principles of ethnic policy.

The percentage of Gagauz employed in the administrative sphere decreases from census to census. Sociological studies conducted in the republic by the Ethnography Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences in line with the program for the "Optimization of the Sociocultural Development of the Nationalities of the USSR" also indicated that the main sociocultural indicators of the

Gagauz population of the Moldavian SSR are far below those of other nationalities in the republic.

The indicator of the general educational level of the Gagauz is also the lowest in the republic. The indicators of other nationalities are from 3 to 20 times as high.

Here is an indicative example. Two and a half times as many students of the Gagauz nationality were admitted to Kishinev State University and the polytechnical institute in 1988 as in 1989. Admissions to other VUZ's have also been limited: the Tiraspol and Beltsy pedagogical institutes, the Kishinev Agricultural Institute, the Moldavian State Conservatory, and the Moldavian Arts Institute.

The measures taken to date in the education of Gagauz intellectual personnel have been ineffective. This will require a fundamental state program aimed not only at regional economic development and local ecological restoration, but also at the stepped-up restoration of the Gagauz ethnic community and its language and culture, the elevation of the educational level, and the development of a national school, cultural centers, and news media in the Gagauz language.

The decree of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party and Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers of 11 April 1989 "On Some Questions About the Further Development of the Culture and National Education of the Gagauz and Bulgarian Population of the Republic" is expected to provide a partial solution to all of these problems. The development of the social functions of the Gagauz language and its use in public education, culture, literature, and the news media will require special government effort. All of this is stipulated in the republic language laws and the state comprehensive program to secure the functioning of languages in the Moldavian SSR.

Experience has shown, however, that isolated cultural measures will not correct the situation. The restoration of the ethnic community will require high-status national-territorial autonomy. The autonomous form of development will establish the necessary conditions for the preservation of the Gagauz as a separate ethnic community and will guarantee its future existence. The right of each nationality, large or small, to a future existence, guaranteed in the Constitution of the USSR, international legal documents, and the CPSU Central Committee platform on the issue of nationality, must be confirmed by real experience.

Analysis of Public Reaction to Draft of Uzbek Language Law

90US0098B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
2 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by B. Nazarov, doctor of philological sciences, and S. Zinin, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Draft Law of the Uzbek SSR on Language and Public Opinion in the Republic"]

[Text] The problem of the development and function of language affects all of society as well as each one of us. The interest that was aroused by the draft of the Law of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic on Language is justified. We can assert that the very publication of this document, regardless of the assessment of individual points, has played an enormous role. We have become witness to lawmaking that truly affects all the people—thousands upon thousands of comments are arriving from all corners of the republic.

Letters, speeches at meetings, publications ranging from republic newspapers and magazines to printed material...All of this must be examined, studied and compared. With this goal, the standing committees of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on legal matters, on questions of inter-national relations and on international education decided to form a work group.

Recruited for this work were representatives of scientific centers of the republic, of public organizations and of artists' unions. The work group is headed by Bakhtiyer Nazarov, director of the Institute of Languages and Literature of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, and members include Ilgiz Asfandiyarov, director of the languages department of the Tashkent Higher Party School, writer Yevgeniy Berezikov, Erkin Vakhidov, poet and chairman of the Children's Fund of Uzbekistan, Ninel Vladimirov, leading scientific worker of the Institute of Languages and Literature of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, Viktor Yegorov, director of the legal department of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, Sergey Zinin, department director of the Institute of Languages and Literature of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, Vasil Kabulov, director of the Kibernetika NPO [Scientific-Production Association], Bakhtiyer Karimov, senior scientific worker of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, poet Mirza Kenzhabayev, Aziz Kayumov, director of the Institute of Art of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, Iristoy Kuchkartayev, dean of the department of Uzbek philology of TashGU [Tashkent State University], Ayder Mamedov and Nizomitdin Makhmudov, department directors of the Tashkent Pedagogical Institute, Makhammad Salikh, secretary of the Uzbek Union of Writers, Dustzhon Nasirov, director of the Institute of History, Language and Literature of the Karakalpak affiliate of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, Pulat Nasyrov, sector director of the Institute of Economics of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, writer Timur Pulatov, Alibek Rustamov, department director in the Republic Pedagogical Institute on Russian Language and Literature, Davlyatbek Sagdullayev and Gaybulla Salomov, department directors at TashGU, Akmal Saidov, director of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Komsomol, Sadyk Safayev, sector director of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, Shavkat Urazayev, chairman of the legal department of TashGU, Azim Khadzhiyev, deputy director of the Institute of Languages and Literature of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, Ozod

Sharafutdinov, professor in the TashGU affiliate, Nuritdin Shukurov, professor at Samarkand University and Lyudmila Tyan, senior physician of the Tashkent House of the Child.

A number of specialists are also working with the group.

B. Nazarov, doctor of philosophical sciences, and S. Zinin, candidate of philological sciences, will discuss the preliminary results of the committee's work at the request of UzTAG [Uzbek Telegraph Agency].

The draft of the Uzbek SSR Law on Languages, published on 18 June 1989, attracted great interest. The very fact of the active participation of the population in discussing this document attests to the growth in national self-knowledge, the development of civic spirit and the activation of the process of democracy and glasnost.

Judging by the many comments made during the process of discussing this document, there were no age, educational or social limitations here. Academicians and students, war and labor veterans, farm workers and workers from industrial enterprises expressed their opinions on many questions regarding language building in Uzbekistan.

We cannot accept unreservedly all of the judgements that were expressed. Often they were based on subjective assessments of inter-national relations in the country, mechanically transferred to language relations, and sometimes emotions resulted in hasty and non-objective conclusions. But the main thing is that many constructive and useful proposals and insights have been made.

The working committee examined and generalized numerous materials. From the day of publication of the draft over 4,500 letters have been received from citizens, organizations, enterprises, institutitons, ministries and republic departments. They are signed by 151,000 persons.

All of the desires, proposals and criticisms of specific articles in the draft law have been subject to careful analysis on the pages of the newspaper and on radio and television programs. Also taken into account were proposals made at meetings and gatherings of labor collectives. A total of 225,000 comments dealing with both the general law and with each of its 39 articles were analyzed.

A number of letters assessed the work of the committee on preparing the draft law on languages—in addition to business-like proposals they also contain criticism. All of this is being taken into consideration.

Some opinions on the general questions of language building in Uzbekistan go beyond the framework of the proposed draft law. Some people are not satisfied with the indistinctiveness of the term "language;" others are worried about the question of the possible material and moral incentives for having a knowledge of the Uzbek language; still others are interested in language problems in connection with military service. We have come across demands to immediately change social-political terms, as for example to replace "international" with "binalmial" and "status" with "makom" and so forth.

In some letters and proposals it is possible to detect a negative attitude toward the title of the draft law. Basically the draft is criticized for its attempt, within the framework of one law, to meet the interests of all the national languages of Uzbekistan. In connection with this the following names have been proposed for the future law: "The Uzbek SSR Law on Language" (0.2 percent), "The Law on the Function of Language on the Territory of the Uzbek SSR" (0.3 percent), "The Uzbek SSR Law on the Uzbek Language and the Written Language" (0.04 percent) and others. But the absolute majority (99.2 percent) propose the following title for the draft law: "The Uzbek SSR Law on the Official Language," or as a variant, "The Uzbek SSR Law on Giving the Uzbek Language the Status of an Official Language."

Judging by the available materials, there is no widespread support for the proposal to recognize two or three official languages in the republic. Only 0.3 percent of correspondents were in favor of giving both Uzbek and Russian the status of official languages. This does not mean that there is a negative attitude toward the Russian language. Many feel that as the inter-national language Russian has already achieved its functional status in the country, and that for this reason there is no need to secure this right on the level of republic law. The Russian language must be viewed on the level of inter-republic, inter-state as well as of traditional means of international communication.

No question is being posed regarding giving other national languages the status of official languages in the republic because guarantees for their free development are secured in the USSR Constitution (Article 36). A very insignificant number of proposals deal with the question of giving the Uzbek language official status.

The committee has statistical data for every article in the draft law. Some articles gave rise to few remarks and proposals. It is possible that the content of such articles in the draft law satisfy the majority, but it is also possible that these articles are extraneous in the draft because they touch on the interests of a small group of the population. Fewer than 0.1 percent of the comments deal with, for example, Article 38, "The Order for Developing and Creating Precise Norms for the Uzbek Language," Article 2, "Guarantee of Language Development," Article 27, "The Language of Scientific Works," Article 36, "Responsibility for Violating Laws on Language," Article 37, "Adhering to Norms for the Uzbek Language," Article 30, "The Names of Administrative-Territorial Units," and Article 17, "Language in the Work of Legal Organs."

Rare comments were also made concerning the content of articles 4, 5, and 6, which deal with the competency of the Uzbek SSR and Karakalpak ASSR in the area of development and use of language. In the opinion of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences, these articles can be reduced to one article

giving the autonomous republic the right to itself deal with the question of the status of languages on its territory.

The content of the remaining articles in the draft brought about lively discussion. Sometimes contradictory opinions were expressed. Article 23, "Freedom to Select a Language in Education" received 72,426 comments. Here one can sense concern arising out of the unfounded opinion about the fact that if the Uzbek language receives the status of official language this will limit the selection of languages used in schools. In many meetings and gatherings and in letters proposals have been made to have the given article state: "The Uzbek language is learned on a mandatory basis in preschools, schools, and higher and secondary special education institutions."

Most of the non-Uzbek population is not opposed to the mandatory learning of the Uzbek language in the republic, especially within the public education system. More is said about improving the methodology for teaching the Russian-speaking population of Uzbekistan the language as a second language. A formal approach to this matter in past years had a negative effect on the development of Russian-Uzbek bilingualism, which in many cities of Uzbekistan is significantly inferior to Uzbek-Russian bilingualism.

Letters from Tashkent note that we must alter the practice of an entry examination to higher educational institutions, giving students the right to select the language they want to be educated in. Only after the exams should classes be formed according to language. Some letters express the desire that in preschools the Uzbek language become the language of the classroom for children of Uzbek nationality.

It is well known that the language of education has a serious effect on the knowledge of the native tongue. Letters from Fergana, Margilan and Kokand and from a group of engineers of the Tashkent Aviation PO [Political department] imeni Chkalov propose to supplement the content of the article, emphasizing that for people of Uzbek nationality the lack of knowledge of the native tongue is seen as a demonstration of disrespect for their own people and for their native tongue.

All of the aforementioned comments do not touch on the constitutional rights of the citizens of the USSR to select a language for education. This is attested to by the measures being implemented in Uzbekistan. In recent years schools have been opened in which classes are taught in the Uigher language, the network of schools where classes are in Tajik is expanding, and the question of schooling in the Korean language is being dealt with. Giving Uzbek the status of state official language will not violate these traditions, and the study of the Uzbek language in all schools and higher educational institutions will considerably ease inter-national contacts among the republic's populations. All of this was reflected in the draft CPSU platform, "The National Policy of the Party under Contemporary Conditions,"

where it is stated that in republics "there should be an unflinching preservation of the equality of languages and a free selection of the language of education."

In connection with this a large number of comments were directed at the content of Article 16, "Creating Conditions for the Study of Language." Many are not satisfied with the existing practice of studying the native, foreign and other languages within the school education system. But more attention in the letters is focused on achieving the conditions for teaching the Uzbek language everywhere.

The workers and kolkhoz farmers of Tashkent and Samarkand oblasts propose to supplement the given article with the following: "The workers of labor collectives are obligated in full measure to utilize the possibilities provided for them and to study the language of the indigenous nationality on a level adequate for fulfilling work duties." This point of view is supported by two-thirds of those who expressed their opinions on this article.

In examining the language of official documents (Article 14) 99 percent of those who sent in comments were unanimous in feeling that in Uzbekistan all official business correspondence should be carried out in the Uzbek language. Only 1 percent feel that the use of the Russian language in official correspondence will significantly facilitate the carrying out of all business in the republic. There are also compromise proposals, for example, of establishing a period of 5 years during which time a translation will be made to official business correspondence from Uzbek to Russian, with a transition to the Uzbek language in the future.

The assumptions of Article 13, "Language of Documents," are made more concrete primarily by means of strengthening the role of the Uzbek language. Evidently, while recognizing the existing tradition of using the Russian language in business correspondence, 17.1 percent insist on the mandatory preservation of bilingualism, and 18.8 percent feel that in places where the population is primarily native the native language can be used in business documents. The majority propose using the Uzbek language in documents.

It is interesting to note that in analyzing proposals for Article 15, "Accounting-Statistical and Financial Documentation in Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations," only 31.9 percent propose using the Uzbek language everywhere. The supporters of using only the Russian language in statistical business correspondence is also insignificant. The majority of the proposals are grouped around the use of the Uzbek and Russian languages, and in some cases some other languages as well (67.9 percent).

There were many comments about the second section of the draft law dealing with the rights and guarantees of the citizen in the selection of a language in official communications. Preference is given to the official language.

At a meeting in Keles a proposal was passed to have the comments and complaints of citizens written only in the Uzbek language, and those who do not speak this language must provide a translation at the expense of the submitter of the document. A similar approach is planned also in cases of communications in the state language in institutions in which this language for a particular reason is not used as the basic language, with the refinement that the response must be in the state language on a mandatory basis.

Many people probably know well the existing practice of using languages in cases where citizens have proposals, claims or complaints (Article 7), and for this reason the possibility exists to use the native language under such circumstances. Letters indicate a proposal concerning the mandatory knowledge of the Uzbek and Russian languages on the part of workers of institutions.

Differing opinions have been expressed about Article 8, "The Language of Appeal of Citizens to Workers in the Service Sphere." We can mention the following:

- workers in the service sphere are obliged to know the official language;
- on the territory of the republic workers in the service sphere are obligated to know the official language, and if necessary the Russian language, on a level that will enable the individual to carry out his job duties;
- workers in the service sphere must learn the Uzbek language within a short period of time—this is a mandatory requirement for hiring in the service sphere;
- workers in the service sphere do not have the right to refuse services under the pretext of not knowing the official language.

The contradictory nature of these proposals can be explained by the fact that right now we do not have the criteria for determining the level of knowledge of the second language. Who will determine the level of knowledge of another language as required to carry out work duties? Is there a direct tie between knowledge of the non-native tongue and professional training? Right now there are no answers to these questions, and this is why the proposal by the workers of the prosecutor's office in the city of Tashkent and by the collective of Samarkand University to provide an official interpretation of the term "mastery of the language," which will help in the future to avoid various types of conflicts in labor collectives, is appropriate.

In determining the language of work of the state organs of the Uzbek SSR (Article 9) 82 percent feel that the language at meetings and conferences must be the official language and that the documents related to them must be in the official language, with translations into Russian or other languages only if necessary.

A similar picture is observed in discussions on Article 10, "The Language of Publication of Laws and Other

Legal Acts." The majority of people feel that all laws must be passed only in the Uzbek language, and the translation into other languages can be made at the request of large non-Uzbek populations living in Uzbekistan.

The role of the Uzbek language must be strengthened in determining the language of communication with general union organs and with foreign governments (Article 11). It is proposed that the texts of any official documents be composed in the Uzbek language, with equivalent documents in Russian or foreign languages.

In connection with Article 24, "On the Old Uzbek Written Language," specific measures for realization have been indicated. It is proposed to begin the study of this written language in general education schools teaching the Uzbek language, in all humanistic departments and in teaching institutions; in schools the study of the old Uzbek script should begin in the second grade (1-2 hours per week, and for the adult population—in special groups and courses). It is recommended that the newspaper SHARK TONGI [ZARYA VOSTOKA] be published weekly in the Old Uzbek script, and that other Uzbek newspapers allocate space for materials using this script.

About 9 percent of the people feel that we must legally secure conditions that will enable the Uzbek language to make the transition to the Old Uzbek written language by the year 2000.

The content of Article 26, "Mandatory Study of Languages," also did not leave people indifferent. Proposals have been made to supplement it with the words, "in educational institutions."

In materials less attention is given to the study of the Russian language as the second language, and on the pages of the newspaper YESH LENINCHI a proposal was made to replace the phrase "Mandatory study of the Russian language" by "To study the Russian language voluntarily." Not too many proposals have been made on ways to improve the study of the Uzbek language as a native tongue even though here many problems have accumulated requiring an immediate decision in order to improve the general literacy rate and level of language quality.

There are few letters which state that it is necessary to precisely determine the organization that will implement controls over the study of the Uzbek language. Deserving of attention is the proposal on the creation of a department of Uzbek language within the system of technical and other non-humanities higher educational institutions.

Letters, meetings and the newspaper UZBEKISTON ADAVIYETI VA SANATI propose to supplement Article 26 with the following words: "The Uzbek SSR on its territory trains people in all specialties in higher and secondary specialized educational institutions using the Uzbek language."

This overview will not be able to relate in detail all of the proposals that have been made. Every day we receive new letters, new publications appear, and recommendations are heard in labor collectives.

The following fact is noteworthy. During the first days after the publication of the draft Law on Language there were many letters in which emotionalism predominated. Undoubtedly, in the published draft we find many unsolved questions, but after all is the reason for publication. Through joint efforts, considering the interests of all strata of the population of the republic, we wish to develop a platform that will enable us to implement language building in Uzbekistan without violating the rights of various nationalities, guaranteeing them free language development.

It is clear that many questions that previously were hushed up now cannot have just one solution, but a pluralism of opinion should not result in national confrontation.

Among supporters of giving the Uzbek language official status there are people who are trying to rigidly and monopolistically confirm only the Uzbek language in the republic. With this goal in mind they propose a short period of time for the study of the official language by the non-Uzbek population (1-3 years) although as of yet the study of language by coercion has not yet brought positive results anywhere.

All efforts must be directed at developing a public need for the study of the official language. Those who feel that a knowledge of languages is enriching, that through language one can understand people of any nationality, are correct.

Unjustified is the opinion of that portion of the Russian-speaking population which feels that the acceptance of the official language will violate the rights of other languages, including Russian. The language of international communication in the country will continue to occupy a worthy place within the language system of the republic. Here we do not need theoretical foundations; life itself confirms this conclusion. What we must do is develop a feeling of mutual respect and support and a friendly attitude in language relations. The language is the soul of the people and for this reason it must be treated with great respect and tact without considering only immediate interests.

Many of the published articles of the draft law require detailed commentary. Unfortunately, this was not done at the initial stage of assessment of the important given document. This kind of commentary will be necessary in the future—work on it must begin now.

The indeterminate nature of the time frame for its implementation is a source of sharp criticism of the draft law. A special group within the UzSSR Council of Ministers is now working on this. It would be justified to

introduce for general discussion the proposed schedule for the introduction of the law as a whole and of its individual articles.

One final comment. Sometimes fears are expressed that the proposals that have been made will not be taken into consideration during the final elaboration of the law text. The confirmation of the law is a matter for the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. It is the task of the working committee to generalize and bring all proposals to the attention of directive organs.

It is possible that it will be appropriate to publish a more precise variant of the draft for general evaluation prior to final confirmation by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet.

Uzbek Political, Religious Leaders View Republic's Nationality Tensions

Tashkent Obkom Secretary Fazylov

*90US0431A Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian
No 11, Nov 89 pp 12-15*

[Interview with E. Fazylov by O. Brushlinskaya: "Perestroika: Experience, Problems: Wherein Lies the Root of the Evil?"]

[Text] Ergash Ismailovich Fazylov, secretary of the Uzbek CP Tashkent Obkom, corresponding member of UzSSR Academy of Sciences: "I am firmly convinced that the tense atmosphere in the republics and the destabilization of life, which are ready at any moment to develop into the conflagration of the next conflict, are created, supported, and saturated by the opponents of perestroika, by those who know that there is no place for them in a law-governed state. Their purpose is served by the appeals 'to clear our native land of migrants, foreigners, and adherents of other creeds,' and it is they who are attempting to suggest to people that the entire blame for all our woes lies not in the times of stagnation and what they gave rise to, but in the other nations and nationalities, and that the lies, crimes, social injustice, and illegality that flourished in our society, and which to this day have not withered away, were the invention of the center and the existing regime, which assigned themselves the goal of destroying the Central Asian and other nations. We are facing a danger when, instead of democracy, we can receive new forms of a totalitarian state. But the only way that it is possible to change the situation for the better is by uniting efforts."

Things are easy nowadays for party administrators. The bulk of the errors made in previous years is too great and too complicated, contradicting the changeover to the new forms of organizing economic and political life. Add to this the glasnost that openly illuminates all the on-the-job and moral qualities of any leader. People want to know to whom they can entrust the resolution of the problems that affect their everyday needs, and how those problems are being resolved. The authority of a person's position has receded into the background today, and what is in the foreground is the administrator's personality. As I was on

my way to meet the secretary of the party's Tashkent Obkom, I must confess, I was of two minds. On the one hand, Ergash Ismailovich Fazylov is a recognized expert in the field of Eastern studies, and the author of fundamental works that have put him in the rank of the world's leading Turkologists. The Turkish Academy of History, Art, Literature, Folklore, and Language elected him as a member, and for several years he headed the Turkological Center of Berlin University. He has an outstanding orientation in the current sharp discussions about the language, history, and culture of the Central Asian nations and about the role of Islam in their spiritual life. However, when a person is engaged in science, that develops his unique style of thinking and way of life, and forms extremely specific experience. How are the obkom secretary's relations with the masses that are awakening from political apathy forming?

[O. Brushlinskaya] Ergash Ismailovich, what led you, a classic author in the field of Eastern studies, into politics? To the best of my knowledge, you have already been engaging in politics for three years.

[E. Fazylov] Actually it has been much longer than that. It is only at first glance that the field of Eastern studies is not linked with politics. I have devoted my entire life to science, and I am 55 years old. But I never succeeded in engaging exclusively in it. It has always pushed me into contact with politics, and that is natural, since definite trends in science lead directly to ideology. And for a long time the people who "ruled the ball" in our society were those who, in their interests, replaced the scientific truths by opportunistic lies: the criteria of creative labor were distorted, the sphere of science was filled with poorly-educated people who had a complete mastery of the art of stifling independent thinking and who lost a concept that they no longer needed—the concept of the purity of moral relations. They applied to me also their rather reliable system—"don't let them go." There were terrible acts of destruction in the spiritual sphere. The undermining of the nation's morality, the almost total hypocrisy, the social passivity, submissiveness, subservience, and profound deformation of moral standards. Is it really possible in just one hour to rid oneself of all these sins of the period of stagnation and of their bearers? They operated in the name of the party and they caused considerable damage to its authority. They undermined the nation's trust in it. And today, having recovered from the blow of the first purifying wave of perestroika, they are operating for the most part behind the scenes, attempting to use the informal groups and associations that are demonstrating in the name of the Uzbek nation, and by speculating on national feelings, directing those groups and associations along a pernicious path—the path of hatred and distrust of other nations and peoples.

[O. Brushlinskaya] That is, you want to say that, in the movement for national rebirth, there are forces that are attempting to turn it against their very own nation, to drive that nation down a blind alley? However, the movement itself arose on completely real grounds—we see and we know that the nation's national life, its

morality, and its dignity were tremendously damaged (I want to emphasize that I do not consider this to be a phenomenon that is purely Uzbek or one that is in general inherent in some specific nationality, and I particularly do not know which nation in our country avoided this). So, during our days of renewal that has been proclaimed and this is to be carried out, there is a natural and understandable desire to return to one's roots, and, as it were, to begin afresh the path from that moment at which our misfortunes began, and then to proceed along in the proper direction, to correct, to give back, to make up for what was lost...

[E. Fazylov] Who would argue with that... We are greatly distressed by the loss of the precious features of our national life and for a long time we shall continue to grasp our head in our hands as we become aware of the scope of the destruction. We have here all the public initiatives, their creative charge, everything that is being done to consolidate society around the idea of perestroika and renewal—this is a blessing, and it is necessary. One cannot fail to share the emotions, or to understand the causes that encourage, for example, the Birlik (Unity) society of informal organizations to engage in assertive actions. The nation's misfortunes are such that it is simply impossible to remain seated with one's arms folded.

How can one fail to understand those who today, at meetings, at rallies, in the mass press, and on television and radio, sound the alarm: monuments of culture are being destroyed; medicine is at a very low level; and many of our excellent traditions have been forgotten—our pain and the tragedy of our land is the high infant mortality rate; the Aral Sea is dying; the pollution of the environment; the unrestrained use of defoliants and the domination of the single-crop mentality, which had a terrible effect upon the health of hundreds of thousands of people, and child labor on the cotton plantations. That is the misfortune that we all have in common. It has been faithfully reflected both in the programs and in the appeals sounded by the informal organizations.

But we evaluate any program of actions on the basis of how it answers the questions: who is to blame? why did that happen? what should be done to correct the situation and to avoid it in the future? What caused our national life to go into a decline? And also our morality? Why has society become so wallowed in corruption that it cannot get completely rid of it or of shady economic practices? So far, in the programs that I have managed to become acquainted with, I have not seen any profound analysis of the problems. Those programs contain a rather large amount of ordinary demagoguery and one sees revealed a large lack of knowledge concerning the question, and a lack of experience. But one can also discern the purposeful exertion of an influence upon the emotions and the instincts of people with insufficient awareness. For example, at rallies and in leaflets the statement is frequently made that it is the Europeans who are to blame for everything. They are the ones who made us practically "mankurty" [mindless slaves], who

deprived us of the opportunity to absorb our native culture, who want to destroy our language and our nature. Sometimes it is simply said that the people of different nations and religious professions who are living alongside of the Uzbeks are making them poorer and more wretched by taking their land and their jobs away from them...

[O. Brushlinskaya] If one accepts this logic and explains the misfortunes of each nation by the fact that there are some who want to "eliminate the nation," then apparently it is necessary to try to find out which nation destroyed the Russian village, killed the Volga, and deprived the Nonchernozem Region of its vital resources, isn't it? Then the Dnestr was destroyed by enemies specifically of the Moldavian nation, and Chernobyl was directed against the Ukrainians and the Belorussians...

[E. Fazylov] That series—of various misfortunes suffered by various nations—unfortunately can be extended, but it specifically attests to the fact that the misfortune is something that we share in common. All nations have a common enemy, and the only way to salvation is by acting together. The components of our misfortunes are international and extraterritorial. But each posing of the question—concerning the guilt that one nation has to another—has its authors, and that posing is extremely beneficial for certain people. And, taking advantage of the nation's ignorance, some things are simply "forgotten," while other things, conversely, are treated as fetishes. And then the bright, pure ideas of the national rebirth and of renewal, ideas that undoubtedly inspire the majority of the movement's participants, are distorted and transformed into nationalistic ones, that is, they carry within themselves the infringement of the interests of other peoples, of another nation, and hence, necessarily, of their own nation as well.

[O. Brushlinskaya] A shady economy needs a shady ideology. One of its components is the propagandizing of Russophobia, the preaching of a decisive secession from the West, the opposing of cultures and the way of life, up to and including irreconcilability, and incidentally with the aid of religion.

[E. Fazylov] I consider anti-European moods and slogans to be anti-perestroika ones. A course aimed at exclusivity, isolation, and separation does not have any prospects under our conditions. And if you engage in politics, it is necessary to see what processes can guarantee a normal future. Throughout the world—is everyone really more stupid than we are!—a process of consolidation is occurring; there is a process of the unifying of efforts wherever this is possible. "Europe is a home that we share in common," the civilized nations state today, and the states are opening their borders.

I feel that we do not have any serious reasons for mutual distrust or for the opposing of nations, but all the prerequisites for normal cooperation do exist. Moreover,

it is definitely not mandatory to accept, say, the standards of the European way of life. In our society this happened quite recently—the skullcap and our national costume, and many everyday standards of life, used to be considered a sign of backwardness. And yet that way of life, if one examines it with the eyes of a rank-and-file Uzbek worker, is natural and necessary for him. It took many centuries to develop the canvas for his behavior in life, his orientation in society and in the world. To a large extent, this was done with the aid of Islam. But is this stability really a sign of backwardness? When I protest against anti-European slogans, I definitely do not want that way of life to be destroyed. And I am completely in agreement that it is ridiculous and wild when uninformed people from the center resolve specific questions that are linked with the situation in the republics, and when some people assert that, in addition to cadres being shipped into the republic from the outside, "honesty is being shipped in." The crux of the matter lies elsewhere. It is just as ridiculous and wild to forget or to break the steady ties that our culture has had with Russian culture, to forget everything good that Russian scientists and intellectuals have done for our nation.

[O. Brushlinskaya] These moods, unfortunately, are widespread. They have also been reflected in the letters to the editor that we receive. Certain correspondents from areas to which Islam has spread are indignant: why do Russian writers and scientists write about our prophet Mohammed? Both in culture policy and in official opinion it used to be considered quite recently that the persons who should be allowed to engage in the national cultures, Islam, etc. are the representatives of the particular nations, but it is rather "unethical" for "nonbelievers" to engage in this.

[E. Fazylov] There is not much wisdom in that kind of culture policy. But it does have deep roots and a long history. As long ago as the late 1940's a shameful campaign was organized against Academician A. N. Kononov. As a sign of gratitude to the Uzbek nation, which had helped him, as well as a large number of evacuated Leningraders, to survive during the war years, that outstanding Turkologist created the first scientific grammar of the Uzbek language. It is a class work, about which dozens of articles have been written in the West, a work through which they became aware of the modern Uzbek language! And that work has not yet been translated in our republic...

Three Russian Turkologists in studying the heritage of Alisher Navoi, in interpreting his multifaceted creativity, did more than entire collectives at our institutes. A. N. Kononov prepared the first scientific edition of Navoi's "Vozlyublennyye serdets" [Our Hearts' Beloved]. Academician Ye. E. Bertels wrote so completely and so accurately about that poet that no one can write anything more about him, although dozens of scientists are engaged in a study of Navoi's work. Academician N. I. Konrad in August 1968 read a paper on Navoi's place in world culture. The great poet's words, quoted in that paper, sounded forth across five centuries

as an evaluation of present-day events: "A nation cannot be free and happy if it oppresses other nations." By no means has everything that was done by Russian specialists in Eastern studies for our culture become the property of the Uzbek nation. Here too I see a definite policy. For some people it is simply necessary for a nation to remain in a state of perpetual sleep and ignorance, and for everything that is offered to it be taken as the highest wisdom.

Nevertheless, I believe and I know that the charge of morality in our nation has not been exhausted. The degree to which that charge is great indicates at least the attitude that the Uzbeks took to the nations that had been forcibly resettled from their homelands, and who had found themselves in an alien environment not only without means of subsistence, but also without language. They understood their misfortune and they helped them. And today a tremendous guilt is borne by those who taught the gullible members of our youth how to hate other nations, who incited them to violence, and now those people will bear for the rest of their lives the terrible seal of the evil deed that they committed. The events in Fergana and Kokanda and the acts of vandalism in other places are also a break with traditions, the violation of man's spiritual system, the deformity of awareness. But we are reaping what was stubbornly and persistently sown for many years.

The word which, in the Uzbek language, means the intelligentsia—"ziyoli," "he who emanates light"—has lost its meaning. "Ziyoli" are not mass-produced. There were not too many of them, those philosophers, connoisseurs of poetry, and connoisseurs of the spoken word. But they felt that they had been **received a gift**, and, consequently, they had the **responsibility** to carry culture to people. They were models of moral purity. Almost all of them were annihilated or sent to concentration camps for many years... Only a handful of them are still alive. But the place of these people in the nation's spiritual life remains unoccupied. One of them, Kutbuddin Mukhitdinov, served his sentence with A. I. Solzhenitsyn. After he returned, by now 70 years of age, he defended his candidate's dissertation in philology—he translated from the Persian a philological treatise devoted to Alisher Navoi and was one of the chief compilers of the first explanatory dictionary dealing with the poet's work. But you would not believe how many denunciations had been written about him! And about me, as his scientific advisor. The basic crime of which he was accused was not even the fact that he did not have a Soviet diploma certifying his higher education, but the fact that he was a believer. His defense of his dissertation took place during what was then the latest flareup in the struggle against Islam...

[O. Brushlinskaya] Ergash Ismailovich, today a rather large number of people link the wild outburst of violence, the triumph of immorality, and the loss of traditions with the departure from Islam, with the struggle that was waged against it, and they hope that the return to religion, the turning of the largest possible number of

people to it, will promote the rebirth of the nation's spirituality and of national culture, and the purification of mores.

[E. Fazylov] I am not one of those people who believe in the reliability and universality of this path. National culture was not always closely joined with Islam, or by no means in all respects. It is the same with morality. In the tradition of the rich Turkic-language literature—and it has accumulated the wisdom of the ages, so that I rely upon that wisdom—there is a critical attitude toward Islam, especially to those numerous ministers of it whom religion could not guard against immoral, sinful acts. Moreover, I think that the flourishing of Islam, the expansion of the sphere of its action, is also the path to keeping the nation in an inert, non-initiatory, humble position, which is advantageous for some people. It is not precluded that this can lead to phenomena that are currently unforeseen. History attests to the fact that many brilliant minds put their hopes on Islam, but they were not justified. Now it is possible to turn to Islam. Possibly, I do not deny, certain restraining cores in the Islamic way of life will indeed bring a benefit, especially since, for certain people, this is the most accessible form of assimilating moral standards.

When we began to learn of the crimes committed by party and other figures who had robbed primarily their own nation, I tried especially to find out whether religious figures were linked with them. I had previously assumed that that was completely probable. But what became known to me from investigator Boris Yevgenyevich Sviderskiy, who has been conducting the Adylov case, exceeded my conjectures. The corrupted elements with party cards had supported the *ishans*—both with financial and other means—and those ministers of Islam created myths concerning their patrons (including, incidentally, Rashidov), to the effect that they were ideal people. Most frequently they repeated the principle stated in the Koran: "Be obedient to the possessors of power among you," if, of course, you are real Muslims. Adylov was helped in all his affairs by *imam* Alimov, who received sizeable support from him. Another person who had his own *ishan* was A. Karimov, a Bukhara millionaire and former first secretary of a party obkom. Whom here did Islam save from immorality? Many religious figures continue to this day to live in a truly luxurious manner. But they have attracted to themselves the dissatisfaction of the Muslims, a dissatisfaction that is directed by the so-called *wahhabites*—warriors for the purity of Islam. This movement also is a source of tension, and it must be studied. As happens so often in similar movements, the matter is not limited simply to religion. But who among us will study that movement? Our specialists in the field of atheism, until that movement, as the expression goes, shows up on our threshold, have stated repeatedly that it does not and cannot exist.

[O. Brushlinskaya] Until recently, those atheists stubbornly repeated that our atheism does not need any perestroika. What do you think about atheistic work, atheistic education, taking into consideration the new

conditions in which Islam's sphere of influence and actions apparently will broaden?

[E. Fazylov] Our atheistic work has always managed to exist completely separately from and independently of the real functioning of religion, "refuting" the theoretical principle that states that atheism, as criticism of religion, still depends upon the object of criticism. I know that the International Organization of Freedom of the Press and Information has developed a comprehensive scientific program for combatting "atheistic doctrines," for the implementation of which funds in the millions are being lavishly allocated. However, I still cannot understand what doctrine was had in mind, for example, in our republic, where, to this very day, there is no single comprehensive scientific program dealing with atheistic education. Speaking truthfully, I do not know a single highly educated, major specialist in the field of religion. The works created by our atheists are secondary, and their elaborations dealing with atheism are clumsy and meaningless. They contain no sense, if, for example, they do not in any way reflect the most typical factor in today's religious life, the previously mentioned **wahhabism**. Incidentally, it has not been recognized by our republic's leading ideologists. And this is why: they thought that, by recognizing it, they would reveal their own feebleness, their inability to work.

Let's leaf through Western publications about our Islam—they provide more of an inner sensation of Islam in us than the items published by our own specialists—either in the center or in the outlying areas. For us, it is not our life that frequently serves as the source of books and articles on religion, but the research there. Whoever has read the work of Sovietologists A. Bennigsen and E. Wimbush "Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union" will easily see the "creative laboratory" of I. Belyayev, the author of the article "Islam and Politics" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 13 and 20 May, 1987), in which, speaking now in his own name, he frightened us with the Islam threat. Religion must be studied in life and on the basis of original sources. We must, without stinting on expenditures, send young, intelligent people to Muslim countries to receive training. Let them graduate from a good school. In this way we can create a cadre base for this oblast. But in our society harmful things are occurring in atheistic work. The way of life and religion are being ignorantly confused, and the struggle is being waged not against Islam, but against the traditional way of life, against the populist view of the world, against the folk, national customs.

The time for dialogue has come. According to my observations, the Muslim clergy wants to participate in it. And, of course, this also makes serious demands on atheists. The game with one goal post has ended. At our university, at a meeting with students, *mufti* Mukhammad-Sodik was asked whether he could speak during the discussions on religion. He answered that he was ready to do so at any time. Are the atheists ready?

[O. Brushlinskaya] Ergash Ismailovich, it is impossible not to touch upon the problem of language. That problem is linked literally with everything that you and I have been discussing. What is your attitude toward the idea that is hotly defended by the majority of the intellectuals—the idea of the status of statehood for the Uzbek language?

[E. Fazylov] The unrest concerning language, of course, did not arise out of nowhere. Language has been on the decline. Properly speaking, the state of affairs with language is the same as with the knowledge of history or with culture as a whole. If you do not know your own language, you will not know others either, and without that it is impossible nowadays to live normally. The Uzbek language must have the status of statehood, and the state must be concerned about expanding the sphere of its functioning. But... Let's take a practical approach. In Uzbekistan one-third of the population does not speak Uzbek. But during the past 25 years not a single curriculum for studying the Uzbek language in the non-Uzbek school has been created. How can it be taught to other nations? In Estonian SSR, 50 million rubles have been allocated for the study of language by the republic's Russian and other population. For us that amount of money is a drop in the bucket, but today we do not have even that at our disposal. Our economic currently could not cope with the changing over, for example, of business correspondence to Uzbek. In order to do this, if only to carry out the ties with other republics and countries, it will be necessary to have a number of translators and interpreters that would take many years to train. As a Turkologist, I might dream of this ideal state of affairs: every republic must have a reliable, scientific curriculum for studying the basic language, a language-study center for all the nations living in that republic, and centers for the rapid and reliable study of Western languages. Western researchers long ago came to the conclusion of the favorable influence exerted upon the individual by the knowledge not only of two languages, but also of several languages. That is what we should be thinking about.

[O. Brushlinskaya] In the situation that you have described, it would seem to be problematical to carry out the appeals to return to the old Uzbek language in which that great cultural heritage was created.

[E. Fazylov] Do you mean the demands to return to the Arabic alphabet?

[O. Brushlinskaya] Yes, because in the programs of the national movements of Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and certain other republics where Islam has traditionally spread, the return to the Arabic writing system is one of the basic demands, and the rebirth of the language and of culture is linked with it. Your colleague, AzSSR academician and Turkologist Z. Bunyatov, and other scientists consider the replacement of the Arabic alphabet—first by Latin characters, and then by Cyrillic—to be a crime. That replacement, which, in their opinion, was done coercively, by way of an official order, deprived the

nations of the opportunity to gain a complete knowledge of their history and culture. In addition, these linguists assert, the current writing system impoverishes the language.

[E. Fazylov] Discussions about the old writing system are today one of the sources of tension in our republic. Especially since I feel it necessary to introduce clarity into this problem. I realize that when these discussions are being conducted, say, by young people from the informal associations, they might not know the history of the question or its scientific aspect. But when this is being discussed by scientists, who are even specialists... I assume that they ought to know that the Arabic writing system was created for the Semitic languages and could not convey the phonetic structure, and especially the vowel system, of the Turkic languages. We might recall Turkey—it was not accidental that, during the period of its national rebirth and general upsurge, that country changed over to the Latin alphabet, and, incidentally, that was done with the blessing of the linguistic scientists. At one time, earlier than Turkey, the Hungarians had rejected the Arabic writing system. In Central Asia, at the very beginning of the replacement of the Arabic writing system, great scientists were involved, and that was long before the revolution, much less the appearance of the system of administration by fiat.

In 1921 the All-Uzbek Congress on Questions of Language and Orthography was conducted, and those questions were considered not from a political point of view, but from the point of view of scientific practice. One of the congress organizers was the author of the first Uzbek school grammars, outstanding philologist Abdurauf Fitrat. He said, "The time requires the most rapid elimination of illiteracy, and all the prerequisites for this exist. The Arabic alphabet, with its complexity and its lack of strict rules, is unsuitable for the Uzbek language." It was impossible to make tremendous masses of the nation literate by using the Arabic writing system. And the changeover to the new alphabet was not a reactionary act, as it is currently fashionable to state for revolutionary purposes.

Now I would like to discuss the reality and desirability of returning to the Arabic writing system. I am conversing with a young specialist in the humanities, an ardent champion of the Arabic writing system. I show him his own published works on the monuments of the fourteenth century, printed in the Arabic writing system. "Read them!" He cannot. And he had never attempted to study it, even though his field is literature and culture, and he had received his higher education long ago. But who is preventing you from studying old Uzbek texts, our precious heritage, if you consider the language in which they were written to be a symbol of national rebirth? But this is a tremendous amount of labor, and it is by no means everyone who is up to it, even those who can read the Arabic alphabet. And as for getting to know the very culture of the nation that has been torn away from it—previously for social reasons, but today because of lack of knowledge of the writing system—why is it that

scientists in the field of Eastern studies, historians, philologists, and their entire institutes have made no attempt to make available to the masses everything that is the best that is being preserved in libraries, collections of manuscripts, and in private collections? Why have they not translated them into the modern writing system, and provided them with commentaries, thus making them accessible to the nation, a literate nation? Why not prepare and carry out consistently that program of publishing the nation's heritage—at least by the Institute of Eastern Studies that is headed by Academician Bunyatov? We are more concerned with ascertaining which classic author belongs to whom—the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, the Tajiks, or the Azerbaijanis. People have been making a fetish of great names, have been limiting their importance by giving proof that they were classic authors of one specific nation. This creates authority among the masses: see! someone wanted to take our classic author away from us, but I defended him. But culture cannot be taken away from any nation. For example, the entire Eastern tradition is linked with Alisher Navoi, Nizami, Khodzhendi, Rumi, and a multitude of other brilliant names. And Nizami, for example, belongs in equal measure to the culture of the Azerbaijanis, the Tajiks, and, of course, the Iranians. Those poets and philosophers whom we consider to be exclusively Azerbaijani or Uzbek classic authors, are studied in Turkey as their classic authors. And they themselves, incidentally, did not consider themselves to be Azerbaijanis, or Uzbeks, or Tajiks, or Turks. And is this really the crux of the matter? These great people had enough fire for everyone, but it is bad when that fire is used to heat people's hands, instead of being carried to as large a number of people as possible, in order to make a great heritage everyone's property...

[O. Brushlinskaya] Certain scientists feel that the replacement of the Arabic writing system was linked exclusively (or largely) with the tasks of combatting Islam, since, for a Muslim, the Arabic letters have sacral meaning, and they were replaced to prevent the people from reading the sacred texts, and also, at the same time, to deprive the clergy of the monopoly in teaching people how to read and write...

[E. Fazylov] Properly speaking, I have answered those scientists. But it must be added that when the struggle against Islam spread, many atheists, knowing nothing about it except that its sacred texts are written in Arabic, considered all the books written in that writing system to be religious works and destroyed them in an atheistic frenzy. That vandalism, like many other manifestations of it, can only be deplored. It destroyed entire strata of culture. I know of instances when people were killed on the basis of a denunciation stating that they had in their possession at home books written in Arabic. But, then too, a large number of people also suffered because of the Bible. We will have to carry out a tremendous amount of spiritual work to recreate a completely integrated, single, indivisible morality and to give the nation a knowledge of its heritage, which provides us with models of service

to values shared by humanity as a whole, and to educate in people an inner culture that cannot be measured by the number of television sets per capita of population, by fashionable clothing, or even by the overall increase in material prosperity, but only by the level of morality and spirituality...

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Central Asian Muslim Chairman

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Interview with USSR People's Deputy Mufti Mukhammad-Yusuf Mukhammad-Sodik, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: "We Are in Favor of the Good and of Justice"]

[Text] [Interviewer] *Mufti-hazrat*, you are the first spiritual leader of a major religious association to have been elected to that position democratically, as a result of the expression of the will of the Muslims of Central Asian and Kazakhstan. This attests to the fact that you are well aware of the life of Muslims, their moods, and their hopes. But what is their attitude toward perestroika, to that renewal that is occurring in our country and in Central Asia?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Muslims welcome the moral renewal of society. It affects their vital needs. They want to live according to the laws of good and of justice. Until recently there were few opportunities for this—I am speaking about Central Asia, since I know the state of affairs here. There was also trouble here in the arrangement of our religious life. Both at the fault of the authorities and at the fault of a number of religious figures. Currently, all things considered, changes for the better have begun. We have seen that the republic's leadership has turned its face toward believers, we have seen that in the country today there is a respectful, worthy attitude toward their views and convictions. Religious figures are receiving the opportunity to get in touch with people over the television and through newspapers. Muslims have perceived as a good sign the transferral to them of a sacred relic—Osman's Koran, which used to be kept in a state institution, which is not proper for a sacred object. That act became possible under the conditions of perestroika. The mosques that had been taken away from Muslims in previous times are being gradually returned to them. All this increases people's trust in the authorities.

Perestroika calls for moral purification. Its task is to free society of various social evils. Our religion requires the same thing. Islam bans alcohol, prostitution, narcotics addiction, and bribery. But not too long ago, in the struggle against these and other sins, we frequently felt that we were acting all alone. But today our entire nation and the entire country have undertaken the purification, and this gives Muslims hope for the better.

[Interviewer] It is gratifying that we can see, right before our eyes, in all spheres, an increase in people's rate of

participation—not just of believers, but also of nonbelievers. I think that the processes that are occurring in secular life also open up for believers the opportunity to manifest their will. Thus, in your part of the country, in Central Asia, Muslims have come forth with their demands relative to the organization of religious life and have elected a new *mufti*.

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Yes, they have felt the wind of changes. Glasnost has made it possible to express oneself frankly about everything, since religion—whether it be Islam or another religion—does not live solely by itself. It is influenced by everything that is occurring in society—both the bad and the good. Believers want to live decently, on the basis of justice.

[Interviewer] What specific problems were discussed at the Muslim *kurultay* congress that elected you as *mufti*?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] It was the fourth congress in the history of our Spiritual Administration. The delegates were elected democratically, rather than being appointed, as had been the procedure previously. The religious associations themselves decided whom to delegate—an *imam*, other member of the clergy, or a rank-and-file believer. The discussions were very lively. Everyone who wanted to express himself could do so. And we had accumulated a large number of problems. One of the most acute ones was the priest's level of knowledge and level of actions. There are not enough literate mullahs. That was mentioned at the congress. Random people are becoming mullahs. This is harming Islam. Muslims used to acknowledge that all of us, because of our everyday cares, forget about our duty—the duty to help the unfortunate ones... At the *kurultay* a large number of statements from believers and of various communications were handed over to the Spiritual Administration. We studied them and are currently working by taking their wishes into consideration. In general the gates of the Spiritual Administration are open to everyone, and both I myself and my assistants are ready to listen to what every Muslim has to say...

[Interviewer] M. S. Gorbachev remarked in one of his statements that the country has regions where the soil for phenomena of stagnation is still preserved, where perestroika is being obviously delayed. How is this process developing in Central Asia? How is the renewal in the religious sphere progressing?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Essentially speaking, perestroika came to us after 3 February [Ed. note: The day of the Muslims' demonstration and rally in Tashkent]. At the rally the Muslims stated that they were demonstrating against the time of stagnation, against the bureaucratic methods that had penetrated into the religious sphere. People were deeply insulted by the fact that certain religious figures had violated the precepts of Islam and had been very remote from the believers' needs. When an Islamic priest has only a weak knowledge of certain details concerning religion, when he does not have a thorough knowledge of our Prophet's *Sunnath*en that is, of course, bad. But that can be

forgiven. It is something that can be corrected. But if he loses his moral authority, there is no way that he should remain a spiritual mentor for Muslims.

[Interviewer] Muslims had the opportunity to elect their spiritual leader freely. This time they did not have any candidate forced on them "from above." And they elected you. Our readers, who include a rather large number of believers, would like to know a bit about you.

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] I would describe myself briefly in this way. I grew up in a religious family. My father was an *imam* in a mosque in Andizhan Oblast. He brought up his children in a religious spirit. I have two brothers and a sister. We received our first lessons in the Arabic language, our first knowledge about the Koran, in our family. Then I attended the Bukhara *medrese*, and then the Tashkent Islamic Institute. For a year I worked in the editorial office of MUSULMANE SOVETSKOGO VOSTOKA magazine, so that, in a way, you and I are colleagues. I completed my education in Libya, at the Islamic Appeal University. I graduated there in 1980. In 1982 I was appointed the prorector of the Islamic Institute, and then rector. And now...

[Interviewer] Yes, now you an extremely responsible job. But you are already a USSR people's deputy. What, then, is of primary importance in your programs—as a *mufli* and as a figure in the soviets?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] In their main features, I cannot differentiate between these programs. We are all concerned about the moral level of society. We are particularly alarmed about our youth. At the present time a mass of adolescents walk the streets, with nowhere to go, with nothing to do. Their emotions, their soul, their mind have not been educated. We can expect of them any outbursts of aggression and violence, and we have been convinced of this. Certainly, society as a whole should think about this. But everyone has his own means. I see their spiritual protection, the saving of their souls, in attracting adolescents to attend classes in the mosque, because, according to Islam, a mosque is not only a place where one comes to pray, but also a social and educational center. During the times of the Prophet, all the matters pertaining to the community were discussed in the mosque. But now we open the mosque only for prayer. I hope that we shall restore the tradition. Then people can meet here, exchange the news, find out who is sick and who has had a misfortune or a job, and who needs help, and they can organize help for needy old men and widows. Previously, public opinion used to form in the mosques, but even that function has also been almost completely nullified. In the rebirth of the mosques I see one of the reliable means of fulfilling my program as a people's deputy—to use all my efforts to promote the moral purification of society. Of course, we would want to obtain a broader audience, to speak on the radio and television and in the press. We have large opportunities, and I state that with complete responsibility.

[Interviewer] An acute problem in Central Asia is the problem of the children's mortality rate and the health of

women and children. By attempting to have as many children as possible, Muslims are convinced that this is a requirement of Islam. And yet not every family can provide a good education or assure that the children will grow up healthy. Sometimes doctors advise a woman not to have children for reasons of her health, but she risks her life anyway by proceeding to have a ninth or a tenth child.

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Islam's advice is "Have many children." But a Muslim is required to bring them up as healthy, fully realized individuals. And if this is impossible, it will not be a sin if the number of children is smaller than the parents would want. However, it is frequently is not a family matter when the children are sick and feeble. It is necessary to resolve the social problems. The calamitous condition with regard to children's health was mentioned at the Congress of People's Deputies. And that was linked with the arrangement of our entire life. People who are not familiar with Islam want to make Islam guilty of many of the cancers of society. A certain pediatrician, speaking in the press and over the radio, said that the reason for the high infant mortality rate lies in Islam. A certain journalist who wrote about Adylov also said that Islam is guilty of what occurred in his "empire." There are probably some people who would like to heap everything on Islam. And if the people in our society will learn more about Islam, there will be fewer misunderstandings. In the Koran, for example, the woman is advised to breast-feed her child until it reaches the age of two years. That would provide the woman a break between childbirths. But today the Muslims do not adhere to this.

[Interviewer] Islam is also used to explain the erecting of luxurious monuments and even mausoleums over Muslims' graves. Of course, it is not over every grave that you will see such an expensive structure, because that depends on the position that the person occupied during his lifetime, and how much money he managed to acquire.

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Atheists and journalists frequently do not make any distinction between genuine Islam and superstitions. That which is currently done at funerals, weddings, and other family events involves tremendous expenditures, but this is by no means required by Islam. There are injunctions by the Prophet that strictly ban any structures over a grave. The grave must be accessible to the rain, air, and snow. But it is covered by rocks and marble. In Tashkent there are monuments that cost 40,000 or 50,000 rubles, or more. This is immoral. The money that was spent could have eased the needs of the living—that would have been a deed that would be pleasing to God.

[Interviewer] Our editorial office receives a large number of letters with the question: where and how can I get a Koran? One Muslim writes, "I am the father of four sons and soon I will have to marry them off. According to the tradition, I am supposed to give each one a Koran. But where can I get them? I am offered a Koran that costs 400-500 rubles. So that means that someone must be producing them somewhere, or maybe people buy them

somewhere and then speculate with them." A believer asks us, "Is it really impossible for our government or the Muslim leadership to arrange the printing of the Koran and sell it at 100 rubles. The profits could go to meet the needs of the government or, if this is organized by the religious administration, the needs of the mosques and the believers."

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Yes, these are serious questions. As *mufti*, I am required to be concerned about providing Muslims with religious literature. Believers must know about their religion not by hearsay, and not from relatively illiterate people. We plan to publish by our own efforts 50,000 copies of the Koran. This is possible if our income is distributed with a consideration of Muslims' needs. We are also counting on receipts from the Muslim countries. We also share the believers' indignation concerning the fact that the holy book has become an object of speculation.

[Interviewer] But how are things going with the publication of the Koran in the Uzbek language? Is a translation into another language authorized from the canonical point of view? Will it be possible for the Muslims of Central Asian and Kazakhstan to study the Koran in their native languages?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] The principle in Islam is that the Koran can be translated into other languages, but we are talking not about a "translation of the Koran," but a "translation of the ideas in the Koran." The text of this book is a divine miracle that cannot be repeated by man. But we are preparing a "translation of the ideas."

[Interviewer] *Mufti-hazrat*, what can you say about the tension in the relationships among people of different nationalities? About the tragedy in Fergana, in which Muslims demonstrated such intolerance to coreligionists? Can one be assured that this same wave of violence will not come crashing down onto other nations that, not by their own volition, have settled in Central Asia? Because that violence is being carried out under slogans that include Islamic ones.

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Any discussions about one nation's superiority over another are a violation of the standards of Islamic morality. Islam values people according to how God-fearing and humane they are. But not on the basis of their nationality, their outward merits or properties, or their material prosperity. During the times of our Prophet—may he rest in peace!—his community included people of various nationalities. If grains of nationalism have sprouted in our land, then, once again, we ought not to blame Islam for this. National enmity harms Islam. A certain Moscow journalist wrote, without expressing any doubts, that the Muslims are to blame for the Alma-Ata events. But those events had absolutely nothing to do with Islam. At the Congress of People's Deputies, the question was raised about the need to evaluate what had occurred. And to establish the actual causes. I hope that that will be done and we shall hear at the Congress of People's Deputies how it was

possible for what happened in Alma-Ata, Georgia, in our own Fergana, and Kokanda to happen...

[Interviewer] What impression was made on you by the Congress of People's Deputies in May?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Unfortunately, I was not given the opportunity to speak. But I had prepared a speech, and it was published. At first I was very distressed at people's behavior in the auditorium, the shouts, the booing, the lack of respect for what other people were saying, the careless evaluations, and the almost insulting words being exchanged. The lack of cultivation in communicating with people, in maintaining a dialogue. It was explained to me that this is a disease of growth, and if it is indeed a disease, then it is forgivable. It is a good thing if we admit that we have to do things differently, we have to do better. In the course of the work done by the Congress, I, like many others, realized with particular clarity that it is vitally necessary to have mutual understanding, cooperation, and the unification of the efforts of people who think the same way. I had a large number of meetings and conversations. With the writer Valentin Rasputin—I really love his books. We agreed completely that in beauty contests on television there is no true beauty. Those contests have no spiritual value and they do not ennoble anyone, but they worsen people's morals. Valentin Grigoryevich said that he welcomes the Muslim rules that prevent women from being seen by people in this manner... Like many other people in our country, I feel that the first steps toward a law-governed state were taken in May. We need laws that are in effect, and then we will have to work for a long time to develop in society a respect for the law. As for me, of course, as a religious figure, I am greatly concerned about what the law governing religious cults will be like.

[Interviewer] In your opinion, what must definitely be defined by this law?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] The most important thing is to authorize the teaching of religion. And the opportunity to carry out religious propaganda. We want to organize the teaching of Islam at all the mosques. The believers do not have any religious literature, the word of their preachers is not reaching them, and they have nowhere from which to gain knowledge about Islam. How, then, are they supposed to carry out their religious duty? I hope that the law will define the responsibility borne by those agencies that have been hindering the registration of religious associations. It is the duty of the believer to participate, albeit infrequently, in collective prayer. The believers gather for that prayer even where the association has not been registered. But that is illegal. Should one force people to make the choice about which law they should violate—the law of God or the law of the state?

I do not know whether the new law will mention atheistic propaganda. Perhaps its procedure and level will not be defined by the law. But the Muslims of Central Asia have serious claims against it. Propagandists of atheism in our part of the country—and I am stating this frankly—for

the most part do not know Islam and have a poor idea of what is stated in the Koran. Their public statements frequently mislead the listeners who, of course, for the most part, do not have a thorough knowledge of all the dogma. But by misleading others, is it really possible to confirm one's own truth? When I was the rector of the Islamic Institute, I had a meeting with propagandists. They were prominent people, scientists in the social sciences. On the basis of the questions that were asked of me, it was easy to see that those scientists did not have a clear idea of the simplest things pertaining to religion. They say what they are required to say for propaganda purposes, and at such times they quote the Koran. For example, they say that Islam allows narcotics. This is knowledge derived from the source "a certain mullah, a certain old man said." This kind of atheistic propaganda, as it used to be conducted in our republic, can sow seeds of discord among the representatives of various denominations. In the Uzbek-language oblast newspaper a well-known specialist on Islam writes that the Koran recognizes Jesus Christ as having been born outside of wedlock, that is, as being illegitimate. There is nothing of the sort in the Koran. This kind of distortion acts upon the Muslims' feelings. And if a Christian reads that, he develops a hostile attitude toward Islam, which attitude can then be shifted onto Muslims. That is what an atheist can do. I do not want Salman Rushdie to appear among our atheists. If a person's feelings or dignity is insulted, he can institute legal proceedings. But what if the insult is directed at a billion people, for whom religion, the Koran, the Prophet are the most sacred things? The very name "Ayatshaytan"—"Satan's Verses"—is already perceived as an insult. Muslims themselves can endure a lot, but when the topic of discussion is the Prophet's individuality, they are intolerant.

[Interviewer] I have not read the book. But in the history surrounding Salman Rushdie one aspect that cannot fail to be disturbing is the pronouncement of the death sentence, as the expression goes, without court or investigation. Are we really supposed to believe that the countries in the Muslim world do not recognize international documents dealing with human rights?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] Yes, of course, an international court should decide who this Salman Rushdie is, what his intentions are, and what circumstances impelled him to write this kind of book.

[Interviewer] Let us hope that everything will be resolved in accordance with the laws of justice and humaneness. But don't the participants of the pogroms in Fergana, Kokanda, and Azerbaijan insult the feelings of believers and nonbelievers when they accompany the violence with religious slogans, when they kill and destroy while waving the green banner of Islam?

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] They are committing a serious sin. Islam is being used for criminal purposes. In my program as a people's deputy, one of the chief tasks is the striving to establish good relations among people, irrespective of their religious denomination and nationality,

and I will fight against those who want to use Islam to incite enmity among the ethnic groups and religious denominations.

[Interviewer] I wish you success in this truly critical matter. Thank you for granting us this interview.

[M. Mukhammad-Sodik] I was happy to express my positions to the readers of your magazine. And I would like, in turn, to thank the editorial office for having granted me this opportunity.

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Removal of Previous Muslim Leader Detailed

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[Article by O. Brushlinskaya: "The Time Has Come..."]

[Text] On Friday, 3 February, in the old part of Tashkent, on Ulitsa Khamzy, where the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan is located, and in the square that separates it from the Tillya-sheykh mosque—their gates look at one another—something unusual happened. Both the street and the square were full of people and the roar of excited voices hung in the air. On Fridays it is always crowded here—it is *dzhuma*, the Muslims' day of collective prayer, but on this day it was impossible for all those who wanted to get inside the mosque courtyard to do so. Standing at the gate were several strong black-bearded men, who, on the basis of identification features known to them, would allow certain people to pass through, but would politely but firmly bar the way to others. The mosque courtyard kept filling up more and more. I was told that several thousand people had already gathered there and that many Muslims had come from Dushanbe, Osh, Alma-Ata, Samarkand, and other cities—mullahs, rank-and-file believers, old people and young...

Alongside the majestic gate of the Spiritual Administration, a small empty island had formed—contrary to the usual situation, no one entered that island, and no one appeared from it. From the street one could easily view the empty pathways of the well-kept inner courtyard that had been planted with the traditional roses. Meanwhile, what was occurring pertained directly to this institution, which, as everyone knows, is supposed to be concerned about the Muslims' religious life, their spiritual betterment, their interests as believers...

"*Allakhu akbar! Allakhu akbar! Allakhu akbar!*", rang out the *muezzin's* voice over the roar in the square, calling everyone to leave behind their worldly thoughts and turn their soul to Allah. The third prayer—the afternoon prayer—was beginning. But there, in the mosque, it was probably difficult even for the most devout believers to rid themselves of worldly thoughts, of what they had planned to carry out today.

Knowledgeable people used to say that as long as a month ago, a message had been sent to the republic

leadership, requesting the removal of the chairman of the Spiritual Administration, *mufti* Shamsutdin Babakhanov, because the Muslims were very dissatisfied with him. It was said that in Andizhan, Fergana, Namangan, and in other places, the *imams* who had been appointed by the *mufti* had been driven out of the mosques. Recently he himself had been approached several times by delegations of believers who suggested that he resign. The last time had been a week previously. That deadline—by today—had been established and had been reported “to the top.” *Mufti* Babakhanov since that time, 27 January, had not appeared even once in his luxurious office. Today the deadline had expired, everything remained unchanged, but now, when the “informals”—the very same people who had written the message and gone to see the *mufti*—would be coming out of the mosque, something would definitely happen...

And so, in the spirit of perestroyka, the Muslims had named the people who had undertaken the restructuring of religious life.

As soon as the loudspeakers that were amplifying the voice of the *imam* leading the prayer had become silent, the gates of the mosque opened up, but the crowds of men did not disperse, as usually happens after a *dzhuma* prayer service. Instead, they formed into a dense, broad column that slowly moved off the square along Ulitsa Khamzy. “We’re going to keep this up until *a-syr*,” they said. *A-syr* is the evening prayer; it will begin in three hours, at 1930 hours. Yes, from the Tillya-sheykh mosque to the center of Tashkent, to the Red Square where the government institutions are located, is a slow walk of about three hours. They were going there to set forth their demands to the republic government, and to have a demonstration of the Muslims who had created the organizing group for the attaining of their goals, which they had formulated as a struggle for the honor and purity of Islam.

The demonstrators were carrying posters on which, in Russian and in Uzbek, one could read: “Shamsutdin Babakhanov was created by stagnation,” “The *mufti* must be chosen by Muslims, not appointed by the party leadership,” “The *mufti* is not a hereditary office,” and “Muslims Are in Favor of Perestroyka!” Walking as escorts on both sides of the column were serious, athletic young men—their task was to keep out of the religious march the extremist elements that are capable of disrupting a well-organized action. When a voice suddenly rang out in the middle of the column, “Down with the Russians, the enemies of our Islam!”, the person to whom that voice belonged quickly found himself outside the column, and the escorts made sure that he would have no further desire to return. The “informals” did not use nationality as a criterion for determining the enemies of Islam and its friends.

Why, then, had the chairman of the Spiritual Administration, *mufti* Shamsutdin Babakhanov, proven to be so unsuitable? Actually, he had been given that honored and responsible position, as it were, as an inheritance—

from his father, the previous *mufti* before him, and from his grandfather, also a *mufti*, who had at one time given the position of *mufti* to his son.

I asked that question of one of the oldest workers at the Spiritual Administration, sheik Yusufkhan Shakirov, the administrator’s deputy chairman. He had also occupied that position under Shamsutdin Babakhanov, and was also occupying it now, under the newly elected *mufti*. (The “informals” had managed to achieve Babakhanov’s resignation.) This is what the sheik said.

[Yu. Shakirov] At one time we were experiencing strong pressure from the top, and so we agreed to make Shamsutdin Babakhanov the *mufti*. We hoped that he, as the son of a major religious figure, would perceive his spiritual inheritance. But the *mufti* is not a position. It is a religious office. But Shamsutdin Babakhanov is a worldly person and did not want to become anything else. Either that, or he was unable to do so. He did not complete the necessary training. Being an Arabist by education is not enough. He did not have any faith in his soul. People saw that and they were insulted. He never conducted a service in a mosque. He never delivered a sermon to the people that was based on his own life, his own experience. If, indeed, he did speak to the believers, it was on the basis of a previously prepared text, which, moreover, had not been prepared by himself. As an irreligious person, Babakhanov had a life style that was incompatible with his religious office, although among secular people this kind of behavior is not a rarity nowadays. The clergy also raised the question of replacing the *mufti*, but they did so shyly—having been educated in the Muslim tradition, which demands the showing of respect to persons who are senior in age or in position, the clergy was patient. Our administration also had an apparatus that was inclined toward stagnation. But there were also decisive people among the Muslims. They were aided by the entire situation throughout the country, by the democratization of life, and by glasnost. That which happened was just.

[O. Brushlinskaya] On that day, 3 February, a crowd of 1000 people arrived at the building housing the UzSSR Council of Ministers. The Muslims, after performing *a-syr* prayer on Red Square, demanded to be received by chairman Kadyrov. They had to wait for a long time, and people began getting agitated. There were several tense moments when the militia, at a sign given by their leadership, were ready to employ force and to disperse the “unsanctioned demonstration” that threatened to end not only in a rally. But that did not happen. Fortunately, the situation was also being evaluated by other representatives of the republic leadership who were present that day in Red Square in Tashkent. Finally the chairman of the republic’s Council of Ministers received a delegation from the demonstrators. It was at that time that an agreement was reached concerning the conducting first of an expanded session of the presidium of the Spiritual Administration, then its plenum, and finally, in order to confirm all the decisions, a *kurultay*, a congress of Muslims. So great was the impatience of the

people thirsting for justice that the question of the new chairman of the Spiritual Administration was resolved within an unprecedentedly short period of time, by 6 February, at a presidium session. At that session, in violation of all the rules in the charter of the Spiritual Administration, representatives of the informal organizations were present and participated actively. They also insisted on their own, apparently well thought-out candidacy for the then rector of the Islamic Institute, Mukhammad-Yusuf Mukhammad-Sodik.

Sheik Yusufkhan Shakirov recommended, in the spirit of the time, choosing their three candidates, but the recommendation was rejected. [Sheik Yusufkhan] *Mufti* Shamsutdin, thus, did not show up at the Spiritual Administration. He wrote a message to the presidium that was something like a renunciation. To tell the true, I made no effort to read the first part of that message, in which Babakhanov listed his merits, decorations, and books. Because everyone knew what kind of merits he had, and to whom, the decorations that had been given to him, as they had been given to many others at that time, without people being asked whether they considered that person to be worthy of receiving an award. Everyone knew that it was not he who had written the books. Not a single person could be found at that session who would say a word in support of Shamsutdin Babakhanov.

People might ask—and it will be correct—what we, the clergy, people who had worked alongside of him, used to think previously, and whether we had not seen that the *mufti* was leading that way of life that was being led by the republic's former leaders who currently have been openly censured by society. Of course we say, knew, and understood. But we endured. The Muslim movement that was caused by perestroika also pushed us on. The participants in that movement played an active role also at the Muslim *kurultay*-congress that was held in March, that had been convoked on the demand of the believers and that confirmed the new chairman of the Spiritual Administration in the rank of *mufti*.

[O. Brushlinskaya] The congress was held in a movie theater situated on the very same square, not far from the Spiritual Administration and the Tillya-sheyk mosque. The mosque holds as many as 10,000 persons, but that day it could not hold everyone who wanted to be present. Here it was possible to hear a relay broadcast from the congress. In a silence that was astonishing for that kind of meeting, people listened to every word being spoken at the Muslim congress that had been convoked for the first time for this unusual reason. Mention was made about the life of the mosques, the believers' needs, and the decline in morality among the clergy. Mention was also made openly and for the first time so critically about the spiritual mentors. Sheik Yusufkhan sees in this the direct influence and the democratization that has begun in society. The tradition of Islam is such that it not only is not generally accepted to criticize Islam, but it is also a sin. Because it has been said (and the believers are constantly reminded of this): if an ordinary believer

performing his prayers criticizes his *imam*, his prayers will not be received by Allah.

[Sheik Yusufkhan] That was overstepped at the congress. People began seething in their souls. But now the era of glasnost had come in society, an era when it is possible to speak openly and tell the truth about the leadership, even about the party leadership. The atmosphere in the country pertains equally to the believers and to nonbelievers.

[O. Brushlinskaya] Who, then, had been the initiators and participants of the movement, who had sensed precisely that the time had come when it was possible to achieve justice, to demand the execution of the laws? Many of them had recently taken the course of violating the procedures that had previously existed with respect to religion. They wanted to teach religion to the children, they wanted to have literature dealing with Islam, and they conducted collective prayer services where a congregation had not been registered. Some of them had been fined, some had been subjected to criminal punishments. Indignation and protest were growing. They did not understand wherein their crime lay. They lived according to the laws of Islam, a religion that had not been banned, but now it seems that they are acting illegally...

[Sheik Yusufkhan] Perestroika came, and those people came up from underground in order to speak openly about their demands.

[O. Brushlinskaya] When the floor at the conference was given to Saidkerim-aka Agzamov, the entire mosque courtyard, filled with many thousands of people, roared its response.

Saidkerim-aka is very satisfied with the events (people say that he was, indeed, one of the organizers of everything that occurred). He is 65 years old and has a large family—nine children. He is energetic, he manages to get around everywhere in his Zhiguli, and is famous for knowing the Koran by heart and teaching Islam to his children. Because of these actions, he at one time had been in conflict with the authorities, and had served time for his illegal actions, but that had not forced him to renounce his goal—the goal of making every child a real Muslim. He feels that this will help society to restore morality and he has a very decisive frame of mind with respect to his plans.

"Saidkerim-aka," I ask him, "are you just as satisfied with the fact that the son of your late friend, *mufti* Ziautdin Babakhanov, has been driven out of the position he used to hold?"

[Agmazov] If Shamsutdin had been my son, from the very beginning I would not have allowed him to get close to that place. He trampled everything. In Islam, people think like this: if someone deceives or mocks a person who is close to him, if he makes a promise but fails to execute it, then that person is no longer a Muslim. And Shamsutdin has done all these three things. For six years

he sat as the *mufti*, for six years I did not go to the administration. There was a poor atmosphere here. People did not pray here, and that should not have been; this is not a party raykom. Ordinary people were not allowed to come here. Now everything is changing for the better. The new *mufti* is a young man, a scientist. No one can say a bad word about him. He lives modestly. We ourselves, the nation, Muslims elected him. We do not need any pawns who have been sent to us from above. These are different times now. It used to be that people mocked us. When Shamsutdin was *mufti*, he would bring in on tours foreigners wearing shorts. They would come right into the mosque during the prayer and would walk around us, as though walking around tables, photographing us. That is extremely shameful. The people who go to the mosque are going there to communicate with Allah, and if others stare at them when they are praying, that means that they are mocking them. Shamsutdin would sit in his fancy office, play billiards, and drink arrack. He did not protest when people who were not real Muslims were sent to Mecca. And I told him about that at the *kurultay*. Here at home it is a secret to everyone that the people who are being sent on a *hadj* include nonbelievers, but you cannot conceal that in Mecca. Especially since our own kind are being observed.

I never used to go to the elections. Why go? Today you vote for someone, and a year later he is sentenced for theft. Even if he is not a thief, you are an ordinary person and you will never be able to get to talk to him. But all the Muslims were present at the recent election. Our *mufti* is a deputy. So, things are improving.

[O. Brushlinskaya] I asked Saidkerim-aka, "Can the Russians live peaceably and normally in Tashkent and in other cities of Uzbekistan?" He answered that they can if, all of a sudden, everyone will live the way that he and other Muslims do, in accordance with Islamic law.

If everything were that simple, if there did not exist a large number of different interpretations of Islamic laws...

Even the *kurultay*, which definitely was conducted under the sign of unity, revealed that Muslims have different ideas about what it means to live in accordance with Islamic law. Among the statements that constructively pointed out the path to renewal and the establishment of order in religious life, one also heard demands to stop coeducational teaching, to ban the wearing of short hair by girls, to ban their wearing of stockings and European dresses, but to replace them by *shalvars* and long blouses. Just as the Islamic law requires, they say. I do not know what Saidkerim-aka thinks about this matter, but at a meeting with university students the *mufti*, in reply to the question, "Is it absolutely necessary for Muslims to wear national clothing, to have a beard, etc.?", answered that it is not mandatory, and that adherence to Islam manifests itself in other ways.

One of the champions of pure Islam spoke at the congress, calling for the chasing of all male physicians

from maternity hospitals. Otherwise Muslims should refuse medical assistance. In April 1989 at the School of Philology, Samarkand University, a warning was spread among young Uzbeks: if you appear at the May demonstration not as true Muslims, that is, not wearing *chapans* (long robes), white *shalvars*, and *ichigs* (soft shoes), you will be knifed...

Since the memorable Friday meeting of the "informals" in the Tillya-sheyk mosque, since their demonstration, which also is something that the people of Tashkent will remember, and since the Muslims' *kurultay*, several months have passed. What is the most typical feature that can be noted today in the Muslims' religious life? I asked that question of U. A. Rustamov, authorized representative for Uzbekistan, Religious Affairs Council, under USSR Council of Ministers.

[U. Rustamov] Currently new mosques are opening up, and newer and newer Muslim associations are being registered. There is a visible tendency toward reducing the number of self-professed mullahs. But the Muslim movement—and there is indeed such a thing, the active participation of the believers—is very heterogeneous. One is becoming aware of a reformist current. Its participants are called *wahhabites*. They accuse the clergy of being too concerned about earnings. When the clergy visits homes and performs ceremonies, they charge people money. These critics of the clergy want to oppose to them their own *imams*, assuring people that they will not take any payment for performing a ceremony. Time will tell. If people do not give donations to the mosque, how will it exist?

[O. Brushlinskaya] Among Muslims there have been a large number of arguments as to whether women should visit mosques. Strictly speaking, it is not mandatory for them to do so—is it a good thing for a woman to leave her home and her household duties five times a day? But the *wahhabites* teach, "Praying at home is worse." In Namangan they organized a demonstration by Muslim women who demanded that the mosques be open to them. It went so far that those 300 women wanted to use force to seize for their purposes a kindergarten situated next to the Gumbez mosque. "A mosque is more important than a kindergarten!"—those are the words of the people who inspired them...

Uzbek Agzamovich tells how, after the *kurultay*, a large number of *imams* were chased out of the mosques. According to the laws of Islam, they should be elected, but the appointed mullahs are extremely vulnerable. From the point of view of Islam, they are illegal. K. M. Kharchev, former chairman of the Religious Affairs Council under USSR Council of Ministers, in one of his conversations with journalists characterized in the following manner the previous cadre policy with respect to religion: "Mullahs frequently were elected in accordance with the principle 'the worse, the better.' That was the 'atheistic' method. The reasoning used to be, 'People will not follow a bad minister of the faith, and therefore the influence of religion will become weaker.' However, the

expected 'decline of religion' did not occur. People did not trust the mentors who had been 'lowered' from above, but they did continue to trust in God."

The local authorities today find themselves frequently face to face with the fact: without waiting for authorization, Muslims have seized a mosque. It turns out to be one that has been standing empty, having been locked up no one knows when. Or that people have used force to evict from a holy building an office or storeroom that has been housed there.

Seizures of mosques, the demand to leave a kindergarten and turn it over to believers, the terror that is directed at girls who prefer to wear their hair short and to wear European clothing, the forcible imposition of Muslim standards of life, the threats that are sometimes acted upon with respect to those who do not want to submit, who do not perform the ceremonies... Why are all these things happening today? Certainly there is no single simple answer. But the explanation of much in our present, as we realize today, must be sought in our past. When the decision was made to put an end all at once to religion...

Recently Uzbekistan marked the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Khamza, a revolutionary, opponent of religion, and talented man of letters. Working on instructions from the party in 1928-1929 in Shakhimardan, one of the famous religious center, he attempted to enlighten the peasants and to rid them of spiritual oppression. And Khamza had spoken out against that. He hated the mullahs who were faithfully serving their rich landowners and who demanded of Muslims that they be obedient to them (this kind of clergy has existed in all eras). He created a commission to combat Islam in Shakhimardan. He demanded coeducational teaching, took a mosque away from believers in order to house a library and museum there, and called for the rejection of the despotism of custom and religious ceremony. It is understandable why he did all these things. But how can one also not understand those who, in their fear, looked at the destruction of their traditions, which it is difficult, if not impossible to separate from religion? Was it difficult to convince the Muslims that Khamza was acting on instructions from the devil?...

The mosques were closed without the believers being asked. Now the Muslims themselves are returning that which legally belonged to them. "There is a time to scatter the stones, and a time to collect them..." Not too long ago, the promise was made to us, in the name of the party, that the current Pope would be shown to us on television. Today religious figures constantly appear on the television screens.

Whatever voices rang out at the *kurultay*, that congress demonstrated that the interests of the majority of the Muslim workers are the same as for the rest of society. When the law is just, when the legal foundations in the state are reinforced, there will be no favorable conditions

among the Muslim population for the action of elements that are opposed to perestroika.

We must understand one another, we must find the opportunity for dialogue, we must acquire our lost patience and the ability to hear and listen to the other side. The time has come when it has become obvious that there is no other way out.

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Central Asian Orthodox Bishop

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[Interview with Nikolay Lvovich Tserpitskiy, Bishop Lev of Tashkent and Central Asia: "Life Dictates: Complicated Problems Will Have to be Resolved by the Orthodox Pastor in a Multiethnic, Multidenominational Region"]

[Text] The Tashkent Diocesan Administration is not far from the center of town, in a quiet side street. The building predates the revolution and is strongly built—it withstood the 1966 earthquake. It is not very impressive, but its walls prevent the local heat from getting into the rooms, and also keeps out the city noise.

The furniture in the room in which we are having a conversation with Bishop Lev of Tashkent and Central Asia also could not be called luxurious, but it does have a certain nobility, probably because of the presence of various antique objects that outlived many owners. A tall grandfather's clock of dark wood with a tremendous copper pendulum that gleams with a dull glow through the crystal glass counts off every half-hour in a pleasant tune. Hanging on the walls is a long row of portraits: hierarchs who administered the diocese at various times. They include Archbishop Luka (V. F. Voyno-Yasenetskiy), who was not only a member of the higher orders of clergy, but also a famous surgeon for whom Tashkent became a place of exile in the 1920's. For many years a large number of Russians, including famous ones with names known around the world, have lived in this part of the country. To the best of my knowledge, the Orthodox Church here, to the extent that it was able to do so, participated in local affairs and concerns, although the church itself has had to experience difficult times.

Lying on the magazine table is a beautiful album with gold letters embossed on the leather binding: "1000-letie Kreshcheniya Rusi v Tashkentskoy yeparkhii" [Millennium of the Christening of Rus in the Tashkent Diocese]. Bishop Lev is proud of the fact that the anniversary was celebrated in a worthy manner—the first difficult job that he had had to execute in this diocese after being assigned here.

The bishop is slightly over 40 years of age. His pale lilac cassock looks elegant on him, and his beard, with much gray in it, does not age the bishop. His wordly name is Nikolay Lvovich Tserpitskiy.

[Interviewer] Your Holiness, in this republic your name is frequently pronounced together with the name of the Muslim religious figure, *mufti* Mukhammad-Sodik. Both of you talk to the public, and both of you are seen among the participants of popular television broadcasts. Is this a formal indicator of the changes in our life, or is there actual cooperation here?

[Bishop Lev] It is cooperation, and even than that—it is friendship. Anything else would simply be inconceivable for our congregation in the tremendous Central Asian diocese, with its 52 parishes in four republics. In this region most of the believers are Muslims, and the Orthodox Christians—like the Jews, Catholics, Baptists, and representatives of other denominations who live here—live as close neighbors alongside of the Muslim population of various nationalities. There are many paths that lead to friendship, and cooperation among religious figures is one of them. When I accepted the diocese about two years ago, I looked around and began to understand the specific conditions that prevail here—the conditions are incomparable, say, with those in the Leningrad diocese, where I had served previously. What became obvious to me was the need to establish smooth contacts. Because the flow of life here, whether one likes it or not, is largely determined by Islam. Is it reasonable to isolate oneself from that life, to make no attempt to understand it, or, having understood it, to fail to adapt better to it?

Good, businesslike relations developed between the current *mufti* and me while he was still the rector of the Islamic Institute. I organized his trip to the Leningrad Spiritual Academy. He gave lectures there, and our students asked him a large number of questions. That first meeting between Orthodox students and a Muslim theologian was considered by both sides to have been successful. Unfortunately, Islam is not studied in the Russian Orthodox Church, and for that reason the priests who are performing their pastoral duties in regions where that religion has been traditionally widespread suffer greatly. I think that this is also a misfortune in the secular sphere. We never used to be very interested in one another. We assumed that we are all alike. But we are different...

[Interviewer] You were an authorized representative of the *mufti* in his election campaign, when he was nominated as candidate for election as a USSR people's deputy. That was rather unexpected, to tell the truth.

[Bishop Lev] And yet I was very pleased to accept the recommendation that I act in that role. Primarily because in the very act of nominating the *mufti* I see a standard for life in the future of our law-governed state, the restoration of normal relations between church and state. It was with a pure heart that I pronounced the words in support of that candidate, and the meetings with the voters were instructive for me. The election of the *mufti* as a USSR people's deputy became an event that was important for all believers in this part of the country, including the Orthodox believers. And, in fact,

not just for believers. I am convinced that the *mufti*, as a person of authority, a person with an excellent knowledge of the nation's life, will also promote the resolution of vitally important problems that the population has in common. Because we all suffer identically from our squabbling, and sometimes we lose hope of a worthy, just life. There are very few people today who are free of the sin of despair...

So I sent the election poster with the *mufti*'s portrait to the Tashkent church and asked to have it hung in a prominent place. And, do you know, our conservatism is so solid that certain believers made a protest to me: why was the *mufti*'s portrait hanging alongside our patriarch's portrait? But I think that we have had more than enough divisiveness, opposition, and confrontation, and, unfortunately, we are well aware of what they lead to. The only thing that can save us is drawing closer together, mutual understanding. There is no other way.

Long before the tragic events in Fergana, Kokanda, and other republics, the *kazi* of Tajikistan, Akbar Kakharov, an educated and modern-thinking person with a good sense of the situation, told me, "You and I must be ready for serious events, and to strengthen our ties. Friendship will be useful to us. We must think about people."

[Interviewer] Yes, we can see that so long as the tension in interethnic relations is intensified, intolerance constantly makes itself know. But what are the living conditions today, in your opinion, in Central Asia for Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, believers and nonbelievers, people who are historically linked not with the Islamic tradition, but with Orthodox tradition?

[Bishop Lev] At the present time, judged on the basis of many features, things are not too good for them. New churches are being opened up in our diocese, but the problem lies elsewhere—how to preserve the old parishes? Since time immemorial, Russians have lived in Central Asia, even in the most remote places, and lived without any fear alongside the local population. There are many thousands of people who do not have another homeland. Their grandparents and great-grandparents were born here. There were Russian settlements with parishes that have their own history, with Slavic names that have existed since time immemorial. Now for many years there have been neither names nor parishes. People come to me requesting the church to help people to resettle to the west, to RSFSR. Of course the church cannot engage in such matters, but the problem itself is a reality that exists today.

The migration is becoming more intensified. This is grievous, but how can one fail to understand people? The overwhelming majority have had to come up against manifestations of interethnic tension for the first time in their lives. We had to celebrate this Easter without the jubilation that is typical of this secular holiday. I was in a car on my way to an evening service in the Cathedral and the city was unusually empty. It was as though the city was dead. And yet there are thousands of Orthodox

believers in Tashkent, and we had had a splendid procession with crosses last year on the eve of the great jubilee! But this year rumors began spreading through the city during the days before Easter: "A St. Bartholomew's massacre is being set up for the Russians for Easter!" Whatever served as the cause of the rumors—whether it was unjustified fears felt by some or malicious intent on the part of others—they have done their vile deed.

[Interviewer] But those problems never used to exist. It is well known that the attitude to Russians here has traditionally been friendly and respectful: people worked side by side, and they were well acquainted with the doctors, teachers, scientists, and performing artists. Central Asia served as a place of exile for many meritorious representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, and the local population had the opportunity to evaluate their high human qualities.

[Bishop Lev] Of course, such people from RSFSR as Archbishop Luka created authority for their nation here. Needless to say, the Russian intelligentsia—the true intelligentsia, of course—is a unique phenomenon. But, in addition to the intelligentsia, there were also other people here, other circumstances—and they also influenced the attitude toward Russians. All this makes me reflect and make comparisons. Today, in our part of the country, it is impossible not to see individual attempts to confirm the superiority of a particular nationality: because the persecutions are being directed not only at people of another faith, but also against fellow-believers who are representatives of other nations...

However, I assume that it is not only for reasons such as this that the attitude toward Russians has worsened. I am afraid that I might be reproached again for saying this, but I am convinced that we too have our share of the blame. The intelligentsia, that very real intelligentsia, thinned out seriously long ago. The overall level of culture has declined on both sides, and the respect for it has disappeared. So we undertook our own European methods of enlightening the "benighted" nations on the fringes of our country, but by so doing we ourselves lost much. Frequently I hear a supercilious, practically peremptory, tone. But, properly speaking, on the basis of what right? The basis of friendship is respect for the other person's culture and a knowledge of it. Yet, for some reason we are convinced that we know how to make things better for these people. But we do not know.

Take, for example, the problem with families in which there are a large number of children, the problem with their health and with the birth and education of children. Not long ago a republic conference of the Children's Foundation, with the participation of luminaries from the center, was held in Tashkent. The name given to it was "Family Planning." That is a European concept. But it is a concept that the bulk of the people here are not ready to accept. Therefore all the recommendations—the scientific ones which, according to our way of thinking, are correct ones, and which were supported by

the World Health Organization—got a hostile reception even by the local intellectuals. It must be admitted that the reasons according to which, from the European's point of view, it is a bad idea to have a large number of children "do not apply" here. What is needed is a refined, delicate approach, such as is used in neurosurgery—if you don't cut, you don't do any harm. So it has turned out that the good intentions of the persons who arranged that conference ended up by worsening the attitude toward the Russians: "They are trying once again to teach us how to live. They worm their way in here and then they want to do things their way." Like other religions, Islam opposes any interference in procreation. And so, even the nonbelievers among the local intelligentsia take a respectful attitude toward Islam.

I am surprised by those Russians who, at the conference, in the press, and over the local radio, hotly protest the leading role of the local languages. Without delving deeply into the essence of the matter, I would like to ask: what feelings can this cause in the local population with respect to the Russians? Because it does cause such feelings. Especially if someone wants to take advantage of them...

For a time I served in Muslim Morocco and it was quite apparent to me there how alien our concepts about happiness and prosperity are to the indigenous population. Good-hearted everyday Europeans, both men and women, do not spare their efforts (or funds) to instill European culture in the Moroccans, considering that culture to be universal and the best for everyone. And yet the Muslim world has its very rich culture, its brilliant names, its pearls of world civilization. In Morocco my work as the president of the ecumenical council did not yield all the desired results—from the point of view of broad cooperation with the Muslims—and largely as a result of the Europeans' zeal. We are invading the ecology of other people's way of life and we can do—and have already done—a lot of harm.

But there is yet another side to the problem of the attitude toward Russians. As a pastor of Orthodox believers, I sensed from the beginning that certain persons' effort were simply conducive to a confrontation. Currently, things have become a bit better. But previously... After M. S. Gorbachev's meeting with Patriarch Pimen and members of the Holy Synod, remarkable (yes, truly remarkable!) changes occurred in religious life. We encountered no hindrances in registering congregations, we began to have churches turned over to us, etc. But Islam remained in its previous position. By virtue of a "secret" directive (which everyone knew about) dealing with the struggle against Islam, mosques were closed and property was confiscated from the unregistered Muslim congregations. And most frequently the persons who were assigned to execute those orders were Russians. Was that accidental? I do not know. But I do know that, in the final analysis, it became a widespread belief: the order to eradicate Islam originated with Moscow, with the Russians. And so it is forbidden to fight against the Orthodox Church, against the Russian religion...

Isn't it obvious what an unequal attitude toward religions leads to, even if that attitude manifests itself in minor details? As a matter of principle, I reject absolutely any privileges for the Orthodox religion, since I strive for a cooperation that is based on an equal position, mutual respect, and tolerance. Things have also been difficult for the local Muslim figures. I was present at their invitation at the *kurultay* where their *mufti* was elected. The demands on their believers are high. I have no doubt that, in order for the clergy to fulfill its intended purpose, it must also participate in what is currently occurring throughout the country.

[Interviewer] But what do you think religious figures can do in perestroika?

[Bishop Lev] They can influence the public's moods and can promote changing them for the better. We are masters of the word, and everything begins there. Perestroika will not occur if we do not overcome the confrontation among the nationalities, if we do not eliminate a situation in which people are on guard and suspicious about one another. And in this matter the religious figures have much to do. It is a sin if we do not use this for the good. From my point of view, the *mufti* exerted an influence upon easing the situation in Fergana.

We members of the clergy have completely practical matters that can promote perestroika. And if today people expect church participation not only in the form of monetary assessments or the presence of a high church figure at some conference, then the church must be helped to implement its opportunities.

We would like to invest our material funds purposefully, but frequently we do not know precisely exactly what use will be made of the believers' money that has been contributed by us to various foundations. We have good ties with international organizations that are ready to give us support, and I think that, by joint efforts, we could render aid to the best of our ability to the Central Asian republics to meet their most essential needs. But it turns out that our efforts do not find support. Here is an example. The Russian Orthodox community in a certain country rejected our request and decided to give as a present to Uzbekistan a million single-use syringes. The request was made to the Soviet embassy in that country for cooperation in transporting the precious gift, but they were shown the door: we have everything, they were told. We don't need anything. And this was after the earthquake in Armenia, after Chernobyl and Afghanistan, after nuns in the Catholic order of the Sisters of Charity began operating in the USSR!

[Interviewer] You began this discussion by stating that you are establishing smooth contacts with the Muslim community of Central Asia. But there is also alarm concerning the Russians living here. How do you evaluate what has been done? What is there more of in your forecasts—optimism or pessimism? And in this regard, in considering the future, what would you say about the new law governing freedom of conscience?

[Bishop Lev] I have traveled around all parts of the diocese. Muslims are living as neighbors next to Orthodox believers everywhere. But I have never heard from these so-called ordinary people any disrespectful words with respect to myself or to our faith. The Muslims who were present at the *kurultay*, and those who heard it being relayed to them, gave my speech there a tumultuous welcome. I had said there that all of us, as God's children, have definite obligations to one another and that we must do good and tell the truth, we must respect the experience and wisdom that have been accumulated in both cultures, in both religions.

But, as the expression goes, Moscow wasn't built in a day. Especially since we have made so many mistakes in the policy of interethnic relations! I am attempting to help the Orthodox believers in this very complicated situation, to guard them against taking improper actions. In my trips around the diocese I have been convinced that even the Muslims trust me. Frequently they come to me for advice, and I myself visit their mosques and communicate with people. They have frequently seen the Orthodox bishop with the *mufti*, and they assume that I know his opinion. Both of us—the *mufti* and I—are alarmed at the fact that currently human life has begun for many people to seem to be such an inconsequential matter that people think that they have the right to tell other people casually how they should live their lives. But religion does not allow telling even one's own people how they should run their lives—that is a sin. I think that the factors that exerted an influence on mores were the ones that had prevailed for many years—cruelty, violence, intolerance of persons whose beliefs were different, and social and all other kinds of injustice. And I would also like, in particular, for the law that you have asked about to be just. It must put religion and atheism in equal conditions. And I would like it to remove the discrimination with respect to priests—because our parish clergy has been stifled by taxes, so that the priests, for the most part, live a very meager life, and if God has given them a large number of children, then it is very difficult for them to make ends meet.

I do not know whether the law governing the freedom of conscience should decide this, but what is to be done about the arbitrariness of the local authorities who register religious associations but do not give their churches back to them? It would be also be good if those accommodations were occupied by some activity. That would make it possible to preserve them, because using them as warehouses or offices... In the 1960's a church in Przhevalsk was taken away from the believers. It is painful to see what it has been converted to in our time. But the story of how it was erected is linked with the name of Przhevalskiy, and the architecture is beautiful. No, they say, we will not give it back. There is a large number of similar examples. Well, the middle management link, so far as one can judge from the press, goes contrary to common sense not only in matters concerning us. However, I am an optimist. I believe. And I also understand that water does not flow under a lying rock...

[Interviewer] Before saying goodbye, I ask Bishop Lev whether he reads our magazine. He answers that he reads it attentively, and he has read certain issues with a large amount of interest. Then he says jokingly: even if, under

the conditions of a general price increase, the price of the magazine rises, he still will subscribe to it...

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Kazakh Justice Ministry Explains Law on Demonstrations

90US0491A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 17 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by the Administration for the Systematization and Propagation of Legislation of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Justice: "On Meetings and Demonstrations"]

[Text] The law enforcement organs of the republic are receiving letters and statements of citizens, in which they ask for an explanation of the Law on the Procedure for the Organization and Conduct of Assemblies, Meetings, Street Processions and Demonstrations.

In a number of cities and regions of the country, some extremist-oriented persons and groups of persons are trying to aggravate the situation, are organizing unsanctioned meetings, demonstrations and gatherings at which they propagate anti-social ideas, incite citizens to the violation of public order and Soviet laws. Such actions destabilize the public-political situation, undermine the faith of people in the ability of the organs of state authority to protect the interests of citizens, generate various rumors, and call forth the discontent of the population. Precisely with a view to the uniform regulation of the procedure for the organization and conduct of mass public-political demonstrations, the guarantee of social order, the protection of the rights and interests of citizens, the stopping of crimes and other infringements of the law, legislative acts were adopted.

The law establishes that an application—indicating the goal, forms, place of the conduct of the measure, the time of beginning and end, the proposed number of participants, the name and patronymic of the representatives (organizers), the place of their residence and work (study), and the date of the submission of the application—is made about the holding of a gathering, meeting, street procession, and demonstration by the representatives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, organs of cooperative and other public organizations, organs of public independent action, and individual groups of citizens.

The executive committee of the Soviet of People's Deputies, having examined the application, takes a decision concerning the permission (sanction) or prohibition (non-sanction) of the holding of such demonstrations and reports this no later than 5 days to the representatives (organizers).

The demonstrations that are being conducted with infringement of the procedure for organization or with infringement of the procedure for their conduct, i. e., if they are held not in conformity with the goals indicated in the application, within unestablished time periods, and in non-stipulated places, must be stopped at the request of representatives of the organs of power.

For the infringement of the procedure for the organization and holding of gatherings, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations, administrative and criminal responsibility is established by the Ukase of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet of 20 August 1988 and the decree of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet of 14 November 1989 "On Measures to Strengthen Socialist Legality and Law and Order in the Republic." Thus, for the infringement of the procedure for the organization and holding of gatherings, meetings, street processions and demonstrations, administrative responsibility is stipulated in the form of a warning or penalty in an amount of up to 300 rubles, and in exceptional cases—administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days.

The same actions, perpetrated repeatedly within a year, after the application of administrative punishment, or perpetrated by the organizer of such measures, entail the imposition of a penalty in an amount of up to 1,000 rubles, or correctional work for a period of 1-2 months with the retention of 20 percent of wages, or administrative arrest for a period of up to 15 days.

The organizers of gatherings, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations bear criminal responsibility for the infringement of the procedure for the organization and holding of such demonstrations and are punished with a penalty of up to 2,000 rubles, or correctional work for a period of up to a year, or deprivation of liberty for a period of up to 6 months, if measures of administrative punishment for such actions have already been applied to them.

All of these restrictions apply only to non-sanctioned demonstrations, i. e., those held with infringement of the procedure for the organization of meetings, gatherings, street processions, and demonstrations.

Any gatherings, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations are not prohibited if they are organized and held in accordance with the procedure established by law.

The special procedure for the organization and holding of gatherings, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations regulated by the designated normative acts, undoubtedly, cannot be applied to the general meetings of labor collectives, meetings for the nomination of candidates for people's deputy, party, trade union, Komsomol, and other meetings held in accordance with the law, their statutes and regulations. This is unequivocally and precisely formulated in Article 10 of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 28 July 1988: "The procedure for the organization and holding of meetings established by the present Ukase does not extend to gatherings and meetings of labor collectives and public organizations that are held in accordance with the law, their statutes and regulations."

Correspondents Investigate Narcobusiness in KaSSR**Correspondents' Actions Annoy Local Authorities**

90US0141A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Oct 89 p 6 Morning Edition

[Article by V. Ardayev, IZVESTIYA Correspondent: "Is it Easy to Get Hashish?"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction, final four paragraphs are commentary by the IZVESTIYA Internal Information Department]

[Text] A few days ago the program VREMYA showed a clip from Kazakhstan in which that republic's Internal Affairs agencies were conducting Operation "Mak" [poppy]. There was a raid in the Chu Valley to capture drug couriers. The screen showed policemen detaining one narcotics dealer after another, along with vehicles and weapons... Behind these people was a voice that said, "Absolutely all the holes for drug addicts in the Chu Valley have been blocked..." But is this what really happened? Do those who want to become rich through narcotics have a reliable covering force? Journalists from the republic's youth newspaper decided to check this out.

"This document was produced by LENINSKAYA SMENA Special Correspondents A. Nusupov and T. Ospanov to be published under the heading 'A Journalist Changes Profession.' We foresaw the possibility of Internal Affairs agencies detaining the journalists while they were gathering materials for the newspaper. We thank you for your watchful service."

This document is very unusual. It was verified by the editorial press—in the Kazakhstan republic youth "trade" form. They hypothesized that this "mandate" would fall into the hands of militia workers who would certainly detain young people in the Chu Valley who were gathering the cannabis that grows wild there. But this is not what happened. This "thanks" remains unclaimed... Why?

Talgat Ospanov and Adolkhan Nusupov tell us, "We got the idea of an official trip into this valley, one that is well-known to all the country's drug addicts, after the editor received a document from the Kazakhstan SSR MVD. That document specifically reported that former Kurdistan ROVD [Rayon Department of Internal Affairs] Criminal Investigation Section Chief Boryakov had been arrested in January on charges of storing and selling drug paraphernalia. This raised some doubts. If the 'chief detective' of the rayon contiguous to the Chu Valley was involved in this dirty business, how could the rank and file of that ROVD maintain order there? Judging by the number of television specials and the amount of press publication, police in the valley have halted all criminal activities by the drug businessmen. We also decided to verify this, but since we had not been 'invited' to take part in the earlier raid, we decided to try out the courier's shoes. And the editor supported this idea. When we set out for this mission, we were almost one hundred percent sure that we would be caught. What

could we amateurs do against armed details, cordons, vehicle patrols, helicopters and specially trained dogs. And that is why we signed our names to the 'mandate.' But what in fact did happen was totally different..."

This may be very unpleasant for the police, but the fact is that the journalists got into the Chu Valley, packed five-liters of cannabis and returned to their editor in Alma-Ata without any problem. It wasn't that there were no serious pickets. They did not see a single policeman in the city of Chu or meet one on the road to the valley. Even the GAU [State Automomile Inspection] post that they past as they entered the "zone of increased control" was empty. When the journalists talked with local inhabitants, the latter did not set their guard up, but instead showed the "couriers" the road. Moreover local inhabitants even gave the journalists additional instructions on "security measures." By the way, they were superfluous.

The correspondents "officially" gave their prepared poison to the newspaper editor. He locked it in the safe and sealed it. And the journalists described all their adventures in detail in the report "Marijuana Couriers." This is how the material concluded: We ask officials in the KazSSR MVD Anti-Drug Addiction Department to come in to see the LENINSKAYA SMENA editor and pick up the cargo that was delivered.

However, instead of a visit we got a call from republic MVD official K. Aliyev who advised the authors of the report to give themselves up. The authors proved in vain that there was no need for them to make an appearance for they had already described in detail in the newspaper (an entire page) everything that they had "done." Their "booty" was not destined for sale or use and this precluded any criminal action... They suggested that infuriated Ministry workers give the newspaper any written answer which the authors pledged to publish so that readers could settle the dispute about which side was right. The telephone discussion went on for two days, during which time the newspaper was represented not only by the "couriers," but also by a lawyer, the editor and other officials from the newspaper. The authorities finally won and on Saturday Nusupov and Ospanov accompanied by the editor's lawyer, S. Katorch, delivered the package to the rayon's Alma-Ata Internal Affairs Forensic Department.

While the record of proceedings for the "voluntary statement" was being written, one of the witnesses that criminal investigation officials called in right out of the ROVD corridor (the police had already been trying unsuccessfully for a month to uncover the petty larceny that had taken place right in their office) didn't hold back and cried, "Are you work in a healthy manner if people bring you hashish on a saucer! They sent the cannabis to be examined by experts, meanwhile remembering to "popularly" explain to the newspaper men that criminal matters associated with drugs always begin with expert examinations.

And the only document that the editor received after publishing the report "Marijuana Couriers" is still that same recording of proceedings of the voluntary statement. But then soon afterward an extensive rejoinder written by Chief of the Section Against the Illegal Drug Circulation for the Kazakhstan SSR MVD Criminal Investigation Department V. Gorelkin appeared in the KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper. This rejoinder was entitled "For A State of Total Bliss" and primarily contained a series of unambiguous threatening allusions. I quote: "We see this now, when obviously for a state of total bliss they are asking police co-workers to come to the LENINSKAYA SMENA editor to collect the booty that was delivered and they see the two journalists' journey as a dumb joke. How much more difficult would it be to prove to A. Nusupov and T. Ospanov if they are detained as they are involved in illegal business or transporting narcotics. And references to their editor will not save them from the appropriate and very severe articles of the criminal code..." And there is more: "I am afraid that there is a 'second bit of bad luck' in the provocation that was conceived and, and this is especially sad, carried out. How will dozens of other young people respond to this invitation that was offered by the republic's youth newspaper?... Gravy is still gravy, even if you lavishly season it with hashish..."

And the entire retort is this: the journalists are "provocateurs," "criminals"... What does this remind you of... (I remember one Kazakhstan SSR MVD leader who seriously expressed to me his own dissatisfaction with the materials that IZVESTIYA prints under the heading "Local Events," for as he puts it, after almost every publication there are crimes committed somewhere that are similar to those that were described. What can you say about that?)

The reporters say "We are working with the youth newspaper, are constantly interacting with young people and are often with students, peteushniki [not further expanded], and simply "the lads from the lower strata. We really know how often many of these types of people love to 'fool around a little' with drugs. We hear stories about trips that these 'couriers' make to the Chu Valley, stories that as a rule are glorified with an heroic and romantic aura. And unfortunately there are enough 'instructors' there without us. We actually intended to tell about how police workers detained us and about how little heroism there is in those caught in this illegal business. And it is not our fault that we had to write about something else entirely... And we added to this alarming report episodes that describe the sad fact of young drug addicts. Yet now they are trying to charge us with complicity in the drug business..."

[Commentary] We will begin with some statistics so that things are more clear. The country has now registered more than 120,000 people who admit to the non-medical use of drugs (there is such a term). Of that number, almost 60,000 have crossed that risk line and have become hard-core drug addicts. In the first stage of Operation MAK that was run not long ago in the Central

Asian republics we found and destroyed 1,442 illegal crops of poppy-seed and cannabis, eliminated 2,700 hectares of wild growing narcotics and confiscated almost 900 kilograms of narcotic substances.

But our analysis shows that we are eliminating only a total of 15-20 percent of the narcotics that are in illegal circulation and the real number of people who use these poisons from time to time is about five times higher than the number registered by the authorities. This means that a slight reduction in the narcotics trade level that official sources are reporting does not arouse any optimism. We understand from the bitter experience of the past level of satiety that it is possible to reduce crime by artificial means: for example, the police removed pickets in the "valley of evil" and thus detected and registered fewer law-breakers. We passed notifications about routes for subsequent "couriers" which means that there are still dozens of crimes that are not included in the statistics.

It is the journalists duty to raise the alarm in this area. It is also their duty to uncover instances of inactivity by police workers and even individuals. We totally support the Alma-Ata newspapermen in this regard. But our colleagues collected only the means for achieving their goals without looking at the law (by the way, this is the first thing that a journalist who is planning risky acts must do). The law states that it is a crime to illegally manufacture, acquire and transport or carry narcotic substances even when not planning to sell (and we stress, without planning to sell or otherwise use) them. Thus they should not undertake any such actions, even within the framework of journalistic acts. And what if the reporters had run into real "couriers" in the Chu Valley and a confrontation had ensued? People in the criminal world have terrible tempers and, alas, reactionary justification is not a bullet-proof vest.

And now my main point. After rejecting the sound idea and while fanning their pride, local police are proving the illegality of the the journalists' actions. And—is that all? What have the police done to carry out their service obligation to combat the drug business? The readers do not know anything about this? One thing is still clear—the spark that set it all off is that it is obviously not difficult to get hashish in the Chu Valley. And that fact, more than anything else, is not in accordance with summary reports sent to "higher levels." And that is obviously why the energy of some defenders of law and order is being totally spent on this "uncompromising battle" against the youth newspaper. In any case, this is what is obvious from publications.

MVD Responds to Report

90US0141 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Oct 89 p 4 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by A. Illesh: "It Is Still Easy to Get Hashish"]

[Text] "It is still easy to get hashish," say experts from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs who are effectively responding to the article "Is It Easy to Get Hashish?" that was in IZVESTIYA (No 290).

That report told how, after taking their editor's official travel certificate with them, journalists for the republic's youth newspaper LENINSKAYA SMENA went into the famous Chu Valley, a location that is well-known to all drug addicts in the country. They did not meet the increased military pickets along the road, calmly collected five liters of cannabis and came back with it. The result of that trip was a report about what they saw that was published in Kazakhstan's MOLODEZHKA. In commenting on this situation, IZVESTIYA noted that it is better to take such journalistic actions after checking with the law. And the law is strict in this case. But our paper wrote that the police must adequately respond to this criticism and must not try to use other publications to exert influence on "obstinate" journalists. As a result of the lawsuit that was started, the problem of setting up an effective battle against the drug business in Kazakhstan has collapsed in and of itself: local police did not feel they had to respond to LENINSKAYA SMENA on this subject.

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs reacted to our newspaper's publication. We received an answer from the Main Criminal Investigation Directorate in which the IZVESTIYA publication was supported and a number of measures that the MVD planned to take in connection with this publication were cited.

Meanwhile the problem of the status of the battle against the drug business is taking on special significance today. Unfortunately, since this phenomenon has become an open subject for the press, a lot of space has been allocated to the "detective" side of it. But have the police agencies that are combating the spread of drugs in our country had as many successes as can be gleaned from television specials and scheming publications?

I will cite some statistics. In the last decade the number of people using drugs has increased by more than two hundred percent. There are now 121,000 such people. Almost two-thirds of them are under thirty years old. And research by experts shows that if we continue to advance at this same rate, by the year 2000 the number of drug users will reach 250,000. But that is not all. Those same experts confirm that at this crime level the latent level (the hidden part of the crime iceberg that doesn't show up in any reports or statistical tables) will be extremely high, with the real number of drug addicts being approximately five times higher than the official number. We can only imagine how sharply the demand and thus the illegal production and trade of narcotic substances will increase.

We have already established one thing: despite the measures that we are taking, we are still not achieving good results in our fight against drug addiction and we are seeing new types of narcotics that are manufactured in underground laboratories. Criminal activities in this area are taking on an organized, inter-regional and also international character. The problem of contraband is worsening. And here is one more piece of information—according to several expert estimations, the annual

illegal turnover of narcotic substances within the country today is worth approximately 400 million rubles.

I asked the chief of the USSR MVD Main Directorate's Criminal Investigation Department, Lieutenant General of Police V. Pankin, to comment on the situation that has developed and the materials that were published by IZVESTIYA ("Is It Easy To Get Hashish?").

[Pankin] The numbers that you quoted are known to the police and we plan our work based precisely on those figures. But I would like to note that these numbers should not scare the public, for I am convinced that we have the power to keep this evil in check. The police do not get enough assistance and understanding from many departments and there is one other very important detail. We have all been too late in realizing how dire the consequences of the drug society can be. Now, a little about hashish. I will begin with an acknowledgement that is unpleasant to our service. In reality, it is not very difficult to get hashish in our country. According to our information, approximately 30 percent of the people on Internal Affairs agency records use this narcotic. More than 80 percent of the narcotics in illegal circulation are of natural origin. And nature itself "promotes" this. There are massive amounts of wild cannabis from which marijuana and hashish are made that grow in the Far East, in the Povolzhye region and in the Northern Caucasus. And it also grows in other regions of the country. But there is an especially large amount of such wild plants growing in the Chu Valley. Approximately 1.5 million hectares are covered with this intoxicating grass and there is a total of approximately 130,000 hectares of cannabis growing there. The largest breeding ground for cannabis is in Dzhambul'skiy Oblast's Chu, Merkenskiy and Lugovskiy Rayons.

[Illesh] Excuse me, but if we follow the logic of the Kazakhstan police, we can make the same claims against you that were made against the journalists from the youth newspaper—the leading USSR MVD worker is showing drug addicts the way to find where they can get hashish...

[Pankin] We are not getting involved in these old, senseless accusations. We have not uncovered anything new for those who are making drugs. Alas, the people who use hashish really know the way to places where it grows. We are convinced about something else. Only extensive glasnost, well-regulated anti-drug propaganda and cooperation among police, medical personnel, teachers and mass-media agencies with participation from society as a whole can really cause people to totally understand the extremely serious dangers of drug addiction. And this includes the danger of smoking hashish.

[Illesh] Everything is clear about the labels that people have often hung on the press, which, they say, promotes the spread of drug addiction through its publications. Let's return to talking about the Chu Valley. What are the police specifically doing there now?

[Pankin] I will try to be objective. First, some statistics. This year Internal Affairs agencies in Kazakhstan are taking more active measures to prevent the export of cannabis from the Chu Valley region. For example, Operation MAK ran from June to the present. Four hundred to 600 police workers who work in 30 around-the-clock and 15 daylight posts and covering force positions operate on a daily basis in this area to stop the drug business. We have set up 39 operational search groups and are using helicopters to find the people who are making drugs. During this operation more than 1500 citizens have been detained on suspicion of preparing narcotic substances and more than one thousand of them have been criminally or administratively charged. Eighty-nine people who were involved in the organized sale of drugs have been exposed and approximately 4 tons of finished product and raw materials have been taken out of circulation. The Kazakhstan Council of Ministers, and we are thankful to the republic's government for this, has additionally allocated a new staff of people, 290 to be exact, to the battle against the spread of drugs. This "detachment" has already been manned at the 70 percent level and this entire force will work in the Chu Valley area.

[Illesh] This is a convincing answer. But here is another fact that is no less convincing. Two inexperienced (within the context of obtaining drugs) journalists simply made their own raid...

[Pankin] There was no need for a high level of professionalism in that so-called "operation." It is very difficult to totally block access to narcotics in that area. The valley runs for approximately 200 kilometers in Dzhambul'skiy Rayon alone. At the same time you are correct in stating that the police are still doing a poor job of organizing their work and an analysis of the work done by the Dzhambul'skiy and Chimkent'skiy Oblast Internal Affairs agencies indicates that they could get much better results from the forces that they have.

The Ministry is looking for ways to increase the number of the country's workers involved in the battle against the narcobusiness (at the present time there are 900 such people). We have established the Temporary USSR MVD GUUR [not further expanded] Department Against the Illegal Circulation of Drugs in the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan and are looking at recommendations to set up another such element in the Northern Caucasus and the Transcaucasus. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Tom'skiy Oblast and a number of other places are studying the question of setting up special directorates or departments to combat the narcotics business. I think that these decisions are totally justified in the locations where the narcotics situation is dire.

[Illesh] I am skeptical. If you increase the number of policemen in the Chu Valley you will temporarily improve the situation there. But how many such valleys are there in this country? Will we end up with a "Trishkin'skiy Kaftan" patchwork [a tale in which repairing one

element results in a failure somewhere else]? The police do not have enough forces today to resolve other urgent problems...

[Pankin] I am also not given to reckless optimism, but I am thoroughly convinced that we must radically restructure the entire operation, define specific missions and goals for the work of every ministry and department (and not just the police) in this area, provide for coordinating their efforts, and monitor the end results in order to successfully resolve the task of stopping the spread of narcotics addiction in this country. The experiences of other countries indicate that a special program for combating drug addiction could be the correct foundation for this. We must define all aspects of the problem, the strategy, the priority areas for operations, and measures for each of these.

It would be advisable for us to establish a special state agency and give it appropriate powers so that we can establish such a program. This will allow us to be more operational in examining and resolving the most diverse problems and will let us eliminate the existing inter-departmental and coordinating councils in the various ministries. It will also help combine the efforts of all interested departments in the battle against drug addiction. We recently had a meeting with the leading American experts in the battle against drug addiction during which we exchanged experiences. We also discussed financing such programs. The U.S. is allocating billions to the fight against narcotics addiction, while we want to defeat this terrible and aggressive evil through the sheer enthusiasm of police and medical personnel.

[Illesh] As always in such situations, there is the counter-question? What would it take to carry out such a program?

[Pankin] We understand the country's economic difficulties. But there is a way out. We can provide resources for the program. What we need is a single fund whose foundation could be funds deducted out of profits from selling alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, voluntary payments from citizens, enterprises and organizations, and amounts from financial compensations collected in judicial decisions, to include collections from people who committed crimes associated with drugs. These funds could be used to cure sick drug addicts, open special drug rehabilitation centers and also improve the technical equipment for agencies that are waging the battle against drugs.

Counternarcotics Operations in Kazakhstan's Chu Valley Detailed

90WD0115A Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 46, 11-18 Nov 89 pp 31- 33

[Article by Yuriy Lushin: "The Grass Narcotic"]

[Text] The helicopter flew over another of the isolated sheep pens, the 9th or 10th so far, in the vast Chu Valley. All of the others had been empty. In spring the shepherds

drive the flocks to distant pastures, but we were certainly not looking for them. We were looking for "botanists," the sophisticated term by which drug addicts describe themselves. We were looking for hunters for the Chu cannabis—or, to put it more bluntly, for anasha addicts and pot smokers. Where could the troublemakers go in the steppe, exposed to the winds and the brutal sun? Here they would have a roof over their heads and an armful of last year's straw to lean against. It was not the Hilton Hotel, of course, but it was still incomparably better than burying themselves in burrows in the sand hills (and we do find pot smokers in these burrows, and even in graves—they store their anasha in the mazars, the Kazakh cemeteries—and we also find some in summer homes, where they ply their trade in winter and take refuge in empty garden sheds). Besides this, as if by special order, the cannabis thickets—known as pot (this is how the potheads got their name) in the slang of the drug culture—are particularly thick for some reason around the sheep pens.

We flew over the steppe for a long time in a fancy zigzag pattern, following the orders of Sgt Ziyad Abdullayev, a man with an unparalleled knowledge of this territory. His friend, an equally outstanding pathfinder, Sgt Anvar Musayev, was combing the pot thickets in a car at the same time. We communicated by wireless....

The helicopter flew over the sheep pen, and all of us took a good look inside and at the surrounding landscape but did not see anything suspicious. The helicopter flew a little lower, and then the sergeant shouted:

"There is a car in the pen. Come in for a landing, Captain!"

I was the last to jump out of the cockpit, and I saw what happened next as if it were in slow motion, although everything was over in a few seconds. The sergeant was running in front, and a small blue Zhiguli flew out of the open doorway of the pen and headed straight for him at an insane speed. I wanted to yell, "Take cover!" but Ziyad leaped sideways before I could speak, simultaneously stretching out a hand carrying a pistol. I did not hear the shot but I saw a brief flash. In the next instant the car flew right past us, covering us with dust, and I got a close look at the rabid expression of the driver, his eyes round with fear and hatred. "He missed," I thought.... The driver of the Zhiguli raced along the road in the steppe without stepping on the brake, paying no attention to ruts and bumps and showing no pity for his shock absorbers. The drug addicts did not know that this part of the valley had been secured with blockades and that people were waiting for them at every entrance to the highway.

"We might as well take a look at what they left behind in the pen," Abdullayev said. "They will not get far anyway."

His prediction was absolutely right.

Everyone started to go in, but I took a look around for some reason and saw something completely incomprehensible. Two people jumped out of the car, which had stopped around 400 meters from us, and were racing through the steppe.

"Where are you going?" I shouted, as if they could have heard me over the whirring of the helicopter.

"We will go ask them that right now," the sergeant said, turning toward the helicopter. It rose into the air in the opposite direction from the car, and after we had circled back, we could not see the runners. The steppe was completely empty. This part of the Chu Valley is a ridge of low hills, separated by ravines and the beds of dried-up streams. The drug addicts call this place the Sacred Hills because of the abundance of pot, especially the particularly noxious Sargovka strain of cannabis. When a helicopter flies over one of these hills, it is impossible to see what is happening behind the rest. We circled each hill around the abandoned car, but the valley was empty. It was incredible. Where could they have gone? Were they lying down in a gully in a nearby ravine? We had to take a look. We landed and set off in different directions. We could not find anyone. I returned to the helicopter. All of the rest were already there. It turned out that the drug addicts had returned to the car and were trying to start the engine and that they had been spotted by the helicopter pilot. We followed them again. Again we found the same mystery: There was no one in or near the car. "What the Hell is going on? Do they have invisible hats?" I thought, and then I repeated my thoughts out loud. Abdullayev did not want to listen to fairy tales. He simply looked under the car and asked:

"Isn't that a tight squeeze? Crawl out of there right now," he added, taking a step backward and aiming his pistol, "but without any tricks. Put your hands behind your heads."

Two wrinkled and unshaven individuals crawled out. They had no identification, they probably invented the names they gave us, and their palms were greenish-black (evidence that they had been handling hashish or making "reefers"—i.e., marijuana)

Lt Col Bezrukov and I stood on both sides of the wounded Zhiguli, guarding the drug addicts seated in it. The helicopter had flown away to bring an investigator and witnesses back here, to the scene of the crime. By law, there have to be witnesses. The sergeant and lieutenant colonel cannot write up a report themselves because they are interested parties....

"How strange," I thought, "that the law does not trust the militia, which exists to uphold...the law. What nonsense. Does this mean that a policeman has to hide a pair of witnesses nearby when he is on a stakeout at night? Apparently he does, because where else would he find people in the desolate steppe?"

We stood there, in the middle of the deserted steppe, the entire population of which now consisted of just the four of us. We did not even have any handcuffs (which turned out to be in extremely short supply) to neutralize the criminals in some way.

After turning over our "catch," we continued the helicopter raid. This is one of the elements of the struggle against the spread of drugs. There are 138 drug addicts on record in Chuyskiy Rayon, but it is a regrettable fact, confirmed by world experience, that each addict will draw another 10 people into his orbit. It is a chain reaction. Then how many of the local inhabitants use anasha? How many of them grow the grass and how many of them sell it? We do not know, but Chairman Anatoliy Grigoryevich Bedora of the Chuyskiy rayispolkom told us some alarming news:

"We are sitting on a powder keg and we are trying to stop an unstoppable chain reaction. We need to take cardinal measures. Otherwise, the Chu Valley will turn into Colombia. Four years ago we proposed a strictly monitored quarantine of the valley. No one agreed with us then, and it is too bad...."

His idea sounded quite sensible to me. Of course, helicopter raids are effective and productive. Fifteen drug traffickers were caught in just 2 days (not counting the teenage users who had been caught on the way to the pot thickets), and almost 200 kilograms of marijuana, known here as anasha, were confiscated from them (incidentally, a glassful of this grass costs at least 50 rubles on the black market—of course, there is no other market for it—and there are 50 glasses in a kilogram). I repeat, the results are impressive. But the department for the control of the illegal drug traffic in the republic does not have its own helicopter and therefore has to ask either the State Automobile Inspection Service or the military for the use of theirs. I waited months for this raid, for example, and then the helicopter had to stop working in less than a week because the owner wanted it back. Obviously, the struggle against drug addiction did not stop at that point. Permanent militia checkpoints were still being manned on the roads, patrol cars kept an eye on suspicious individuals, hidden stakeout points were set up in the steppe and along the railroad, trained sniffer dogs were brought in to search for drugs, freight was inspected.... The outstretched net secured a good catch, which, according to statistics, is getting heavier every year. Whereas 2,823 kilograms of drugs were confiscated in the republic 2 years ago, the figure last year was 4,608 kilograms, and this year's figure should be around 30 percent higher than last year's. Besides this, more than 15,000 square meters of poppies were destroyed in the spring operation. This also broke all records. Here is the pertinent arithmetic: Each square meter produces three glassfuls of koknar (dried poppies) and each glass costs at least 100 rubles. In other words, the price of a square meter is 300 rubles.... These statistics aroused a complex and even contradictory train of thought: Either the number of addicts increases each year or our militia is constantly getting better at combating the vice.

"Where does the truth lie?" I asked Viktor Fedorovich Gorelkin, the militia lieutenant colonel in charge of the department of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs combating the illegal trafficking in narcotic substances.

"Perhaps somewhere in between," Gorelkin answered. "After all, we do not know exactly how many addicts we have. The only indisputable fact is that we catch more of them each year. In this sense, our offices are certainly working better and more effectively."

"Can you say that the Chu Valley is reliably secured at this time?"

"No, regrettably, I cannot. I think, quite frankly, that we are stopping around 10 or 12 percent of all of the illegal drug traffic. There are many reasons, and the main ones are our shortage of personnel and inferior technical and material equipment."

"Yes, people are in short supply," added Yermek Talgarbayev, the militia major in charge of the Chuyskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs. "It is true that in summer we have reinforcements from all parts of the country, dog trainers and cadets from the Higher Militia School. They are sent here for a month, but by the time they get their bearings and learn what they are supposed to be doing, it is time for them to leave. Then we have to find new replacements, and not everyone has a talent for this difficult work. We only have two permanent checkpoints on the roads, because we do not have enough personnel to man more of them. Our wireless radios are weak, we have no night vision instruments, and we do not have our own supply of vehicles. It is true that farms in the rayon are supposed to take turns lending us their cars, but they are also suffering from a vehicle shortage. The rayon department has only two old cars—an UAZ and a Zhiguli with an engine from the first model. Just try chasing drug traffickers in high-speed Yavas and the latest-model cars with this kind of equipment...."

Whenever I remember those days and nights in the Chu Valley, I am overcome by conflicting emotions. I saw the struggle against drug addiction, based almost exclusively on sheer enthusiasm, and this does not make me feel optimistic. Judging by the small number and technical poverty of the fighters against this evil, however, their results might be called remarkable. The black market has customarily reacted to the militia's successes with an immediate rise in drug prices. What is the result? The anonymous big shots of the drug trade get richer. Will this stop the anasha hunters? I think it will not stop them, and it might even make them more ruthless. I am constantly bothered by Lt Col Gorelkin's statement that the lion's share of the drugs gets around every obstacle. I am also disturbed by the knowledge that drugs are crippling our youth. I did not see a single person over the age of 30 among those who were arrested, but I saw many 16-year-olds, 18-year-olds, and 20-year-olds. The net has been cast, but it has too many holes, some of which are clearly visible to everyone, and no one has been able

to patch them up yet. It has been discovered, for example, that local drug traffickers are sending anasha and even hashish by regular mail (not air mail) in ordinary parcels without fear, because postal regulations do not require their inspection (for security reasons, the senders of air mail packages have to present them for inspection unsealed, but this does not apply to regular parcel post). Should postal regulations be changed in certain regions, such as the Chu Valley? After all, these are packages of poison, of slow death. Does the minister of communications, who has the authority to change the regulations, know about this? I was told that he had been informed....

Incidentally, there is also some good news. The Kazakh SSR State Agroindustrial Committee allocated 1.2 million rubles for the struggle against drug addiction in the republic, with subsequent financing of 850,000 rubles a year for this program. This money is already being used to put together a special detachment (part of which will be sent to Chuyskiy Rayon), and the rest will be used to buy equipment, rent helicopters, and set up a dog kennel with its own staff of trainers. Of course, this is not the billions (again, it is difficult to resist comparisons) the U.S. Government allocated for the fight against its own drug mafia and drug traffic, but, thank God, we are lagging far behind in terms of the scales of this problem, and this, quite frankly, is reassuring. I think it is a matter of honor for our law enforcement agencies to maintain this lag in the future. We have no objections.

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Military Counterintelligence Narcotics Operations Detailed

90WD0157A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 First Edition p 4

[Article by Capt 2d Rank S. Turchenko and Lt Col V. Astafyev, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondents: "980 Grams of Opium that Led Military Counterintelligence to Organized Crime"]

[Text] On 25 January 1989, during a customs inspection of a vehicle arriving from abroad, 980 grams of opium in a cellophane package were found under the spare tire. The driver assured them that he knew nothing about the contraband. An investigation began. Serviceman Krysyuk (the names here and further on of those under investigation have been changed so as not to damage the investigation and the trial) turned himself in at the special department and confessed that he had slipped the opium into the vehicle and that he had done this at the request of serviceman Ryaskin, who was continuing to remain on temporary duty outside the country and did not have the opportunity to bring back the contraband. Soon, Ryaskin was arrested. From him, it led to Sharipov and Akulov, residents of a border village. It turned out that during 1988 and early 1989 they had persuaded several conscripts traveling abroad on official duty to transport narcotics from abroad. They indicated

the places abroad to meet the opium dealers, supplied the currency and valuables, and paid generously for transporting each kilogram of narcotics. Sharipov and Akulov initially completely denied being involved in smuggling, but, proven guilty by the facts, confessed. They told how they brought the soldiers home with them, got them drunk, showed them pornographic movies, and let them try the drugs. Then they began to work on them for further joint criminal activity. They taught them how to make contact with the dealers abroad and where and how to hide the "goods" from customs and border control.

Imagine a huge refrigerator and in it frozen chicken carcasses. A container was placed in one of them, which was also treated with a special solution so the trained dogs could not smell the narcotics. There was also another "innovation."

Readers are probably already asking: What does military counterintelligence have to do with drug smuggling?

"Combating drug smuggling occupies a considerable place in the work of our district's military counterintelligence," the chief of the investigative subunit told us. "This stems from the peculiarities of the region, where drug business has traditional roots. Many criminal cases which the district's special department investigates involve namely this type of crime, although we do not have a specific mission of working with narcotics. Our interest is broader: smuggling, the channels of which can also be used for hostile purposes. But the investigation of a specific case begins, and the chain extends to the dealers, the 'wholesalers,' that is, to organized crime. Incidentally, in the context of recent events in the Transcaucasus, I am convinced, it is organized crime that is primarily interested in the disturbances on the border."

In recent years alone, the district's military counterintelligence agencies have exposed and taken legal action against hundreds of smugglers, some of whom were operating as part of well-organized and hushed-up groups having buyers and accomplices in many cities in the country. More than 7 million rubles and valuables, which have been turned into state revenue, dozens of kilograms of narcotics, and quite a number of plain weapons and firearms have been confiscated from the criminals. There is good reason that they joke in the special department that if they were working on a cost-accounting basis, they would long ago have become the most technically equipped institution. It is also significant that one of the pharmacological factories operated for several months just on opium "products" confiscated by the district's special department. Have you had occasion to visit a room where they store evidence? The numerous shelves and safes there are loaded with all sorts of modern radio and electronic equipment and many other valuables. After the trial, all this will go by writ to the state treasury. So it is to no purpose that some unqualified individuals concerned about the people's kopeck reproach the organs of state

security and their component part—military counterintelligence—for being parasites. In any event, the revenue to the state from the special department of the Turkestan Military District is more than from any other enterprise.

However, combating smuggling is far from the only and not the most important concern of military counterintelligence agents. The most important missions of the special departments are organizing reliable protection against intelligence and subversive activities by foreign special services and effective safeguarding of the secrecy of the most important measures being carried out in the Army and Navy to increase combat readiness. These missions are relevant not only in wartime, but also in peacetime. Suffice it to say that during the postwar years, such dangerous agents as Penkovskiy, Popov, Filatov, Nilov, Ivanov, and others were exposed with the active involvement of counterintelligence agents. They managed to stop the leakage of important military information and prevent significant damage to combat readiness.

But let us get back to Sharipov and Akulov. They confessed to criminal activities all right, but then began claiming that they bought the narcotics for personal consumption. But the large amount of "goods" indicated that was not the case. And where do ordinary drug addicts get the money to put tens and even hundreds of thousands of rubles into circulation? They were sent for a medical examination. The drug experts drew a categorical conclusion: the suspects did not suffer from drug addiction. That means they had a ready market or were linked to a "wholesaler" of a higher style. But when the conversation turned to this, Sharipov and Akulov turned white, as if they had seen a snake in front of their noses and kept quiet for a long time.

Meanwhile, the thread that stretched from them horizontally suddenly led higher. One of Akulov's accomplices led them to two more dealers—Khalilov and Gurin. Khalilov, sensing that the military counterintelligence agents had come upon his trail, went into hiding, taking along 6 kg of opium. His wife and six children also disappeared. Gurin was arrested. The criminal world has a unique "information bank" on law enforcement agencies. Information about who was conducting the investigation and how, what his character was like, and what his capabilities were is passed from criminal to criminal. The KGB agencies stand by themselves in this verbal information summary: if you end up there, do not slip up, tell them everything as it is. Bribery does not work here; the workers are highly professional—you will not get through them.

Gurin named one "wholesaler," and this was already on a quite different level of organized crime. On the day that we arrived at the special department, a task force of military counterintelligence agents flew to city K. to make a search in the apartment of the suspect and arrest him.

As soon as the special department got to Gurin, representatives of the criminal drug business began to take action. They began making telephone threats to the investigators. There was an attempt to place their official

vehicle under surveillance. One unknown person even "pulled up" to the driver, trying to find out the "chief's" home address. There were anonymous telephone offers of large bribes. We mention this especially for those who believe the life of a military counterintelligence agent is a piece of cake. Of course, there are people among them, although it is extremely rare, who are weak in something. But the bulk of them are real fighters. This is evidenced by the entire history of the USSR KGB special department for the Turkestan District, which has established decades of traditions. Legendary names, shrouded in the mystery of secrecy, and now already the time of the operation...

Between 1920 and 1922, 89 major political and criminal bands were eliminated with the involvement of military counterintelligence. During the years of the struggle with the basmatch, counterintelligence agents discovered and rendered harmless hundreds of resident spies, recruiters, and suppliers of arms. Many military counterintelligence agents gave their lives in the line of duty and were posthumously awarded state awards. To this day, their names were unknown to the general reader. We will name them with respect and gratitude: Capt V. Podlesnykh, Sr Lt I. Matvenkov, Maj G. Sabelnikov, Maj Yu. Ochkin, Capt Ye. Sverzhnev, Capt V. Shendrygin, WO M. Bondarenko, Sr Lt V. Ivanov, Capt A. Nikitin, Maj V. Romanov, Maj V. Kovtun, Capt A. Lomakin... Maj Boris Sokolov, a military counterintelligence agent, in our day became a Hero of the Soviet Union.

Today's military counterintelligence workers emulate these people, and that means they strive to always demonstrate boldness, decisiveness, adherence to principle, and honesty.

...On just the second day, the special department received information that the task force had conducted a search in the home of a "wholesaler" and discovered large sums of Soviet money and currency. They also discovered drugs in special hiding places.

"The search went on for a long time," the senior investigator commented on this information. "It is the specific nature of the East. Here the searches are not at all like they show in the movies or write about in books. The Eastern house is crowded and connected by passageways to neighboring houses where relatives live. It is an epic work to conduct a search here. You must observe the law, as well as take into account customs. First you have to move the elderly and children from one room into another, inspect, and then move them back again. And so on and so forth. And all of this is in a situation of noise and racket. It is a long and painstaking affair."

We had the occasion to witness the arrest of former serviceman S. Several years ago he made contraband deal and was living in clover, calm and confident in his impunity. But his name came to light in one of the above cases here. He came under investigation, quickly confessed to everything, and returned the illegally obtained

property. He already knew perfectly well what kind of a term was threatening him. Everyday he came: Arrest me, please!

The arrest of the "wholesaler" also took place quietly, without excesses.

How far the trail of the "kiryak" will stretch is not yet known. The investigation continues. And military counterintelligence, as we can see, is making its contribution to the fight against organized crime.

Bidding us farewell on completion of our temporary duty, a representative of the leadership of the special department remarked:

"Today is a day of departure for us in general. Some of our comrades are also departing for a new duty station. Lately, as a result of steps taken by law enforcement agencies and the command authorities, the number of crimes associated with smuggling has decreased sharply."

But then he took a breath and added:

"However, there is still enough to worry about."

Motives, Activities of 'Free Journalists' Union Criticized

90US0444 Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN* in Russian
No 2, Jan 90 p 17

[Article by A. Nikolayev: "Glasnost Versus Hearsay: Drumroll From the Underground"]

[Text] A publisher of samizdat newspapers in Minsk, D. Yemelyanov, raised his voice in Tallinn's House of Political Education.

"Gentlemen!" he shouted. "Are you people or what? Look—here is a type who sells papers to our idiots from the plant for a ruble 30 kopecks. I am a publisher, and I know they cost 10, 12, or maybe 15 kopecks. Multiply that by two, say, 30 kopecks at most. But this type would do anything for a ruble! What's the matter? Not enough for a Mercedes! Are you people—or are you monstrous speculators!"

After taking a pause, and deciding that the time had come to express himself in actions rather than words, the speaker went up to the so-called "type" and boxed him smartly on the ear with his fist.

"And just who is getting excited?" interjected a man in gold-colored glasses from the assembled crowd of "free journalists." Can it be you, Gospodin Yemelyanov? If you consider yourself such an honest and independent publisher, why have you not given me back the 100 rubles that you got from me at the last congress! Then he added: "If you have anything to say, say it from the rostrum—not with your fists in the hall. And no more attacks on the press or you will have me to deal with!"

Thus the third congress of "the gentlemen of the free press" resumed its labors. Converging for two days on the Estonian capital from cities throughout the country to attend the third congress of their extralegal union were members of the underground press, who continue to be called "informals," representing every conceivable sort of "party," movement, trend, if not simply themselves. After occupying quarters in the fashionable hotels of the city, next day in a noisy crowd they literally burst into the hall of the House of Political Education and laid out on tables their newspapers, brochures, and journals. Here could be seen, for example, the Minsk *ALTERNATIVA* (Social-Democratic Union); *SVOBODNOYE SLOVO* (Democratic Union); *UCHREDITELNOYE SOBRANIYE* (Petersburg organization of the Democratic Union); *SIBERSKIY KURYER* (published in Novosibirsk); *PRESS-BYULLETEN* (Independent Information Agency); *FRONT*; *DEMOKRAT*; and *INFORMAL* (published in Grodno). Publications were bought and sold. Pick up a newspaper, peruse it, and occasionally one might become outraged at the filth and outpouring of open fury at communists and the Soviet leadership, and at the nauseatingly gross humor—without which, evidently, neither *SVOBODNOYE*

SLOVO nor the the newspaper *FORPOST* published by the independent news agency White Russian Star could continue to be published.

In one of the articles appearing in *FORPOST*, for example, under the blatant headline 'Brother, Can You Spare a Kopeck?' (see No. 3, 1989), it is alleged that "the socialist state, which is reeling under the burden of educating its citizens, has levied a formidable tax without regard for their views or their demands, on the proceeds of which it is cultivating the socialist-communist way of life exclusively and instilling it in the masses without consulting their wishes."

The newspaper *SVOBODNOYE SLOVO*, published by the Democratic Union, goes even further in an article entitled "The Time Has Come To Call Things by Their Proper Names," written by a so-called free journalist by the name of M. Umov. Without taking the trouble to analyze the situation in the country as it has developed, this newly arrived herald of freedom proclaims:

"There is no point in arguing the need to destroy the very life of the organs of party government. They must be destroyed. The question is: How much of an effort must be mounted to liberate ourselves? It is a moot point. To lift this effort to the level of a mass movement, I propose to begin by putting the Communist Party on trial before all the people: to unmask the cult of the October Revolution and reveal the true meaning of this tragic turning point for the country...and to unmask the cult of Ulyanov-Lenin as the main culprit responsible for national and civil degeneration, the colonial enslavement of the republics, and the barbaric debasement of our culture."

Money, money, money—it costs from 10 kopecks to 10 rubles to obtain a copy of such literature. It was to the tinkle of coins that the chairman of the union of "free journalists" began his address. S. Grigoryants, the notorious editor-in-chief of the journal *Glasnost*, called on those assembled to use their pens "to increase the influence of the independent press—including its influence on the CPSU—so as to strengthen its position in preparation for a military coup in the country." (A military coup!)

"It was like this a year and a half ago at the second congress in Vilnius." (The first congress was in Moscow.) This remark was made by S. Chapnin, editor-in-chief of the Orthodox Christian journal *SLOVO*, who was present here at the third congress in the role of observer. "The fact is, we on the journal consider it to be one of our tasks to establish mutual understanding and cooperation between the various informal publishing houses. This is why we have accepted their invitations to attend. Take a look, if you will, at the conclusions reached by one of my staff associates in the article we published "On the Vilnius Congress."

"What goals the congress is dedicated to achieving may be discerned from the titles of reports delivered at the opening session," the article stated. 'The Situation in the Country and the Tasks of the Independent Press' is the

title of a report by S. I. Grigoryants, who devoted the major part of it to an analysis of the situation in the country without trying to conceal his hostility to the existing political regime in the country. He even went so far as to express his regret that the softening of state policy in the area of human rights and culture would lead to the "erosion" of the anti-Soviet front. Herein may be heard familiar echoes of the extremist slogan 'The Worse Things Get—The Better It Is.' It even appeared at times that Grigoryants in his heart rejoiced at such an event as the carnage in Tbilisi. It goes without saying that his speech had a marked effect in heightening the anti-Soviet mood. The speech intimated that the main mark of independence of a publication was its anti-Soviet stance. Conversely, it was implied that a publication taking any other line was being manipulated."

The orator on this occasion spoke in the same key, the only difference perhaps being that more pressure was applied to collecting dues. His logic was simple. Money was necessary, and lots of it, to combat the CPSU. And to get it, it was necessary to invest in the underground union, and to promptly sign up anyone who had not yet become a member. It was incumbent on them to raise the level of journalism and to contend with the Bolsheviks by exploiting their own revolutionary methods and tactics.

And just imagine, suddenly an "informal" or non-official journalist stood up and asked the chairman why the reports of the union leaders had been carried over to the second day of the conference. Was it not, he inquired, because in the course of the last year and a half they had not lifted so much as a finger to provide moral support or material assistance? The inquirer made particular reference to those who resorted most often to methods of falsification in standing against the existing regime and therefore had experienced unpleasant encounters with the militia.

This prompted a heated discussion. As it turned out, the entire "work" of the leadership boiled down to jaunts taken by S. Grigoryants out of the country, where he may have discussed such-and-such a matter with so-and-so, picking up certain amount of information, and asking his listeners not to forget the free press in the USSR.

"Just try to check on what he was up to," one of the editors complained bitterly. "Meanwhile, here we sit, looking like dunces."

Among the questions arousing a storm of controversy was this one: How to deal with the draft Law of the Press, prohibiting propaganda intended to bring about the violent overthrow of, or any forcible change in, the existing form of government? Was it necessary (and if so, to what degree) to assist the "official journalists and editors" who were subject to, or susceptible to, intimidation by the party apparatchiks? How could greater use be made of state printing and reproduction facilities without in the process "falling under the Soviet legal system"?

The false problem of Article 5 arose as a result of the fact that the organizers of the congress had distributed to all the participants in advance a written resolution stating

that the provisions covering propaganda intended to bring about the violent overthrow of the state permitted its organs "to arbitrarily limit or shut down any outlet of the mass media calling for a change in the system of government by nonviolent means."

Although opinions differed on this subject, nevertheless, reason prevailed, and the criticisms of Article 5 fell by the wayside. If in this matter the congress reached a consensus, however, in its approach to the question of possibly assisting the "official press," it soon became apparent that passions would not subside for long. One of the delegations proposed sending express telegrams to the "official" editors, informing them who they would support under what conditions and who they would not. On the contrary, E. Molchanov, editor-in-chief of SVOBODNOYE SLOVO, urged participants not to interfere with natural flow of skilled workers from the official to the non-official press, which in his judgment would undergo a swift expansion in the very near future. "Moreover," he noted, "there is no point in engaging in polemics with the CPSU over Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. Let the Bolsheviks remain in power. In a year and a half, when the country collapses, under the terms of the very same constitution, we will be the judges of how those most responsible are to be dealt with..."

Most of those assembled in all probability did not envision such a turn of events. Publisher and independent journalist V. Yakovlev from Grodno kept trying to address the gathering, from the floor as well as the rostrum, in order to focus attention on another and in his view far more pressing problem—how to assure at all costs accurate and objective reporting, which by no means every non-official publisher could boast of doing. But they would not let him speak.

Mamy Tkhakurdas, general director of of the samizdat newspaper SANKIRTAN, openly proselytizing Krishna Consciousness, quit the hall after saying: "As you can see for yourselves, all my efforts to establish a place for myself in the activities of this union have failed. This congress lacks a spiritual foundation. That means, it will go down to defeat."

Evidently, there were others who perceived this. In any case, on the following day the hall was noticeably more empty. From conversations with delegates that remained it became clear that their attitudes toward the "moguls of the underground press" were changing, and that is not surprising. What, for example, has the editor-in-chief of SVOBODNOYE SLOVO, E. Molchanov, to teach anyone? This is a man who, according to his own acknowledgment, neither writes nor knows how to write. It is, incidentally, also the same literary personage that came to Pushkin Square in Moscow on 30 October with members of the Democratic Union for the purpose of committing an act of vandalism—the burning of the official flag of the USSR.

Here is a revelation direct from the chairman of the underground union. Today the journal GLASNOST was devoted to a special group of 40 persons making up a television crew, consisting of five or six cameramen and

certain working associates, assigned to work at foreign stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union.

Where the money comes from for carrying out ideological sabotage is not hard to guess, bearing in mind the numerous foreign contacts of the "chairman." And if earlier, over there, he represented himself as a major journal editor, there is little doubt that from now on he will assume the role of leader of the "free press."

The third congress, in the opinion of many participants, did indeed go down to defeat; for it ended in a largely abandoned hall. The "free" journalists and publishers dispersed to their underground stations. But this in no way means that the newly established union has ceased to exist or that the "independent editors" have ceased to publish newspapers, brochures, and journals that are at times of extremely dubious content.

I can recall the atmosphere of the congress—the irritable, often open hostility to perestroika and its supporters. But, of course, it was not yesterday, nor was it only under isolated circumstances, that the underground press arose. Obviously, it arose because it was not always possible to read about everything in our "official" press. But times change. And where is it if not in on the pages of the "official" press that heretofore suppressed subject-matter has been made available to the masses? Who if not the communists have become the champions of open dialogue and glasnost in the pages of the press? A confirmation of this could be seen in the USSR Congress of Peoples' Deputies, which clearly demonstrated that there can be no going back to the days of the past. It might be supposed that many of the "non-officials" also understood this fact since they did not show up for the second day of the underground congress. Journalists and publishers for whom the illegal congress served as a turning point have reason to ponder it.

There is reason, too, to ponder who these people are who are beating the drums from the underground; people who call themselves "dissenters from the system" while living on the proceeds of its labors; people in a rage to criticize everyone and every thing under the banner of freedom and democracy; people who rejoice in the grief of others, and fan the flames of international discord. It is time to pause and consider the question: Are these no more than excesses of glasnost or do they represent the emergence of some fully determined political drive?

Soviet Copyright Agency Chairman on VAAP Policies, Author Rights

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Second Edition p 4*

[Interview with N. N. Chetverikov, chairman of the board of the All-Union Copyright Agency [VAAP], by V. Gorlenko, Moscow: "Creative Work, Law, Commerce..."]

[Text] [V. Gorlenko] Perestroika has put into movement all segments of Soviet society. May I ask, Nikolay Nikolayevich, how this reflects on the activities of the

All-Union Copyright Agency, which activities are directly linked with people engaged in creative labor?

[N. Chetverikov] The renewal processes that have encompassed all spheres of our life are occurring especially strongly in the nation's spiritual and cultural life. And it is precisely here that they are leading to the most visible shifts. Because the intelligentsia, our invaluable spiritual capital, in the recent stagnant past not only lived in expectation of changes, but also prepared in society their psychological and moral foundations. Today also that intelligentsia has also engaged actively in the resolution of the vitally important socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and cultural problems. Brilliant testimony to this is provided by the highly civic position of the people's elected representatives who are scientists, writers, painters, and composers, who have not remained indifferent to a single vitally important question that has been disturbing Soviet citizens.

However, their main goal is the taking of decisive steps to multiply the overall culture, the need of which is dictated by the very essence and logic of perestroika. Hence also the growing attention that is currently being paid to the copyright, which has been called upon to promote the creation and dissemination of spiritual, intellectual values, and the building up of the cultural foundation of perestroika. VAAP, as a general copyright organization, encompasses all types of creative activity and strives to create for it the best possible legal, psychological, and material prerequisites.

There is yet another important aspect in the agency's work—participation in international cultural cooperation, in the exchange of works of science, literature, and art, which helped nations to find areas of rapprochement and trust, consolidation and integration—on the basis of the priority of universal spiritual values over all other considerations. Perestroika in the USSR has become a factor of world importance—the experience of communication with foreign colleagues convinces me that many foreign observers, including those who are from taking a sympathetic attitude toward our country and socialism, justifiably and reasonably link the future development of events on the international scene with the fate of perestroika.

The truth about perestroika conforms to the interests of world peace and security, and VAAP is applying major efforts to assuring that the foreign public becomes promptly and broadly acquainted with the works of Soviet authors who are revealing the goals and tasks of perestroika, and the essence and directedness of the revolutionary changes that have brought to life in the intellectual, initiatory Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

That process would be inconceivable without a counter-movement. The agency attempts to use all its opportunities to promote the acquainting of Soviet people with the advanced achievements of foreign sociopolitical, scientific, and artistic thought. The glasnost and openness

that are being confirmed in our life have promoted in this area a very important factor—a new view of and approach to the creative work of our fellow countrymen who, for various reasons, have proven to be outside the confines of our Homeland. We are having returned to us not only the talented works that were consigned to oblivion and silence, but also brilliant creative individuals!

And, finally, by carrying out its international function, VAAP promotes in a practical way the expansion of the spiritual communication and cultural dialogue between countries and continents, and this corresponds to the letter and spirit of the Helsinki and Vienna accords, which see the important role of the copyright in the context of that complex of concepts that is called human rights.

[V. Gorlenko] Do you mean that the copyright itself needs perestroika?

[N. Chetverikov] Undoubtedly. The legislation that is in effect in the USSR in the area of copyrights must be renovated and put into conformity both with the present-day methods of reproducing and disseminating works (for example, video recording, reprographics, computer programs, satellite or cable television), and with the generally accepted world models.

The fact of the matter is that the level of protection of copyrights in the USSR, with regard to a number of features, does not correspond to today's requirements. Therefore our country, alongside of 17 developing states, still remains a member of the World Copyright Convention in the 1952 edition, which has been recognized as being obsolete and has already been closed to any further annexation to it. All the developed capitalist countries and the European socialist states have entered either the World Convention in the 1971 edition, or the Bern Convention, which guarantees the highest level of protection of literary and artistic works.

Recently, in the course of the London Information Forum, we declared our intention also to join the Bern Convention. However, the practical implementation of this important political step, which will serve to solidify our country's international authority and prestige and which, incidentally, promises tangible material advantages, requires an amendment to the existing domestic legislation in the copyright area.

[V. Golenko] What is VAAP doing in this regard?

[N. Chetverikov] Jointly with the creative unions and a number of other organizations, we have prepared the appropriate recommendations, the essence of which can be summarized briefly in two basic points. Currently television and radio broadcasting, the cinematographer, and the newspapers freely use published works without asking for the author's consent and without paying him any compensation. Instead of this obviously unjust system, it is planned to introduce a normal contractual

basis for the relationships between the author (that is, the copyright holder) and the mentioned mass media that use his published works.

It is also being recommended that the 25-year period for protecting the copyright after the author's death be extended to 50 years, which is the minimal requirement for the participants of the Bern Convention. I would like to emphasize the importance of this principle, inasmuch as much as, strange as it seems, it still has opponents, who assert that this standard norm is only detrimental. Their arguments are based on false ideas concerning the tasks of the copyright service and they completely ignore not only the heirs' material interests, but also the moral aspects of the question: in particular, the right to reproduce and disseminate the work, and the right to the inviolability of the work, which rights guarantee that that work is preserved for the author's descendants and will be passed onto them in undistorted form.

[V. Gorlenko] Those are convincing reasons, so why have things stalled?

[N. Chetverikov] The proposed draft of the copyright law has been coordinated with practically all the interested departments and creative unions. However, despite certain assertions, it has not yet been submitted for discussion by the Supreme Soviet. Consideration of the draft is being delayed because of the fact that USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] and USSR Minfin [Ministry of Finance] cannot find a mutually acceptable resolution with regard to the sources of the additional funds necessary to pay the royalties to the authors for the use of their works.

Gosteleradio also objects to the proposed standard that establishes that the right to a movie, television, or video film belongs not to the studio that produced that film, but to the director and scenario writer. But that standard conforms completely to our absolutely fundamental principle that a copyright cannot be taken away from its holder, and, incidentally, in the area of book publication we have achieved an important shift. On the initiative of VAAP and the Writers' Union, USSR Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press] adopted a decision concerning the changing of the rules for affixing the copyright protection symbol to works of science, literature, and art which are produced in the Soviet Union. Starting on 1 August 1989, that symbol indicates not the name, for example, of the publishing house that published the book, but the name of the author who is the sole owner of the copyright for that edition.

We are convinced that the most rapid adoption of the recommendations for improving the Soviet copyright would correspond to the psychological and material interests of the entire creative intelligentsia, the support and defense of which interests VAAP considers to be its chief and constant concern.

[V. Gorlenko] Nevertheless we have recently heard serious complaints about the agency.

[N. Chetverikov] Our work, of course, is still far from perfection. We take a very serious attitude toward well-substantiated and just criticism, feeling that it helps the agency in its attempt to work actively to raise the level of service provided to the authors. But our efforts in this direction, frankly speaking, are being restrained by the fact that the existing conditions and procedures that were established frequently by so-called legally binding acts came to contradict the sharply changed situation in the country.

For example, a Soviet author who wants to waive the right to the use of his work abroad is currently required to do so exclusively through VAAP. This principle does not satisfy either the creative unions or the authors themselves. We understand and support their attempt independently to establish contacts with foreign publishers—this attempt is completely in the spirit of the processes of democratization in our country and corresponds to world practice.

It would seem, however, that if we truly want to create a law-governed state, then the first thing that we should do is to learn how to respect the existing standards and how to observe them until they have been reconsidered or repealed. Because the citizens' loyal attitude to an albeit imperfect law is the inseparable differentiating feature of truly high legal culture.

The agency, on its part, is not grabbing onto this kind of "monopoly" and could construct its relations with those authors who do not like the existing practice on principles of the voluntary nature of their asking of VAAP for assistance and their membership in it on the basis of contracts that clearly define the terms under which the services are provided when the works are used within the country and abroad.

However, even then one should not go to such extremes, say, as the proposal that an a service that is an alternative to the agency, which service would consist of two or three legal experts from the publishing world. Judge for yourself: every year VAAP concludes as many as 7000 export and import contracts. Behind each of them are negotiations, correspondence, frequently a search for the person who has the copyright, or his descendants who sometimes are living in various remote parts of the country or even abroad.

Every year VAAP collects royalties for the public performance of works at approximately 20,000 locations that are strewn over the entire Soviet Union: from the largest concert halls to tiny provincial restaurants. Then it is necessary to the distribution and quarterly payment of the royalties to each of the 25,000 authors who are registered at the agency. This is a tremendous, painstaking job, because the total amounts of money are computed not in the tens or even hundreds of thousands of rubles... This is work that, unfortunately, is invisible to the public, which at times displays a lack of understanding of all the complexities that arise here.

We might add to what has been said the collecting of contributions to be paid into the creative unions' funds—here also the amount of money involved is in the tens of millions of rubles. With this volume of work, and these work loads, two or three legal experts are certainly not enough. In addition, there is no complete assurance that even a service with a large number of people from "the publishing world" will properly guard the authors' interests, which, to put it mildly, do not always or in all respects coincide with the publishers' interests. It is obvious that in this instance we are discussing only the sphere of literature, and that sphere constitutes approximately a third of the volume of VAAP's entire activity. But who, then, will "alternatively" be concerned about protecting the rights of artists and photographers, architects and designers, playwrights and composers?

VAAP cannot allow itself to lag behind the times in this way. Therefore we, in principle, do not preclude the possibility that "parallel" copyright services might arise, say, on a cooperative basis. I think that at first we would not refuse to help them by providing well-qualified consultative services.

[V. Golenko] Nevertheless, how just are the assertions that VAAP imposes "extortionate" fees on authors?

[N. Chetverikov] Unfortunately, on the pages of certain printed publications there actually have appeared items in which attempts are made to represent VAAP in the "image of the enemy" of authors, who is allegedly "ruining" them for selfish purposes and to the benefit of the notorious "apparatus."

Let us leave to the conscience of the quick-tempered critics the factual errors, the dubious interpretation of the information cited by them, the formulations that are scathing to the point of crudeness, and the simply obvious absurdities. For example, the intimidating statements made about certain kinds of "official pressure" exerted on the authors. Because the true situation consists in the fact that, out of the several hundred cases involving a conflict that are annually under the jurisdiction of VAAP's legal service (which, incidentally, is not directed against copyrights, but is intended to defended them), the overwhelming majority do not even get as far as the court, and practically 95 percent of them are resolved by the method, so to speak, of an amicable agreement in favor of the authors. It is now without pride that we can note that the agency, thus, promotes in a real manner the restoration of the legal copyrights, but even these facts, which lend themselves so easily to verification, are subjected to distortion.

Nor can we fail to mention the direct falsification, when, for purposes of sounding more convincing, people quote verbatim the disparaging comments made by prominent representatives of the creative intelligentsia concerning their out-and-out "indentured" relationships with VAAP. Actually it turns out that these respected and authoritative persons, although they do have definite

claims against the agency's work, have never expressed them to anyone in the form that is prescribed for them.

And so an objective analysis of the reasons for the unsatisfactory activities of VAAP could explain a lot. For example, that, for a number of questions, as paradoxical as this may sound, the agency occupies positions that are close to or similar to those positions occupied by its critics.

We, in particular, also feel that the income tax that is levied on authors when their works are used abroad is excessively high: from 30 to 75 percent. And it precisely VAAP, together with the creative unions, that recommends dropping that tax to 13-50 percent. Incidentally, in our opinion, it would be desirable to free the agency completely of a function that it should not be carrying out—the function of collector of taxes to be paid into the state budget.

We also consider to be extremely high the commission fees established for the agency, to be deducted from the total amount of royalties coming in from abroad. VAAP recommends reducing them in 1990 from 15-25 percent to 10-15 percent, and recommends that, starting in 1991, we be allowed, proceeding from the economic results of our activity, to continue the reduction of commission fees.

The agency is also in favor of a less complicated, less cumbersome, and, for the authors, more convenient method to compute and use the currency accruing to the author's account in the USSR Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity] system.

You will probably agree that it is ridiculous to pay foreign authors compensation by drawing on the commission fees deducted from the currency royalty coming to Soviet authors, and then to receive a state subsidy—moreover, at the rate of one ruble per foreign-currency ruble.

But let us, nevertheless, take into consideration the real-life situation in our life, our country's complicated economic, financial, and currency position. But let us not forget that, for all this, the state has taken the step of substantially raising the rates for compensating authors since 1 January last year, once again demonstrating its attention and its concern for the conditions of the activity of the creative intelligentsia. VAAP took direct and active part in preparing recommendations with regard to this matter. That was within its competency. But the resolution of the previously mentioned problems lies outside its confines, and we would like to count here on the self-interested assistance provided by public opinion and the mass media.

[V. Gorlenko] As long as the topic of conversation has swung around to these questions, should there not be an admission of what the funds earned by the agency are expended for?

[N. Chetverikov] We do not make any secret of this. VAAP's total income planned for this year from its basic activity constitutes approximately 4.3 million rubles.

And the basic items of expenditure are represented by production expenses linked with the exporting and importing of works of science, literature, and art. Approximately 2 million rubles are appropriated for these purposes, including more than 800,000 rubles that are being channeled into advertising works of Soviet authors abroad. The salaries paid to all the workers in the VAAP system, including the republic-level and inter-oblast departments and the numerous representatives working over the entire vast expanses of our tremendous country, will constitute during the period mentioned 2.4 million rubles. But not a single one of those who work within the confines of the USSR receives, despite the rumors that are currently circulating, even a single "penny in foreign currency."

Of course, the work of the agency's collective is not devoid of shortcomings. There have been instances of carelessness, hastiness, or the inability as yet to trade and bargain strongly. But we are gratified by the fact that in the process of restructuring VAAP, there has been confirmed among its workers the priority of the authors and the conviction that the agency exists for them and in the name of providing the maximum possible support under the present conditions of their psychological and material interests. And we are guided only by the desire to fulfill this duty of ours in a worthy manner.

Glavlit Deputy Chief Comments on Draft Press Law Censorship Issue

90US0435B Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Jan 90 p 4

[Reply by N. Glazatov to reader's question: "Glavlit Without Secrets"]

[Text] The draft of the USSR Press Law has been presented for nationwide discussion... The first paragraph of that law states: "Censorship of mass information is not allowed." But, to the best of my knowledge, no one yet is planning to liquidate Glavlit!—N. Gorchakov, Volgograd.

N. Glazatov, deputy chief of the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press [Glavlit], under USSR Council of Ministers, replies as follows.

Frequently censorship is equated with the activities of Glavlit. But that is not so. Glavlit develops the country's only system for safeguarding state secrets in the press. With regard to these questions, the actions of the ministries, departments, and organizations are coordinated, normative documents are published... The preliminary monitoring of published items, as one can see, is only part of the multilevel work of protecting state secrets.

Every country has military, economic, and scientific secrets such as those that agencies have been called upon to safeguard. It would seem that there should hardly be any doubts in anyone's mind about this. But another question is the frequently unjustified secrecy, the departmental attitude, when various ministries classify as "secret" any information that shows them in an unfavorable light. One need only remember how long nothing

was said in our country about narcotics addiction, crime, the serious ecological situation...

Much has already been done to remove the unjustified limitations. For example, enterprises that were "closed to the press" used to exist quite recently, but now, with the consent of the manager of a defense enterprise, it is indeed possible to discuss the variety of nonsecret defense output being produced. Recently a document was published, in which it is stated, "Materials are copied without monitoring by agencies of USSR Glavlit, but with the observance of the legislation that is in effect."

Under conditions of freedom of the press, glasnost, and democratization, Glavlit workers prevent the divulging of state secrets, and render the necessary assistance to the mass media in this matter. But the decision as to what can be printed and what cannot be printed must be made within the confines of the Law by the publishers themselves.

KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA Deputy Editor Views Draft Press Law

90US0436A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by V. Strybnykh, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA deputy editor: "A Good Foundation Is Being Laid: Discussion of the Draft Press Law"]

[Text] *Usually when the press begins discussion of some new draft legislation journalists turn to their readers and ask them what they think about the issue. This time, in discussion of the draft Press Law, it would be quite appropriate for journalists themselves to have their say.*

* * *

Perhaps the broad masses of readers are not aware of the fact that the current draft of this law is not the first one. In recent years the apparatus has drawn up several such drafts, but all of them were not so much about the press as they were against the press. The current draft legislation is the first document which is concerned to an equal extent with both the rights and the responsibilities of press organs, as well as those of all citizens and organizations which in one way or another are connected with the mass media. Incidentally, a very necessary and timely correction has been made in the very definition of what the press is. This draft law uses the term "mass information media," whereas previous versions referred to "mass information and propaganda media."

In my opinion the best feature of the proposed law is that it defends the principles of protection for freedom of the press, restricting it solely with constitutional requirements: not to permit appeals to violent overthrow or change of the existing state and social order, propaganda in favor of war, racial, ethnic or religious exclusiveness

or intolerance, dissemination of pornography, incitement to commit other criminal acts, or divulging of any state-related or other specially protected secrets.

All that is as it should be. And this is quite clear to the great mass of readers. But the eye of a journalist who is experienced in such matters immediately comes to rest on the phrase "and other legally protected secrets." It is well known that all of our valiant ministries and agencies are still the one who compile lists of these "other secrets," lists which in many cases are dictated not so much by reasons of state as by unwillingness to permit journalists to interfere in the "internal" affairs of those ministries and agencies.

Naturally the Press Law cannot make explicit reference to all possible types of secrets. That is what makes it essentially that immediately after the Press Law is adopted another draft law be drawn up, this time on state secrets and other legally protected secrets.

One highly important point in the draft law is the declaration that it is impermissible to hold a monopoly over any form of mass media. This is especially important for republics, oblasts and rayons. Because whereas at the nationwide level we have at least some semblance of diversity—party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol press, as well as the press published by public, cooperative and other organizations—on a local scale, especially at the level of oblasts, cities and rayons, even this meager diversity is absent. I consider this point in the law important because it is my opinion that pluralism of opinion should not exist so much in the pages of a single press organs as between various publications. Because every individual publication should preach a single "religion": the views of its own publisher in accordance with the publication's program. Of course, I am not referring to readers' letters or polemical articles; these can and must contain some differences of opinion. But a newspaper or magazine should not be an "omnivorous" collection of differing opinions without any sort of order. Hence the urgent need for publications which differ in their programs and views, within the framework of the Constitution, of course.

The section about whether individual Soviet citizens should be allowed to establish their own press organs, an issue which has caused so much debate among deputies, does not seem to me to be such a fundamentally important one. The most important thing about the article is still the fact that now the right to establish mass media belongs to any properly registered state and public organizations, creative unions and religious, cooperative or other associations of citizens. This fosters diversity among press organs, liberation of society and glasnost. It also fosters the freedom for journalists to work for any press organ whose program most fully coincides with their personal views and convictions.

Now a word about another article which has been a source of controversy: Article 42. For those who have not read the draft law, here is the gist of its content: the draft

law gives the mass media the right to report to readers the fact that a certain publication or article has been banned by officials. A group of deputies has suggested that this statute not be extended to include the publishers and founders of press organs. This formulation of the issue is completely wrong. Many years of experience working in the press tells me that the individuals who prevent the publication of various materials always operate precisely through publishers, not in their own name. This amendment could nullify virtually one-half of all the articles in the proposed law.

And one final point: it seems to me that the law still lacks one important article. An article stating that all complaints and disputes involving the press should be resolved solely in court. Some of my journalist colleagues are afraid of this formulation. Yet there is absolutely no reason to fear it. For a court can only agree to hear a case when it has been proved that sufficient grounds exist for doing so. The various other agencies which commonly complain about the publication of various articles record all the letters received by them. And once a letter is recorded some action must be taken in regard to it. So press organs get taken to task over every trivial thing: "the individual in question states that he was wearing a striped suit, not a checked one, that the matter in question took place on a Tuesday, not a Wednesday, and that it occurred in the hallway of his institution, not in his office." This sort of disputation often obscures the heart of the matter: the fact that the individual in question, who was indeed wearing a striped suit, had treated a visitor rudely, tied up a case in red tape, refused to respond to an article in the press, etc. In order to refute a claim the courts require substantive evidence regarding the essential facts in an article.

Overall I feel that the Press Law will serve as a good foundation for further democratization of society on a basis of glasnost and pluralism of opinion.

Soviet Legal Expert Analyzes Draft Press Law Content

90US0436B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Jan 90 Second Edition p 3

[Article by G. Maltsev, doctor of juridical sciences: "The Flaw Is Obvious"]

[Text] The USSR draft law "On the Press and Other Mass Media" has, thanks to the very same mass media to which it applies, gained a reputation as progressive even before its publication. Since on this occasion fame precedes the draft law, everyone is eager to see the new document. Well, it really does contain ideas which if adopted could mean an about-face in the public's attitude toward the press, radio and television.

It appears that this time our legislators were filled with determination to put an end to the eternal conflict between the censor and the press, to stop this game which has gone on for many centuries, with the score always 1:0. In the draft the result looks like this: "The

press and other mass media are free. Censorship of mass information is not permitted" (from Article 1). Well, who could fail to be delighted by the liberation of the press from petty bureaucratic and administrative impediments, from unprofessional interference in its affairs? Yet this is stated so categorically that one automatically feels a twinge of doubt: is everything as it should be here?

To all appearances the draft law accepts freedom without conditions. The mass information media may do anything that is not forbidden by law. The document's ideological asceticism is striking: it contains no declaration about how the press serves the people, socialist values, freedom and human rights, social justice or universal peace. Does this mean that the concept that the press bears a social burden, that it has an obligation to serve someone and perform a social task, is hopelessly outdated?

It seems to me that those who wrote the draft have lost sight of a realistic assessment of the political role played by the press and other mass media in society. Increasingly we hear that in the Information Age people are beginning to encounter a new phenomenon more and more often: the emergence of information power. Naturally in order to guarantee the information freedoms of its citizens the democratic world is seeking forms of social control over the production and dissemination of information. And we have no right to refuse to take part in that search. Today information is such a powerful force that to refuse to control it "at the source" would be a disservice to society at large and to individual citizens.

It is obvious that this type of control has nothing in common with bureaucratic censorship; it should be open, have the protection of rights as its goal, prevent the use of the mass media against the interests of the state and to the detriment of the public's health and morals, and prevent human rights violations, i.e. be in accordance with Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966), which established the limits of freedom of information. The mass media should be responsible not merely in the sense of their overall duty to the people, but also legally responsible for all their actions at every stage of their work with information. Unfortunately the draft law currently under discussion contains no clear-cut mechanism for such responsibility. The position of those who compiled it is this: when the press and other media violate the law and abuse information then will be the time to weigh the possibility of invoking sanctions against them, i.e. halting their activities temporarily or permanently and also (this is stated in a very vague way) confiscating or destroying printed materials at the court's discretion.

Does this mean that only retroactive legal responsibility is being considered? But such responsibility is by no means capable of always of compensating for real losses and, of course, will not undo events. If a state or commercial secret is divulged the damages will exceed anything that can be recouped from the press organ which is to blame. If a person takes his or her own life,

unable to bear up under slanderous attacks, then that person cannot be brought back. But legislators seem to be saying to the victim: first feel the effects of information abuse, then we will console you by punishing the guilty. Such a stance can hardly be termed humane, and the consolation is promises is meager.

That means that it is essential that we have a system of general monitoring which will be capable of preventing or interdicting violations of the law, abuse of information and revelation of state secret and personal secrets. This could be in the form of a newly-organized state service for the protection of society and individual citizens from the abuse of information, or a state-public organ of the type formed to protect rights.

My principal reproach against those who created this draft law is this: the standards guaranteeing freedom of the press and other mass media have not been sufficiently well developed from the standpoint of the public interest. Freedom of the press as a classic human right has been overshadowed by freedom for press and mass media organs and personnel, which has become an end in itself. According to all widely recognized standards of democratic life (including our Constitution) citizens have the most serious reasons to count on the press, radio and television as a means of realizing their rights. But democracy also has its paradoxes: throughout the whole world, and gradually in our country as well, the mass media are becoming autonomous and being transformed into independent "empires," well-fortified bastions to which the ordinary individual has no access. A situation is taking shape in which it is not people who use these media, as called for by international acts on human rights, but rather the media who are using people and their ideas.

Glasnost and restructuring have given the press and television an opportunity to take their place inside the "gates" of big politics. Anyone who intends to assume any political role or have an influence on events as they occur is obliged to go through the mass media and have their support. By influencing masses of people the press and television are successfully destroying old myths, yet they are also often creating new ones. Pluralism is fine, but in political discussions the voice of the media often sounds like that of a judge, selecting and accepting only those opinions which are most to the media's liking.

Let us take another look from the standpoint of human rights at the system of guarantees for freedom of the press provided for in the draft. One cannot fail to notice that this freedom is distorted in one direction, guaranteeing primarily the freedom and independence of press organs and personnel. It would be hard to find any serious objections to the majority of these standards; they are justified and should take their place among democratic legislation. But the problem is that press freedoms which are appropriate in the press' relations with entrenched bureaucrats are also affirmed in areas where the press deals with the public and with individual citizens. Yet that is a domain where other democratic

standards prevail. In this respect we need legislation which will do more to accommodate citizens and their rights.

Those who wrote the draft law magnanimously permit editors not to respond to letters and petitions "whose authors do not indicate that a reply is required" (Article 29). What that means is that from now on citizens should not forget to attach a request for a reply to everything they send to the media. Bear in mind that under current laws all organs and organizations, state and public, and all institutions, including the media, are obligated to reply to all correspondence from citizens without the citizens having to include any special requests or reminders.

True, the draft law does contain one section which will surely attract particular attention. The draft promises all citizens, absolutely all citizens, a new right: the right to establish mass media outlets themselves (Article 6), i.e. to found their own newspaper or own their own television studio or radio station; if one had adequate funds one could conceivably do all these things at once. How can one not be dumbfounded by this? How can one refrain from sarcasm: the broadest opportunities and fantastic prospects are opening up for people who are barely getting by from one payday to the next. This is probably their most timely and essential right today! But seriously, it has long been demonstrated by the experience of Western countries that there are human rights, and then there are the rights of "big money" carefully concealed behind them. Among the latter is the aforementioned right to set up mass media outlets. For one needs more than just some money, one needs real capital to found a newspaper as a private business. In actual fact there is maybe one Soviet citizen in tens of millions who is capable of doing this, but in those cases we must ask ourselves how that person acquired his capital. How did he manage to "earn" that much money?

When it comes to real citizens' rights in regard to the mass media, those rights are virtually not mentioned at all in the draft law, with the exception of perhaps one: the right to refute flagrant defamation of character directed at oneself. Article 30 grants this right to individual citizens just as it does to organizations, yet Article 31 restricts it by listing the grounds, formulated in a legally vague manner, on which such refutation could be rejected.

The weakest section of the draft law is the part which regulates relationships between the mass media and writers who are not paid staff members of newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, etc.

Unfortunately, the draft retains virtually no traces of legislators' concern for legal guarantees for citizens who have certain interest as authors and otherwise in the operations of press organs and other mass media. In my opinion this is a major flaw which should be eliminated in the process of further work on this draft law.

KGB General Outlines Function of New GRANITSA Publishing Organ

90US0480A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 2, Jan 90 p 8

[Interview with Maj-Gen G.V. Martynov by V. Murin: "The 'Border' Will Be in Moscow"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution on establishing the "GRANITSA" [Border] book and magazine publishing house in Moscow in 1990.

We asked Maj-Gen G.V. Martynov, deputy chief of the USSR KGB Border Troops Political Directorate, to comment on this news:

[Murin] Gennadiy Viktorovich, what brought about the necessity to establish a publishing organ for the border troops?

[Martynov] In recent years, interest in the border forces as a topic has noticeably declined on the part of both a number of the central publishing organs, and writers and journalists. This symptom cannot but disturb us. You see, today we badly need literature which teaches the younger generation of border troops the heroic traditions of our people; one which bears the message on a high moral plane. The GRANITSA Publishing House will also be one of the channels through which we will inform the Soviet people of the life and activities of the border troops.

The second reason is, the withdrawal of the border forces from the Armed Forces structure. We have excellent relations with the publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And we shall continue to learn from our colleagues, and cooperate closely with them. But you understand yourself, that the new situation also entails a great deal of independence from other agencies.

One cannot but comment on the fact that the economic conditions of management have changed as well. The transition of publishing houses to cost accounting and self-financing, and the associated price increase for printed products forces one to count every ruble. For the time being, you will note, they are the people's rubles. But tomorrow we may have to earn them ourselves. After all, the publishing business is one of the most profitable.

[Murin] It is well-known that any book and magazine publishing house is a rather complex organization, requiring considerable assets and resources...

[Martynov] At the initial stage we will be relying on our own capabilities. We have three small printing plants in Moscow, completely furnished with printing equipment. They will be combined and will become part of the publishing house. In the future we propose fitting out our printing facilities with modern multi-color, high-performance equipment.

[Murin] The publishing house is called GRANITSA. Does it follow from that, that it will be exclusively occupied with the border theme?

[Martynov] Certainly, priority will be given to literature on border and Chekist [KGB official] topics. We plan to publish works of literature about frontier soldiers, historical-commentary and memoir literature; posters, albums, textbooks, training aids and postcards; and we will also be printing our magazines, POGRANICHNIK [Border Guard] and VESTNIK GRANITSY [Border Herald].

At the same time I would like to say that we do not intend to limit ourselves exclusively to the border theme. The history of the Fatherland, military adventures, and questions of culture and the ecology will also be in the sphere of interest of the new publication.

[Murin] And so, what sort of new book should the readers expect?

[Martynov] We are already receiving manuscripts, and have begun working on them. As far as the first book is concerned, I would like it to be the anthology, "V.I. Lenin and Guarding the State Border of the USSR."

Belorussian Soyuzpechat Official on Republic Subscription Trends

90US0480B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with G.I. Panfilovich by L. Maslyukova: "A 97-Million Ruble Advance"]

[Text] The readers have "paid" a generous advance for periodical publications: the sum from subscriptions received in the republic for 1990 amounted to over 97 million rubles. Our correspondent spoke with Galina Iosifovna Panfilovich, chief of the Belorussian Production Association "Soyuzpechat," about this and other results of the subscription campaign.

[Maslyukova] Galina Iosifovna, last Fall during your busy period you gave an interview to our newspaper. It was entitled, "We are 18 Million." That is how many subscribers there were in the BSSR in 1989. You will remember that we were concerned that their numbers would not decline. In that September article you posed the question of the necessity for extending the subscription term to 1 November, since the data indicated that in order to cope with the editions, Soyuzpechat would have to work with the permanent readers of periodicals in October too.

[Panfilovich] Another tough campaign, with all its stresses, is behind us. The year 1988 remains in my memory as the year that ceilings on popular newspapers and magazines were lifted. Then the subscribers were competing for the right to read whatever suited their tastes and needs. In 1989, not without delays and problems, we switched to year-round subscription. Beginning 2 January 1990, you may subscribe for both the present year and coming years—I can say this without any reservations.

Taking our clients' opinions into consideration, last Fall Soyuzpechat extended the subscription period by one month. This, in my view, was one more victory for glasnost and bears witness to the dynamism of the processes taking place today. This devotion to periodical literature, which is filled with topical and at times contradictory articles, demonstrates once again the high degree of politicization of society. The experience of Subscription Campaign-89 showed, that any obstacles will be pulled down under the pressure of the people's desire to follow what is going on and to take part in it. In the final analysis everything was done in a way that was convenient for the subscribers. I am happy to report that their numbers have not declined in Belorussia.

For the republic as a whole the total circulation of periodical publications of the widest variety, distributed by subscription, amounts to over 17.5 million copies—6.0 percent higher than in 1989. If one considers and adds-in the production sent beyond the bounds of the republic, one finds that the number of subscribers exceeds 19 million.

[Maslyukova] Are you satisfied with the results Soyuzpechat has achieved as a cost-accounting association?

[Panfilovich] We believe the results are not bad. It goes without saying that they are being thoroughly analyzed from all angles—by cross-section of oblasts and rayons, by percentages, by indicators per issue, and so on. The shortcomings and omissions of the past campaign have been systematically analyzed, and we shall try not to repeat them in the new year. However, all this is our intra-departmental affair, and detailed information about that would probably not arouse much interest among your readers. Would it not be better to try to show what the subscribers themselves look like in the mirror of statistics? Soyuzpechat's columns of figures reflect the passions and the disillusionment of the people. Pondering over the results will help both journalists and publishers better understand why their newspaper or magazine was chosen, or rejected.

[Maslyukova] Which publication is most popular with Belorussian readers, to the envy of all the rest?

[Panfilovich] There is a relatively obscure weekly called SEMYA [Family]. Last year about 38,000 people in the BSSR subscribed to it; and in 1990—more than 170,000. Circulation growth expressed as a percentage is—461.5. Are you impressed?

[Maslyukova] The circulation increased by a factor of four-and-a-half! How did SEMYA manage to win such high marks?

[Panfilovich] I would not say that this central weekly is unique. The publication is rather modest-looking, both in terms of appearance and content. It seems to me the secret of its success lies elsewhere. Problems of family relationships are extremely important for any person. Most periodical publications about one's personal or one's relatives' happiness (or unhappiness) speak about

it in passing. But as SEMYA's take-off showed, the reading audience is starved for all-round information on this complex sphere of life.

I think that, if a publication of such a nature sprang up in the republic, it would enjoy no less demand. The Law on the Press is going into effect, and it is not excluded that any newly-approved publication would thereby enjoy a great deal of interest. Incidentally, existing republic newspapers and especially magazines which illuminate a topic just as worrisome to the people, consistently, professionally and inventively, would become a competitor to SEMYA.

In my opinion the reserves of the market in which the printed word is sold have not been studied very well. The discovery of demand for this or that propagandistic "ware" takes place spontaneously. Apparently life will force periodical publications to take a closer look at the market, forecasting success, and not hoping that "perhaps" they will recover.

[Maslyukova] We have long since become accustomed to arranging publications by order of size: here, let's say, is the party press; in it some things are out front, and some lag behind. Press organs of creative societies, social organizations and other founders are compared within their own subgroups. It's as if formal gradations are ignored in the market of the printed word. There subscribers to PRAVDA are compared with AIF [Argumenty i Fakty], and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA with OGONEK. The covers, the format, the masthead indicating the publisher and such information are of secondary importance to the reader. Trying to orient himself, he asks other questions... Whose political line suits me? Whose arguments are more convincing? Whom do I trust the most? Which editor is bold and always adheres to principle? A person answers these questions, and the choice is decided. His choice of publication, and at the same time, his position...

[Panfilovich] I think there is an element of truth to your reasoning, although the problem of choice is, of course, more complex. As far as comparisons are concerned, let the statistics testify.

Demand for PRAVDA has fallen. The average level of PRAVDA subscriptions for Belorussia in 1990 is 72 percent of that of 1989. In certain of our oblasts PRAVDA is subscribed to more eagerly, and in certain rayons it has managed to maintain its circulation and even increase it. But, the general tendency is obvious.

Circulation of the weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Belorussia for 1990 amounts to 168.2 percent of that of 1989. Nearly 1.4 million citizens in the republic have subscribed to it.

Subscribers have shown a clear preference for OGONEK. Readers have become more indifferent to IZVESTIYA, "Literaturka," SELSKAYA ZHIZN, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, and EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA. On the other hand,

interest in the socio-political "thick" magazines has increased noticeably. Circulation of ZVEZDA, NASH SOVREMENNİK and NOVYY MIR has increased over last year's (by 70 to 100 percent and more).

[Maslyukova] How are the readers' sympathies divided among Belorussian publications?

[Panfilovich] The nationwide youth magazine PARUS, published in Minsk, has lost more subscribers than any—about 40 percent. RODNIK ("Krynitsa"), its competitor, has gained readership. The youth newspapers CHYR-VONAYA ZMENA and ZNAMYA YUNOSTI have not reached last year's level. SELSKAYA GAZETA has yielded a little bit. Two weekly party newspapers have passed the test with honor—ZVYAZDA and SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA: circulation of the former grew by 17.3 percent, and the latter by 11.6 percent.

The popularity-growth curve of your newspaper looks quite convincing. In 1986, circulation of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA was 190,000; next year it was almost 220,000; a year later it reached 260,000. You had 460,000 subscribers in 1989; and this year, more than 550,000. The indicator is gratifying. Counting retail trade, your words will be spread throughout the republic and beyond in about 600,000 copies. At the same time one must keep in mind that every issue comes into a house and a family, and a minimum of three people read it. You are responsible to an audience of 2,000,000 for your facts, opinions and analysis.

[Maslyukova] That is both gratifying and disturbing—Will we be able to maintain the level achieved, and climb higher!

[Panfilovich] The situation requires it. People have invested their assets in your publication. You have received an advance, and consequently, you must earn it.

You know, I have a premonition, as have the readers... The time will pass when one can get "dividends" from ultra-critical presentation of problems and exploitation of particularly readable topics such as narcotics addiction, and altogether high-quality sensations. What do we desire more than anything? Stability, mutual understanding, faith in tomorrow, and genuine changes for the better. People are drawn to topics like—who knows—how to achieve what they desire; and who is able to demonstrate the correctness of the chosen path in a practical way and not by verbal guarantees. The struggle for the people's minds and hearts, for their trust in you, newspaper writers, does not appear to be an easy one. I do not think that my wishes for your success in this struggle would be out of place.

Moldavian Gostelradio Chairman on Republic Radio Broadcast Changes

90US0461A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 13 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with A.P. Usatiy, chairman, Moldavian SSR Gostelradio, by ATEM correspondent: "Attention: Radio Channel 'Luchaferul'"; time, place not given]

[Text] As has already been reported by republic radio, in accordance with the decision of the Moldavian SSR Gostelradio collegium, starting 15 November, a second republic channel "Luchaferul" is being broadcast on the republic transmission three-channel broadcast network in place of the all-union "Mayak" radio channel. A multitude of radio listeners are addressing the republic mass information media to express various viewpoints about the innovation. An ATEM correspondent requested A.P. Usatiy, chairman, Moldavian SSR Gostelradio, to comment upon the decision made by the collegium.

[Usatiy] In discussing this issue, we were guided by both the wishes of our listeners and by those of the radio journalists. After all, the programs of republic radio until now have been broadcast by the transmission networks less than have been all-union programs. For example, the republic channel one was on the air 19 hours a day; the all-union radio channel one, 20 hours, and the radio channel "Mayak," 18 hours a day. If we take into consideration the fact that over the course of 7 hours, republic radio channel one rebroadcast the most important programs of the all-union radio, then it worked out that of the 57.2 hours of total on-air time of the three-channel broadcast networks, Moldavian radio was on the air only 12 hours a day. you will agree that this cannot be viewed as a normal phenomenon.

[Correspondent] And how are the volumes of all-union broadcasting and republic broadcast correlated now, after the changes were introduced?

[Usatiy] The volume of Moscow and Kishinev radio programs on the wires now is fairly even. As previously, all-union channel one is broadcast 20 hours a day, and "Luchaferul" just as much; republic channel one is on the air 19 hours, and it, as previously, rebroadcasts all-union radio programs for 7 hours. It is worth adding that radio programs are broadcast according to about the same diagram in other republics as well.

[Correspondent] Adrian Petrovich, you would agree that the "Mayak" radio channel is quite dynamic and diverse. Over a quarter-century, it has won enormous popularity among the country's radio listeners, including those in our republic as well. What would you advise those who are accustomed to listening to "Mayak" on a steady basis?

[Usatiy] Purchase even the most basic radio receiver and set it to the "Mayak" frequency. We transmit this radio channel in broadcasting; it can be received in the entire territory of the republic in the mid- and ultra-high frequency range. Gostelradio regularly publishes the schedule for its reception in the weekly "Program for Television and Radio Broadcasts." In addition, we will duplicate the most important "Mayak" programs on "Luchaferul," such as was done, for example, during the Congress of People's Deputies and the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Correspondent] It must be assumed that the audience for "Luchaferul" will increase significantly. How is that channel working now, and will there be any changes in its preparation?

[Usatiy] In the first place, "Luchaferul," like "Mayak," is an informational-artistic channel. It broadcasts concerts of popular Soviet and foreign music of various genres, works of domestic and world prose, poetry, and dramaturgy, constituting almost 90 percent of the air time. All of this alternates with informational news releases and thematic programs, sports releases, and advertising. Of great interest to our listeners are the regular programs "Agrumente shi fapte," "Memoriya anilor," "Ora keletoruluy" and others. Broadcasts on this channel are done in stereo for 10 hours a day.

Secondly, broadcasting on the "Luchaferul" channel is done in the Moldavian language, and this will be of additional assistance to the radio listeners who are studying it. On this channel recently we have also been doing live broadcasts of the most important events in the republic's life with simultaneous translation into Russian and Moldavian, giving a large number of listeners the opportunity to be aware of the latest event in the sociopolitical life of the republic. The work of the recent sessions of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 11th convocation was broadcast by this principle, and we have no intention of rejecting it in the future.

Thirdly, one must agree, of course, that changes in the channel's formation are necessary, and they will be made. Life does not stay in place, and we cannot lag behind it. In accordance with the changes in the structure of Moldavian radio, it is planned that in the new year a special creative group will be formed which will work on the "Luchaferul" programs. I believe that with audience expansion, the responsibility of radio journalists for preparation of the programs will increase, and their creative potential will be revealed.

New Moldavian Weekly Aimed at Rural Audience
90US0461B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 3

[Report by A. Bessarabov: "The Weekly VIATA SATULUI"]

[Text] There appeared yesterday the first issue of the new weekly of the Moldavian CP Central Committee—VIATA SATULUI, the successor of the Central Committee newspaper by the same name, previously published three times a week. This is hardly a switch of a signboard. Starting with the very first issue, the weekly's reader will be convinced that the publication answers to and strives in all possible ways to answer to its title in the future.

VIATA SATULUI, or "rural life" in Russian, is unobtrusive, yet strongly emphasizes that this is not an agricultural newspaper dominated by technology and technological phrases, but that it will speak of the villagers and their lives, complex yet noble and fruitful, and

what are the concerns, thoughts, and hopes of those who live, work, study, and create in the countryside—that is the main topic of the journalistic search, the authors' discourses. And now we can go through the issue and convince ourselves that this is so.

In his reflections upon the peasant and the peasantry in the country, Ion Drutse calls to us all: "Let us once and for all halt the mockery of our martyr of martyrs, for a peasant does not just stand for plowing and sowing. The peasant stands for limitless dedication to ancestors, hard and honest labor, and spiritual equilibrium."

The editorial board's guest, N.A. Kutkovetskiy, the new Moldavian CP Central Committee secretary in charge of issues of the republic's agro-industrial complex expresses his ideas regarding one of the problems vitally important to our countryside.

Readers I.G. Kochu, party and labor veteran from Teleneshtskiy Rayon, B. Besku, kolkhoz chief engineer from Sorokskiy Rayon, and M. Tsurkanu, resident of the village of Tokuz, Kaushanskiy Rayon, share thoughts openly under the rubric "political life."

The sections and rubrics "the activity of the soviets," "the economy," "our language," "good counsel, a good word," "at the source of the soul," "culture, art, and literature," "our inexhaustible fount," and "a letter for the road" and others presented their own material. Here the reader may share or not share the categorical opinion of G. Tetaru, a simple peasant from the village of Pozhareny: "I cannot bear to have lazy people next to me," acquaint himself with the children's verses of the poet V. Romanchuk, and "converse" with A. Tamazlykaru, the godfather of the "Telenkutsa" ethnographic ensemble, who is firmly convinced that "folklore is the source of national culture."

The most wide-ranging section, "good counsel, a good word" conducts a concerned conversation with the reader about farm plots, wishes him bon appetite, advises how to conduct oneself in public, includes answers to inquiries, legal consultations, etc. The reader will find a great many interesting and useful things in his weekly.

And the issue ends with humor in the section, "kay verze perets," which is like the Russian "talking nonsense." For example, "It is a good thing when a horse laughs. It could be that a person will laugh too, and it would be at something."

Bon voyage, VIATA SATULUI!

New Moldavian Cultural Weekly Profiled
90US046C Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 6 Jan p 3

[Report by A. Bessarabov: "FACLIA—FAKEL"]

[Text] Yet another weekly came into being this week, specifically yesterday, 5 January—the organ of the Moldavian SSR Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Public Education, FAKEL. (We previously reported on the

publication of the weekly VIATA SATULUI). The publication data specifies the number 1, but in parentheses, another figure—2,880. This stems from the fact that FAKEL is also a successor of the newspaper YNVETSEMYNTUL PUBLIK (NARODNOYE OBRAZOVANIYE). But we give the floor to the weekly's editor, USSR People's Deputy Anton Grezhdiyer, as he writes in "A word to the readers": "...We have great hopes that this new publication which must, by our design, regenerate the spirit of the weekly KULTURA, beloved by us all, yet on a higher level. The expansion of the subject matter in compliance with our interests and spiritual hopes will be conducive to the presentation and resolution of many issues concerning the cultural and spiritual renaissance of society... The weekly will favor the morality and healthy spirituality of society, and a civilized way of life for every person."

Readers V. Apostol, honored Moldavian SSR cultural figure and chairman of the league of Moldavian theater figures, P. Doroshenko, parent, M. Rusu, teacher, and V. Dorofte, librarian, wish FAKEL "Good luck!" We join in this wish.

The first issue was presented by sections and rubrics "perestroyka—moving from words to deeds," "the school day," from our friends' experience, "letters to the editor: the readers' reflections," "problems of culture," "theater," and others. The publication of satire and humor continues as "mockingbird."

We refer the readers directly to the weekly for the details, especially since it is published in both Moldavian and Russian. Anyone who has for one reason or another not subscribed to FAKEL may obtain it in the Soyuspechat kiosks on Fridays.

Moldavian Militia Weekly Published in Moldavian, Russian

90US0461D Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 4

[Report by V. Narozhnyy: "Continuing Traditions"]

[Text] Republic internal affairs staffers had already had their own newspaper. It was called NA VOYEVOM POSTU, was published until 1974, and enjoyed great popularity. Time-yellowed issues of the high-circulation paper are now preserved in the Museum of the History of the Moldavian Militia. Thus it is a matter of honor that the new weekly VIIATSA MILITSIYEV [BUDNI MILITSII], which will be published on Tuesdays in Moldavian and Russian, will continue and develop the best traditions of its predecessors.

"Today as never before it is necessary to regularly and on a complete scale inform the public about the militia's work for strengthening socialist legality and law and order, the status of discipline among the personnel, and the organization of ideological-indoctrinational and cultural-educational work," V. Voronin, Moldavian SSR minister of internal affairs, wrote in his address to the readers, defining by these words one of the newspaper's main trends.

"Shoulder to Shoulder"—such was the title of the article by L. Lashchenova, Leninskiy Rayon party committee first secretary, placed in the first issue. The understanding is maturing in the rayon's party organizations and labor collectives that society is concerned with the creation of a strong and authoritative militia, emphasizes the author. Well, we shall keep up with the pages of BUDNI MILITSII, and how the republic's internal affairs organs restructure their activity, and what lofty goals they set for themselves.

Sakharov's Exile in Gorkiy Examined

90US0449A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Sergey Leskov: "Bitter Exile; Little-Known Period in the Life of Academician A.D. Sakharov"]

[Text] Many great research scientists have left schools behind—Ioffe, Mandelshtam, N. Vavilov, Kapitsa, and Landau, and so have laboratory scientists—Korolev, Kurchatov, and Tupolev. Many occupied positions of prominence, were admitted to offices at the highest level, and had easy access to any rostrum. Nevertheless, today we sometimes hear that there was never a scientist who could have influenced our life and our thinking more strongly than Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. But after all, for much of his life Academician A.D. Sakharov was not only deprived of a rostrum in his own country, but also had to live in strict isolation. What kind of moral lesson should we derive from this? What was the "school" the scientist left behind?

The questions have been asked. We could remain silent because the hundreds of thousands of people who attended Sakharov's funeral and the memorial services held in many cities in our country attest to the past and present importance of this man in our country. Nevertheless, let us try to find the answers. We will do this by examining the most "uncomfortable" part of his life—the 7 grim years, like the 7 lean years in the biblical parable, the scientist spent in exile in Gorkiy, when he was forcibly excluded from public and scientific affairs and probably did not expect so many of his predictions to come true so quickly....

In the last days of December 1979, a group of Soviet troops, described in official reports as a limited contingent, entered Afghanistan for the purpose of rendering internationalist assistance. The details of this action were then known only to a small group of top-level politicians, and its consequences probably could not have been foreseen by anyone. In the very first days after the troops had been sent, however, a fearless voice in our country protested the action. Academician A.D. Sakharov made three statements and held press conferences to condemn this action and to ask the Soviet leaders to recall the troops.

In the morning of 22 January 1980 Sakharov left home to go to a scientific seminar. In the afternoon he called home from the office of the secretary of the deputy procurator general of the USSR, A.M. Rekunkov, and said he was being sent to Gorkiy. That evening a plane carrying A.D. Sakharov, his wife Ye.G. Bonner, and a few guards, headed by KGB First Deputy Chairman S.K. Tsvigun, landed in Gorkiy, a city closed to foreigners. The family luggage consisted of two travel bags....

Was his position on Afghanistan the only reason for his exile to Gorkiy? No, the dissatisfaction with the scientist who had expressed heretical ideas about the reform of the society of "developed socialism" and who had dared

to have his own opinions about the balance of world arms, had been brewing for a long time. The authoritarian system assigned each person his own step on the hierarchical ladder, and in line with its precepts Sakharov had already been given several warnings. The academician had been demoted from deputy scientific director of a major institute to senior scientific associate, he had been subjected to shattering criticism in print—from the central newspapers to bulletin boards, he had been reprimanded by the procurator, and his fundamental works were no longer listed as recommended reading in scientific books. The exiled scientist was divested of his three stars as a Hero of Socialist Labor and his titles as a Lenin and State Prize laureate. It is true that he retained his world renown—it does not respond to injunctions....

Afghanistan was simultaneously the straw that broke the camel's back and a convenient excuse for an exile which was endorsed, in the opinion of our top-level politicians, by the unanimous public opinion on the academician who had completely forgotten about patriotism, at least in the sense in which these politicians interpreted it. The academician would eventually become more reasonable and realize that Gorkiy was not even the most remote place he might be sent. Incidentally, it is still not clear who made the decision to exile the academician from Moscow, just as it was not clear for a long time who came up with the idea of rendering "internationalist assistance." The administration of FIAN [Physics Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences] had been advised to dismiss A.D. Sakharov a couple of times at the beginning of the 1980's, but the matter was dropped immediately following a "naive" inquiry as to the nature and executor of the resolution to be cited in the dismissal order.

Here is a significant point: No attempts had been made to change Sakharov's mind for a long time, because the efforts of ideological functionaries to re-educate the "errant" scientist in past years had left the two sides unreconciled. Sakharov was not the kind of man who was paralyzed with terror in the presence of officials, and he did not subscribe to the philosophy of compromise. After all, a minor concession frequently leads to the loss of principles. It became obvious to everyone that Sakharov's point of view and Sakharov himself were one and the same. They were afraid to put him on trial—besides, he had not been charged with anything—so they decided to isolate him from the outside world. They expected Gorkiy to serve as the obstinate academician's "mouse-trap," from which it would be simply impossible for him to "yell loudly enough to be heard."

As soon as he got off the plane, Sakharov wrote an open letter declaring his exile illegal and demanding a public trial. It was printed in THE NEW YORK TIMES a week later. The wave of protests against Sakharov's exile arose in the first days of 1980 and engulfed broad segments of the world public. The National Academy of the United States decided to break off contacts with the USSR Academy of Sciences, ties with many other organizations were severed, and a movement to boycott scientific

forums in the USSR came into being and lasted until 1985. The country and its prestige suffered incalculable damage, and it was clear that the administrative measures taken against the dissident scientist were the latest suicidal move by the authoritarian system. How could the situation be saved? In an interview in *NEWSWEEK* magazine in 1983, at the height of the boycott, President A.P. Aleksandrov of the USSR Academy of Sciences spoke of the desirability of scientific cooperation and called the government's treatment of Sakharov "humane": "Because Gorkiy, where he is living now, is a beautiful city, a big city with many academy institutes. The academicians who live there do not want to move anywhere else."

To be fair, we must say that A.P. Aleksandrov was in a difficult position as the president of the academy. He had behaved well: his covert resistance of the suggestions that the scientist be expelled from the academy in 1980, and the even earlier absence of his signature on the devastating letter by 40 academicians against Sakharov (readers interested in the details can find them in the August 1973 editions of newspapers). But his words were the direct opposite of his actions, and I even feel uncomfortable quoting them.

According to what he said in the interview, Sakharov had every chance to do productive scientific work in a "large scientific center." He should have completed the description by adding that a militia patrolman was stationed outside Sakharov's door, day and night, to turn away anyone without special authorization. There was a police station in the courtyard across from his window, and a police van occasionally parked on the other side, near the balcony. A black Volga followed Sakharov's Zhiguli when he went out. His camera, movie camera, tape recorder, and radio, and even his typewriter, were confiscated during a search, and it goes without saying that he did not have his own telephone. After a while, he was not even allowed to use a public pay-phone. Andrey Dmitriyevich had no contact whatsoever with colleagues from local institutes in the whole 7 years. He was never invited to a single conference, and not one of the scientists in Gorkiy ever crossed his threshold.

Like a character in a bad detective novel, Andrey Dmitriyevich made arrangements to meet people in the most crowded place—the post office. But how could an amateur elude the professionals! Professor M.L. Levin, a university friend of Andrey Dmitriyevich and one of the few scientists who visited him in exile, told me that a visibly upset deputy director of a large research institute walked up to him at a conference in Gorkiy and begged him not to have any more meetings with Sakharov because, as he said, "otherwise, we will not have any more conferences."

What frightened the scientists in Gorkiy? What frightened the scientists from Moscow who went out of town on business and avoided visiting their dishonored colleague? Many of them were protected by academic titles, honors, and high office. They were afraid that allocations

would be "slashed," that the institute would be "pressured," and that trips to conferences abroad would be disallowed, as they had been several times in the past on the slightest pretext. They assessed the risk of a visit to the exiled academician with academic precision: If I do this, they will do that. They decided it was not worth the risk, and for the most respectable reasons, which seemed to exclude their own cowardice. This is what is known as a compromise. This is what made these pragmatic men, who did not take the risk of visiting Sakharov, different from Andrey Dmitriyevich. He was always quick to defend people who had suffered offense, even people he did not know at all, without giving much thought to what this "rash" behavior might cost him. This was an example of the "unprecedented simplicity" Pasternak spoke of: "It is what the world needs most." Sakharov was a Russian intellectual in the forgotten sense of the term, with an overwhelming desire to serve the public, no matter how much he was reviled by this misguided public.

Quite frankly, it is an easy and an unusual task for a journalist to write about Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. It is easy because there is no need to dig for frank statements. It is unusual because it is still quite rare to meet a man with the courage to reveal his personal qualities, predilections, and views. Individuality is rarely admired. Our heroes have a common appearance and group interests, and the main feature of the positive character is naturally collectivism, and in the extremely popular interpretation of collectivism as submission to the will of the majority. Besides this, our heroes are able to make compromises, to transcend their own convictions and their own conscience. Is this why personal accomplishments are in such short supply here, and why we so rarely take a firm stand on anything? Yes, we must admit that Sakharov was not a collectivist in this sense of the term. He was unable to act as he was ordered to do, against his own convictions.

We have already said that Sakharov could think what he wanted and as much as he wanted in Gorkiy, but he was not allowed to act in accordance with these thoughts. The whole problem was that he simply could not accept this dichotomy! Andrey Dmitriyevich tried to contact the outside world in every way possible, sending out letters, protests, articles, and statements to be forwarded. In the beginning his courier was Ye.G. Bonner, but it was difficult for her to take anything seditious to Moscow because she was searched several times. Sometimes Yelena Georgiyevna fooled the men assigned to "tail" her by climbing out of the window after dark, making her way to Vladimir in stages, and then going to Moscow from there, but in May 1984 she was forbidden to leave Gorkiy. Sakharov searched for other opportunities. He "lost" letters on the street in the hope that they would be found by a kind passerby, but in most cases his naive attempts were easily thwarted by the professionals assigned to him.

The humiliating isolation in Gorkiy was the sad truth, but a happy story was needed for "export." This led to a

decision that he should be visited by colleagues from the FIAN theoretical division. The physicists promised not to discuss political matters and not to accept any letters from Andrey Dmitriyevich. They were given detailed instructions before each trip by the FIAN deputy director of operations and by the chief of the first division and had to report to them on their return. A few reproaches made it clear, recalls Professor V.Ya. Faynberg, that the authorities were listening in to all of the conversations in the Sakharov home, but Andrey Dmitriyevich knew about this and only spoke frankly when he drove to the woods. Even here, however, he could not relax: The amusing story about the extremely muscular young man who spent half an hour next to the car pumping up his bicycle tire has been told often.

Sakharov's public activism almost eclipses his scientific interests in our minds. This is not fair, because nothing fascinated Sakharov more than physics. He was always thinking about physics, and the colleagues who knew him well feel that he had all the qualities to make him one of the greatest scientists of our century. It was not only the development of the hydrogen bomb, but also several other fundamental proposals that allow many people today to call Sakharov a "genius." Sakharov the scientist, however, is a topic for separate discussion. Here I want to say that the visits of his FIAN colleagues were necessary, from the scientific standpoint, to Andrey Dmitriyevich so that he would not lose his sense of the atmosphere of contemporary science and intense debate. It is unlikely that he expected fundamentally new information from his guests, and he certainly did not expect new scientific ideas. Here is an indicative detail: Sakharov wrote most of his works without co-authors, which might seem nonsensical by today's standards. Sakharov was working on the cosmogonic aspects of the universe in the 1980's, and his works are so profound that the latest discoveries cannot have any perceptible effect on them. In Gorkiy Sakharov wrote seven theoretical works on physics, and each, according to Professor B.M. Bolotovskiy, could be the beginning of a new field of science. Academician A.D. Sakharov also continued the elaboration of his trailblazing idea about the instability of the proton, and various laboratories in different parts of the world were producing evidence that the hypothetical lifespan of the proton in experiments was getting closer and closer to the one predicted in Sakharov's theory. Incidentally, Andrey Dmitriyevich often said that his greatest dream was to live long enough to see the proof of this revolutionary hypothesis.

It is indicative that one of the arguments supporting the decision to allow physicists to make trips to Gorkiy was the assumption that scientific pursuits would leave Sakharov no free time for other kinds of activities. He was allowed to subscribe to scientific publications without restriction, like any active member of the academy. It was impossible, however, to "divert" Sakharov from "harmful" thoughts with the aid of science. One of the distinctive features of this scientist's thinking was that he had a complete grasp of any topic

and was not satisfied with partial solutions. It was precisely in this way, incidentally, that the young physicist who was working on a particular part of the hydrogen bomb project in the 1950's (the project was so secret that there were blank spaces in the reports in place of the words "electron" and "proton") was able, just like the famous paleontologist Cuvier who reproduced the skeleton of a dinosaur from a single bone, to visualize the entire object and to propose his own, subsequently implemented version of the bomb. Later—and just as inevitably—Sakharov visualized the political implications of the possession of nuclear and conventional weapons and the influence of social processes in each country on world affairs. His conclusions did not agree with the political precepts of that time. The scientist began to take action, just as a scientist should, by writing articles. Some people thought he was a lunatic, others thought he was infantile, and some understood that it was Sakharov's nature to carry through on all of his thoughts and words. Neither professional difficulties nor exile nor the hooting of large gatherings could stop him.

Sakharov wrote one of his main social works while he was in Gorkiy—"The Danger of Thermonuclear War" (1983). In this lengthy article he presented his ideas about a specific scenario of universal disarmament and its intermediate stages and about the need to make compromises in this process and to avoid even local conflicts and said that the "open" society would be a guarantee of peace. "Thermonuclear war would be a calamity of indescribable proportions with absolutely unpredictable repercussions, with all of the uncertainty applying to the worst possible case," the scientist wrote. "We cannot plan for nuclear war with the hope of winning. We cannot regard nuclear weapons as a means of deterring aggression committed with conventional weapons...."

Our reader knows of this article from the sharp rebuke Sakharov received in IZVESTIYA (Alas!) from academicians A. Dorodnitsyn, A. Prokhorov, G. Skryabin, and A. Tikhonov. Their blind rage was apparently aroused by Sakharov's criticism of some aspects of the international policy of the USSR, but did Afghanistan not provide reason for this? In the article entitled "When Honor and Integrity Are Lost" (3 July 1983), the scientist was accused of "hatred for his own country and its people" and of "moral decay." It says that his "foul happiness depends on the misery of the people." The authors did not even mention the title of their opponent's article, and it was certainly not because of absent-mindedness—the title did not help their cause.

In Gorkiy Sakharov also wrote the articles "The Responsibility of Scientists," "On the Threshold of the 1980's," and "What the USSR and the United States Must Do To Keep the Peace" and wrote statements to be read at the 1982 Pugwash Conference and a gathering of the Nobel laureates at the Sorbonne, and also a short acceptance speech (also in absentia, of course) for the Szilard Prize of the American Physical Society. In these works his

humanistic view of the world was revealed more extensively, and it is genuine pity that a shortage of space in the newspaper gives me no chance to summarize the content of these extraordinary papers.

That same year, when Sakharov's name was accompanied by insulting epithets, the scientist's seemingly utopian ideas about disarmament began to be implemented (for example, his ideas about the separate reduction of ballistic and intermediate-range missiles, about the need for conventional arms reduction, about the destabilizing effect of silo-based missiles, etc.), humanistic tendencies grew stronger, the overall political situation in the country and the world changed, and even an issue as "inviolable" as Afghanistan no longer evoked the previously mandatory, unconditional approval. Some of those who cursed Sakharov during his most difficult years now count themselves among his friends. This was made easy by the fact that he never displayed even a hint of vindictiveness or rancor and attributed all of the betrayals to the "laws of that time." This was the view of the man who would not compromise his conscience, but do we have the right to accept this magnanimous explanation? Do we have the right to continue separating, as if we were separating the cream from the milk, the ideas and the times from the person who acted on the false ideas in submissive accordance with the spirit of the times? The only way of rectifying the situation is to take responsibility for everything we did, even if everyone around us did the same things. "Do you want to disavow your letter?" Sakharov asked a famous academician who greeted him with open arms when he returned to Moscow. "What letter?" the man asked in surprise. "Somehow I cannot remember any letter." Only one of Sakharov's academy colleagues who had reviled him apologized to him later—S.V. Vonsovskiy—and this was a double tragedy: In the 1930's this man had protected people who were under suspicion, but he froze with terror in the stifling atmosphere of the 1970's.

We must not overlook another significant and distressing aspect of Sakharov's life in exile. He used up much of his strength protecting the people closest to him. He went on hunger strikes three times—in 1981, 1984, and 1985. He was put in Gorkiy Oblast Hospital imeni Simashko, where he spent almost 300 days during those years. They force-fed Andrey Dmitriyevich there. In one of his letters to A.P. Aleksandrov ("I am writing to you at the most tragic moment of my life"), Sakharov describes the different methods of force-feeding. Chief Physician O.A. Obukhov told him: "We will not let you die, but you will be a helpless invalid."

After one of the brutal force-feedings in the hospital, Andrey Dmitriyevich suffered a cerebral angiospasm (or a stroke?) and developed the symptoms of Parkinson's Disease. "What happened to me in Gorkiy Oblast Hospital in summer 1984," Sakharov wrote, "bore a striking similarity to the plot of Orwell's famous anti-utopian work, which he, by an amazing coincidence, called '1984.' In the book and in my life the torturers tried to make the man betray the woman he loved. The role the

threat of the rat-cage played in Orwell's book was played by Parkinson's Disease in my life."

People in our country and abroad hurled reproaches at Sakharov's wife and friend, Yelena Georgiyevna Bonner: Was it possible that she, who knew how dangerous the hunger strikes were for Andrey Dmitriyevich, could not prevent them? Here is one of their recorded conversations on this topic: "Andrey, you have to learn to lose gracefully." "I do not want to learn that. I have to learn to die gracefully." It is not likely that Sakharov could have been talked out of anything once he had made up his mind, and he starved himself, by his own admission, primarily for a window to the world, for contact with the outside world, because he did not want to become a "living corpse." Do we even have the right to judge these people? All of the people who knew Andrey Dmitriyevich for many years when he lived with Yelena Georgiyevna mentioned the pervading atmosphere of true love in their home. In his memoirs (this book was also written in Gorkiy and will be published in the United States in April), Andrey Dmitriyevich wrote about his wife with devotion and respect. Some might wish for something else, but his feelings for his wife were also a salient feature of the man. And without this loyalty and fidelity, I think there could not have been the Sakharov—the scientist and public spokesman—we are discussing today.

Sakharov first heard M.S. Gorbachev speak when he was in the hospital in 1985, when the only conversations he had were with KGB officials. He told them that this was the first time the country had been lucky on its long journey. We can only guess how much opposition the new leadership had to surmount before the scientist was allowed to return from exile. After all, as late as 1986 Sakharov was not allowed, in spite of his request, to assist in eliminating the after-effects of the Chernobyl disaster, although his mind might have been indispensable there.

Meanwhile, however, perestroika was picking up speed. The isolation of a man who had issued appeals for it seemed anachronistic and ludicrous. Late in the evening on 15 December 1986 a telephone was installed in the apartment in Gorkiy, and 2 days later M.S. Gorbachev spoke with A.D. Sakharov on the phone. After thanking Gorbachev, Andrey Dmitriyevich immediately—staying true to himself even at a time like this—said that his joy was clouded by his knowledge of the fate of political prisoners. However many disputes M.S. Gorbachev had with A.D. Sakharov later, they were conducted in public and could be witnessed by everyone, and there is no question that they promoted the development of perestroika and helped it surmount some of the difficulties and obstacles in its way.

The exile in Gorkiy had come to an end. Did it achieve its purpose? Sakharov was the same as he had been before and during the exile—he said what he thought, and he did what he said. Even in exile, even when he was banished and cut off from the rest of the world, he did

not change, but the times changed to meet his standards. What he left behind was not only his political initiatives; he proved that integrity, decency, nobility of spirit, and allegiance to ideals—all of these words which have become trite and hackneyed—are alive and can be upheld by an individual at any time.

This is the "school" Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov left behind; this is the moral lesson he taught.

Estonian Procurator Reports on Rehabilitation Proceedings

90UN0776A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 7 Jan 90 p 2

[Statement by L. Urge, Estonian SSR procurator: "Statement by Estonian SSR Procurator"]

[Text] Esteemed inhabitants of Estonia!

I consider it my duty to inform you of the work that has been done during the year to rehabilitate people who innocently suffered in the 1940s-1950s. The law-enforcement agencies have rehabilitated 26,612 persons, to 356 of whom have been returned their farms, and to 77 of whom have been returned their housing. 67.5 million rubles in monetary compensation has been paid out. This year, too, we will do everything in our power to restore the rights of those who have suffered repression. We believe that more radical legislative measures are needed in order to accelerate rehabilitation. To this end we have presented to the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet a draft law that would immediately resolve the question of rehabilitating persons who suffered repression without judicial proceedings. It is long past time to nullify the retroactive force of the 1926 RSFSR Criminal Code with respect to the citizens of the Estonian Republic. We will thereby ease the lives of many people, as well as the work of the law-enforcement agencies.

The investigation of mass killings also continues. The results of the investigation of the mass killings committed in the summer of 1941 in the Tartu and Viljandi prisons have been made public. The investigation of the mass killing in Kuressaare is continuing in connection with the large amount of work.

I thank everyone who has helped us in this.

L. Urge, Estonian SSR procurator.

Kazakh Central Committee Commission Reviews Stalin-Era Decrees Against Writers

90UN0752A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Dec 89 p 4

["Conclusions of Kazakh CP Central Committee Commission for Study of Resolutions on Literature and Art Passed in the 1930s, 1940s and Early 1950s"]

[Text] The commission studied archival materials, articles and texts of speeches made during various discussions in the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s. Based on a careful analysis of those documents, the commission

concluded that resolutions passed by both the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] and the Kazakh CP Central Committees on literature and art during the period in the life of society that the commission studied contained gross errors and distortions in assessing the cultural heritage of the people and the work of a number of poets and writers active both before the revolution and during the Soviet period.

A fateful role in this area played Stalin's epistle "On Some Issues in the History of Bolshevism". As explanatory instructions to that epistle, a note of the department of culture and propaganda of the Kazakh Kray party committee and the Kazakh Institute of Marxism-Leninism was issued in 1932 entitled "On Goals of the Struggle on the Theoretical Front in Light of the Epistle by Comrade Stalin". The note declared many works by Kazakh writers antimarxist.

But those documents themselves suffered from lack of Marxist approach to events and trends in the spiritual life and historical past of the people. They lacked convincing scientific analysis, theoretical proof and arguments. They often attacked what did not exist in those works. For instance, the poem "Kokshetau" by S. Seyfullin, which is now justly recognized as a masterpiece of the Kazakh Soviet literature, was faulted for idealizing the feudal and clan-dominated past, whereas its ideological and conceptual core was the uncompromising spiritual struggle between a noble warrior, who embodied the best traits of the people, against a sneaky master, who was cruel and sly. Critic G. Tokzhanov was accused of "committing gross errors in his works on Kazakh literature, stooping to Plekhanov's nonmarxist positions on literary theory." But could G. Tokzhanov, whose articles were full of amateurish sociology and simplified marxism, be accused of defending "Plekhanov's positions" on the history and theory of art?

The above-mentioned documents encouraged wholesale attacks on many works of folklore and of the oeuvre of many noted poets of the pre-revolutionary period and spurred persecution of leading literary figures of the time, including A. Baytursynov, S. Seyfullin, A. Zhumabayev, M. Auezov, S. Mukanov, I. Dzhanugurov and B. Maylin, many of whom were later arrested.

A number of party resolutions caused severe damage to culture and science in the republic in the 1940s and 1950s. The VKP(b) Central Committee resolutions on ideological issues passed in 1946, including "On Journals ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD" and "On the Repertory of Drama Theaters and Measures to Improve It", provided methodological underpinnings for Kazakh CP Central Committee resolutions "On Gross Errors in the Work of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences", dated January 21, 1947; "On the Progress in Implementing the VKP(b) Central Committee Resolution 'On the Repertory of Drama Theaters and Measures to Improve It'", dated April 29, 1947; "On Major Errors and Deficiencies in the Work of the Kazakhstan Union of Soviet Writers and on

Measures to Eradicate Them", dated August 17, 1951; "On Gross Errors and Deficiencies in Kazakh Literature Textbooks for Grammar and Middle Schools", dated August 28, 1951; "On the SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN Article Titled 'Kopeyev, Nationalist Religious Poet'", dated December 10, 1952; "On the New Edition of the Kazakh Literary Anthology", dated January 7, 1953; "On the Work of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences", dated August 1, 1953, and others.

Categorically and without proof, those documents rejected the artistic heritage of major Kazakh oral poets of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries such as Bukhar-zhyrau, Bazar-zhyrau, Dulat, Murat, Shortanbay, Shangerey Bokeyev, Gumar Karashev, Normanbet Ormanbetov, Sultanmakmut Toraygyrov and Mashkhar-Zhusup Kopeyev. Their works were labeled feudal reactionary, bourgeois nationalist and religious.

Similar labels were given to many works of Kazakh oral folklore, especially the epics of the Nogayla cycle: "Er-Tostik", "Yedige-Badyr", "Karasay-Kazi", "Orak-Mamay", "Yer-Sayyn", "Shora-batyr" and "Kaztugan-batyr". Works by S. Mukanov, G. Musrepov, S. Begalin, K. Amanzholov, K. Abdykadyrov, A. Tokmagambetov, Zh. Syzdykov, A. Tazhibayev, A. Abishev and others were condemned as ideologically dangerous and nationalistically and politically erroneous. Works by the founders of the Kazakh literary studies M. Auezov, Kh. Kzhumaliyev, Ye. Ismailov, T. Nurtazin, A. Kontrabayev and A. Mametova were subjected to severe criticism. They were accused of idealizing the feudal and clan system and of evincing non-class approach to works of past poets. The resolution of the Kazakh CP Central Committee dated October 7, 1947, expelled Ye. Ismailov, former director of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, from the party for allegedly allowing bourgeois nationalist ideology in the research of the institute and in his own work and for polluting the institute with politically and socially alien people; later, he was arrested. A similar fate awaited another prominent literary scholar and poet, Kh. Dzhumaliyev.

Periodicals printed denunciations unmasking "nationalist" ideas of writers; at meetings and discussions rude attacks were mounted against M. Auezov, K. Satpayev, A. Margulan, A. Zhubanov, B. Kenzhebayev and others. Works of all poets of the past and writers of the Soviet period who came under attack were removed from academic practice and textbooks, as were such works as "History of Kazakh Literature" (1948), the anthology of Kazakh poetry "Songs of the Steppes" (Moscow, 1940) and "History of Kazakh Literature" (1927) by M. Auezov and "Literature of the Early 20th Century" (1932) and "Notes on the History of Kazakh Literature of 18th-20th Century" (1942) by S. Mukanov, as well research tracts by Kh. Dosmukhamedov, M. Batalov and M. Silchenko on Kazakh folklore.

In those years, false accusations were leveled also against the Kazakh Writers' Union. The resolution "On Major

Errors and Deficiencies in the Work of the Kazakhstan Union of Soviet Writers and on Measures to Eradicate Them", dated August 17, 1951, claimed in particular: "...The Writer's Union failed to unmask and condemn bourgeois nationalist views of Ismailov, Ye., and Kh. Zhumaliyev, did not subject to stern criticism nationalist errors in artistic and critical works by K. Bekkhozhin, and did not condemn the pointlessly aesthetic and politically erroneous verses of poet Amanzholov, K."

The resolution dated December 10, 1952, on the work of the famous poet and collector of early 20th century folklore Mashkhar-Zhusup Kopeyev ordered the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences presidium to unmask "reactionary tendencies" in his literary heritage.

After the 20th CPSU Congress, Ye. Ismailov, Kh. Dzhumaliyev and other academics repressed in the early 1950s were fully cleared. However, works of poets, academics and cultural figures of the past mentioned in the resolutions of the VKP(b) and Kazakh CP Central Committees are still not used in the academe, not published and not studied. The same can be said about the banned or seized samples of folklore and research tracts on literature and oral folklore.

As is well-known, on October 20, 1988, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee rescinded the VKP(b) Central Committee resolution "On Journals ZVEZDA and LENINGRAD", passed August 14, 1946. Accordingly, the Kazakh CP Central Committee decided to clear the literary names of Sh. Kudayberdiyev, M. Zhumbayev, A. Baytursynov, Zh. Aymautov and M. Dulatov.

In the conditions of perestroika, democratization of society and growth of national conscience, reviewing the ideas and conclusions of the above-mentioned resolutions is an urgent necessity. While studying the history of pre-revolutionary Kazakh literature, we must dialectically discuss its profound and complex idiosyncrasies and review the work of past artists in their actual historical context with its historically determined contradictions. Such profound study is what the legacy of poets Shortanbay, Dulat, Bukhar-zhyrau, Bazar-zhyrau and Murat needs.

They were active in the 18th and 19th centuries, when the czars were persistently colonizing the entire Kazakhstan. This is why their works somberly depicted the expansion of czarism which in their opinion brought unfathomable suffering to the Kazakh people, depriving it of its land, faith, language, centuries-old customs, morals, etc.

All this was actually a natural protest against the lawlessness of the czarist authorities and the inhumane policies of colonialism. In the 1950s, however, those works were dogmatically interpreted as anti-Russian and reactionary nationalistic, glorifying the feudal system. The original works of those extraordinary poets were unjustly suppressed for many years.

The work of an entire group of major Kazakh poets who were active at the start of the Soviet period and raised the

social issue that was very timely in its day, the issue of the people and the age, requires a principally new reading in the light of a profound humanistic and democratic approach not only to the present but to the past, as well.

Shengerey Bokeyev (1847-1920) studied in the Astrakhan school and upon graduating from the Orenburg military academy worked at the Samara district court. Later, returning to his native land, he devoted himself to poetry. With his European education, Shengerey Bokeyev depicted in his works the hard conditions in which the Kazakh people had to live, suffering under the double yoke of the czarist authorities and the local rich. The poet's musings are full of compassion for the fate of his people. These themes in the work of Sh. Bokeyev were labeled decadent in the 1950s, whereas in his major works Sh. Bokeyev called on his people to acquire knowledge and culture.

Gumar Karashev (1876-1921) was a major poet and a public figure of the early 20th century, a philosopher, an essayist, a founder of the first Kazakh newspapers and the author of numerous articles in the press. His works are full of withering criticism of the czarist colonial policy, the double-dealings of the authorities and the ignorance and stupidity of the indigenous upper classes. His poems are full of philosophical meditations about the meaning of life, the laws of being and the place of his people in the contemporary world. The path to national renewal lay, in his opinion, through education. G. Karashev welcomed both revolutions of 1917, tried to assist in restoring Kazakh statehood and was a member of the Alash-orda party. Later he accepted the ideas of Soviet power, joined the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolshevik)] in 1919 and was killed by the Whites in 1921. His short-lived membership in Alash placed a taboo on his works.

The work of talented poet Sultanmakhsut Toraygyrov is now well-known. His works are regularly published and thoroughly studied. He justly assumed one of the leading places in the poetry of the early 20th century. However, the fact that his name was mentioned in the resolution dated January 21, 1947, which has not yet been officially invalidated, casts a shadow on the name of the poet and some of his works.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee resolution "On a SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN Article Titled 'Kopeyev, Nationalist Religious Poet'", dated December 10, 1952, stated that the work of Mashkhur-Zhusup Kopeyev (1853-1931) was permeated with the spirit of bourgeois nationalism and religious mysticism, whereas he in his works, which are quite diverse in content, alertly responded to all problems of Kazakh society of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries and made an enormous contribution to Kazakh culture as a collector and popularizer of folklore. After the poet's death, his grave, thanks to the efforts of some clergymen, became a place of worship for believers, which ironically helped attach to him the stigma of a religious poet, even though his works ridiculed, along with other ills of pre-revolutionary Kazakh society, the ignorance

and gluttony of Muslim clerics. At the same time, his righteous work in collecting folklore must not be underestimated.

Another Kazakh CP Central Committee resolution, "On the Work of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences", dated August 1, 1953, cast doubt on the poetic school of Abay as an antiscientific and politically harmful concept. Time proved the absurdity of such accusations. Contemporary Kazakh literary scholarship, especially research by M. Auezov, proved the existence of the poetic school of Abay and showed its positive impact on later styles of Kazakh poetry. A concrete example is the oeuvre of one of the brightest representatives of that school, Shakarim Kudayberdiyev. However, political charges against the poetic school of Abay, accusing it of being harmful and antiscientific, have not been dropped, which contradicts the concept of artistic continuity.

Thus, the main concepts of the above-mentioned resolutions are still in force, preventing many centuries of development of Kazakh literature from being assessed with historic objectivity.

In the conditions of perestroika, glasnost and democratic renewal of society, we must decisively overcome the consequences of dogmatism and stagnation-period regulations in ethnic history. For the purpose of carrying out those important goals, the commission of the Kazakh CP Central Committee considers it necessary to rescind the following party documents: the note of the department of culture and propaganda of the Kazakh Kray party committee and the Kazakh Institute of Marxism-Leninism "On Goals of the Struggle on the Theoretical Front in Light of the Epistle by Comrade Stalin" and the Kazakh CP Central Committee resolutions "On Gross Errors in the Work of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences", dated January 21, 1947; "On the Progress in Implementing the VKP(b) Central Committee Resolution 'On the Repertory of Drama Theaters and Measures to Improve It'", dated April 29, 1947; "On Major Errors and Deficiencies in the Work of the Kazakhstan Union of Soviet Writers and on Measures to Eradicate Them", dated August 17, 1951; "On Gross Errors and Deficiencies in Kazakh Literature Textbooks for Grammar and Middle Schools", dated August 28, 1951; "On the SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN Article Titled 'Kopeyev, Nationalist Religious Poet'", dated December 10, 1952; "On the New Edition of the Kazakh Literary Anthology", dated January 7, 1953, and "On the Work of the Institute of Language and Literature of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences", dated August 1, 1953.

In light of the above-mentioned facts, we intend to publish in nearby years the literary legacy of the above-mentioned writers and the works of oral folklore with commentaries which would take into account the dialectics of social development and the contemporary achievements of social and political thought.

Solution To Georgia's Demographic Problems Explored*90UN0756A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 1 Jan 90 p 2*

[Article by Giya Pirtskhalava, demographer, head of the division of demography of the Scientific Research Institute of Economics, Planning and Economic Management of the Georgian SSR Gosplan: "Demograph"]

[Text] The year 1989 will enter the chronicles of Georgian history as a year during which the population of our republic passed through an entire era. This was a difficult year—a year whose days and hours witnessed many losses—9 April, the events in Abkhazia and Yugo-Osetin, the natural disasters in Adzharia. In this year the hearts of a number of true sons of Georgia, national leaders devoted to their people, ceased to beat.

But for the Georgian people 1989 was also a year for hope of rebirth. We witnessed bright splashes of self-consciousness. The people awoke to life—and this is a pledge of a bright tomorrow for Georgia.

Many problems remain to be solved, difficult tasks await us on the road to creating a free and independent Georgia—there is no patriot of our land who conceives of our future otherwise. And demographic problems are some of the fundamental issues on which our society's attention has been concentrated. We have already taken the first steps toward solving them.

Let us recall these measures. Alternative methods for ensuring the economic independence of Georgia were published in the official press; the draft program of the government on the topic of national (i.e., ethnic) development encompassed for the first time the concept of demographic policy in the republic, including ethnic-demographic policy. For the first time, as stipulated by the Georgian Council of Ministers, the Georgian Academy of Sciences is developing an integrated program for phased improvement of demographic conditions in the republic; work on alternative versions has been completed, and soon will be presented for public discussion. And for the first time, a division of demography with additional job slots was established in our institute and was tasked by Gosplan to deal with issues relating to development of demographic processes among the indigenous nationalities of the republic. A decree of the Council of Ministers has also stipulated the establishment of a demographic center within the republic's Academy of Sciences. The Demographic Society of Georgia, founded in 1989 to work toward the solution of the demographic problems of the Georgian people, has established its own publishing house, which bears the symbolic name of "Kidevats daizrdebian," "And we will rise again." This society, which was established by decree of the Georgian Council of Ministers will publish its own literary miscellany of the same name.

Starting this year, a new republic law, "On Immigration," will go into effect.

Based on the aforementioned decrees of the Council of Ministers, and on the published and developed alternative versions and programs, a consolidated improved version will be developed and will also detail the financial and resources to support the stipulated demographic policy measures to be included in the State Budget. This issue will be submitted for approval by the Council of Minister as early as the first half of 1990.

Thus, during the current year, all three of the required components needed for conducting an active demographic policy will be ensured—its goal has been approved by the government of the republic (improvement of demographic conditions); the means of demographic investment have been stipulated for inclusion in the State Budget; and a special state agency, dedicated to issues of demographic policy—the State Demographic Commission—will be tasked with periodically reviewing goals and objectives and the way they are being modified.

Thus, beginning in 1991 a start will have been made in Georgia with regard to conducting an active demographic policy at the same time as a new stage begins in the demographic development of Georgia.

In order to present an accurate idea of the importance of these measures, let us emphasize that in the future further decrease in the birth rate will decrease the proportion of the younger generation, while the number of people above retirement age will increase, reaching one fifth of the entire population of the republic, and this means the demographic labor potential of the republic will decrease.

According to our predictions, by the year 2000 the ethnic Georgian population will be 4 million 14 thousand people. Recall that in 1979 the number of Georgians in Georgia was 3 million, 433 thousand, while, according to preliminary data of the last census of 1989, there were 3 million 789.4 thousand. Thus, between 1979 and 1989, the rate of population growth was 110.5 percent, while during the next decade it will be 106 percent; in other words the rate of increase of the population of Georgia will be considerably slower than it was during the previous decade.

All this shows clearly how critical and essential are the efforts undertaken by the government of the republic to improve the demographic situation in Georgia, which is an impediment to independent economic development.

Implementation of the measures described above not only will improve demographic conditions in the republic, but also will facilitate more rapid growth of the future generations of Georgia. Thus, the productivity of the population will be expanded under conditions of increased birth rate, decreased death rate, and increased life expectancy for the population. As a result of this, different generations will coexist for a longer period, which has been an eternal dream of humanity.

Thus, we wish the population of our republic all-round demographic good fortune in the future.

Kazakh Komsomol Plenum Held

KazTAG Report

90US0416A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 1

[Kaztag report: "What Will Become of the Komsomol?"]

[Text] This difficult question is directly associated with two more: Who will become the leader, and how cohesive a Komsomol organization will he be leading? An attempt was made to deal with the entire complex of burning issues of the day at the 8th Plenum of the Kazakh Komsomol Central Committee, held in Alma-Ata on 27 December.

Election of the new first secretary of the most popular youth organization in the republic was held on an alternative basis. On the eve of the plenum, an expanded session of the Central Committee Bureau was held, with the participation of Komsomol obkom first secretaries. Possible candidatures were examined at the session. Three were proposed from the reserve adopted at preceding plenums, and another three arose in the course of the discussion, including the candidature of S. Abdrakhmanov, former Komsomol Central Committee first secretary, who today is a chief construction engineer in the construction association of the Alma-Ata home-building combine. But he requested permission to withdraw his name, as did three other candidates. Thus the choice was between one of two: I. Tasmagambetov, Kazakh Komsomol Central Committee secretary; or S. Seydumanov, who until recently had been Taldy-Kurgan Obkom first secretary, and now is a graduate student at the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee. By majority vote the plenum made its choice in the candidature of I. Tasmagambetov.

The young people's socio-political organization is now going through a complex period. In the last two years alone it has declined by 280,000 people. There have been instances of self-disbandment, and group turn-in of Komsomol cards. And there has been a great deal of neglect in educational work, especially among elementary-school pupils and vocational-technical school students. Is this not one of the reasons for the growth of juvenile crime in the republic? The basic principles of Komsomol activities are eroding away. Certain committees, for example, to the detriment of other directions, have become keen on commercial activities. But at the very same time the Komsomol is not displaying firmness and consistency in the political struggle for deputy mandates, thereby missing the chance to promote youth policies through the legislative organs.

In a word, young men and women have a great deal of business before them. And it can be accomplished only through active participation in perestroika. We must arouse the inert and the non-participants, and help every

Komomol member to define a clear-cut civic position in overcoming the difficulties of life.

The Plenum approved the procedure for discussion and nomination of Komsomol candidates for People's Deputy of the Kazakh SSR, and discussed the question of approving the membership of the editorial boards of youth and children's publications in the republic.

The Plenum decided to hold the 17th Congress of the Kazakh Komsomol in Alma-Ata, 28-30 March 1990.

Kazakh CP Central Committee First Secretary N.A. Nazarbayev spoke to the plenum participants, and responded to their numerous questions.

(The speech is printed on page 2.)

Taking part in the work of the plenum were Komsomol Central Committee Secretary S.N. Yepifantsev, Kazakh CP Central Committee Organizational-Party and Cadre Work Department Chief O.A. Abdykarimov, and administrators of a number of republic ministries and agencies.

Nazarbayev Speech

90US0416B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 2

[KazTAG report: "Speech of Kazakh CP CC First Secretary N.A. Nazarbayev at the Kazakh Komsomol 8th Plenum"]

[Text] Our republic, just like the entire country, is living and working today by the rhythm established by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and by the CPSU Central Committee Plenum which ended yesterday. I am confident that you are discussing among yourselves both the problems examined at the Congress and the questions on party unity raised at the extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum. And no matter which reality we turn to today, no matter which problems of restoring the economy and the moral climate of society we discuss, the dialogue can be directly reduced to the question of political leadership.

Let us attempt together to answer the question, whether there is in our society any kind of force, capable of consolidating the potential of society, and heading the movement for perestroika. If one disregards the lofty phrases and the passionate ideas for "Saving the Fatherland," and focuses instead on the capability to determine the future and to work purposefully for it, then only one answer inevitably arises: such a force is represented by the Communist Party. We must become aware of the responsibility we have taken upon ourselves. I say "we," because alongside and together with the party, yet another communist organization is active—the Leninist Komsomol.

From the atmosphere which prevailed at the Congress and at the Plenum, and from the spirit of the documents which they adopted, it should be clear to everyone: it is

time to put an end to fruitless arguments about the general crisis and to feelings of panic; it is high time for everyone who has an interest in the success of perestroika to get involved in carrying out the plans and programs proposed by the party, the government, and the forum of deputies.

One would think that it is also time for the Komsomol to turn from its state of confusion and its self-destructive mood, and turn to purposeful, constructive work on uniting the various youth movements, and declare and affirm its political leadership in the youth environment.

It was precisely from these positions that the Kazakh CP Central Committee Bureau recently examined the question, "On the State of Affairs in the Republic Komsomol Organization and the Tasks of Party Organs on Strengthening Ideological-Political Work in the Komsomol." In discussing the interaction of the party and the Komsomol, we repeatedly spoke out in favor of rejecting the command methods and endless nit-picking in decisions on internal Komsomol affairs; and moreover—let's call a spade a spade—blowing up over the inevitable blunders and mistakes that occur in our work.

But the commonality of our ideological position obliges us to exercise our influence on the course of Komsomol affairs by means of political methods of leadership of the communists working in the Komsomol. At the same time we have in mind that the Komsomol has been and remains the reserve of the Communist Party.

We are also proceeding from the fact that the processes of party renovation and democratization of its life which have commenced, will have a positive effect on the activities of the Komsomol and on the solution of its internal problems.

We completely understand the fact that the republic Komsomol is now on a quest, and that programs and concepts are being worked out. Youth housing complexes, centers of scientific-technical creativity, youth initiatives—everything associated with realization of socially-significant proposals—are being accepted positively by young people. The Komsomol is not, of course, standing still. However, behind these matters lies a great deal of neglect. After all, the Komsomol, as a political organization is called upon to occupy itself primarily with the formation of a communist world-view, a high degree of idealism and patriotism, and all the qualities of a communist as a whole, among the young people.

These things are not served well, for example, by the excessively commercial tendency which Komsomol committees have taken up today. Many of them have interpreted the USSR Council of Ministers resolution, "On Komsomol Cooperation in Economic Activities," as an opportunity to engage exclusively in profitable business deals, quite often bordering on speculation.

For example, the youth association fund of the Komsomol gorkom in the capital of Kazakhstan, which does not have the right of access to foreign markets,

concluded an agreement with Polish enterprises on delivery of scrap nonferrous metals in exchange for computers and video cassette recorders. In exchange for the scrap metal, 47 video cassette recorders were imported from Poland, 28 of which were transferred to cooperatives, and ten were sold to its own workers and citizens at prices lower than second-hand cost by a factor of 3.5. In addition, they shipped in 20 computers, of which 14—at a cost of 30,000 rubles each—were sold to the not-known Pechora Cooperative in Moscow, and six to the Dzhetys Production Association in Alma-Ata. What is more, the proceeds from the sales exceeded almost fourfold the expenses associated with the cost of the scrap metal, transportation costs, and the cost of shipping the computers and tape recorders.

Similar violations have taken place in the Youth Center, a cost-accounting association of creative clubs; at Temp, a young people's share-holding production and commercial enterprise, and in others.

Do not such costs lead to a situation in which certain young people feel alienated in the ranks of a sociopolitical organization like the Komsomol? Their political feelings become flat, and it's all the same to them whether they're joining the Komsomol or a cooperative. And they lose their philosophical bearings. Today hardly any Komsomol organization is capable of offering its members the opportunity to take part in a dynamic political life, or to create the conditions for self-realization and self-expression. Perhaps therein lies one of the reasons for the fact that in the last two years the membership of the Kazakhstan Komsomol has declined by 280,000; and in the last nine months of the present year—by 182,700 people.

In the republic there have been instances of withdrawal from the Komsomol, and voluntary liquidation of primary organizations. Quite a few Komsomol members have found themselves alienated from the league. From year to year the number of young people working and studying in it has been declining.

The excessive attraction for creating an economic structure is leading the Komsomol astray and is distracting its attention from playing a role in such youth groups and categories as the Pioneers, working and rural youth, and the student body. And the problems of the intellectual life of young people have been ignored by the Komsomol.

Unresolved social problems have a greater affect on young people than on other categories and strata of the populace. A significant part of the working youth today is employed at low-skilled and low-paying jobs, and the housing problem remains severe among young families. Many young men and women, especially in the southern oblasts, are not employed at social labor. Chronic inattention to youth problems on the part of state and economic organs; and existing limitations on participation by young men and women in labor, political and creative activities, have given birth to social apathy

among young people, and lack of faith in the future; and a certain portion of the young people seem attracted to the criminal world.

The resolution of the Kazakh CP Central Committee Bureau of which I have already spoken outlines a complex of measures to solve the problems which have accumulated.

We believe that, together with the Komsomol, the government and the trade unions, we must work out a youth policy for the republic, based on the following principles:

- complete political confidence in the young people and their responsibility to society for contributing to the political and socio-economic renewal of the republic;
- creation of conditions for satisfying the political and socio-economic interests of the young people, which bring out their creative and labor capabilities; and,
- continual expansion of the spectrum of social and cultural blessings offered to young people.

We are in favor of maximum, active participation of young people in the republic's socio-political life, and of their appropriate representation in the organs of popular rule, and in all state structures. For the time being the Komsomol is utilizing the capabilities at its disposal very modestly. In the past election of People's Deputies of the USSR, only 19 candidates of Komsomol age were nominated, and only three Komsomol raykoms out of 273 took advantage of their right of nomination guaranteed by the law. Komsomol committees of Alma-Ata, Kzyl-Orda, Ural and Chimkent Oblasts did not even make an attempt to nominate their own candidates. The elections to local Soviets of the Kazakh SSR testify to their passivity.

It seems to us that the questions of Komsomol participation in developing a strong youth policy and the problems outlined here should occupy an important place in the course of the reporting and election campaign in the Komsomol, and should be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming republic Komsomol Congress.

Youth problems will undoubtedly become a topic of serious dialogue at the 17th Congress of the Kazakh CP, and at the forum of the nation's communists.

While preparing for party congresses, the republic party organization must define the complex of socio-economic, inter-ethnic and socio-political problems, for whose realization Komsomol organizations can and must do a great deal.

The pre-congress platform of the republic party organization is being drawn up and will be made public. I will not be in error if I say that for every one of its positions there are points for the application of power, and for the display of the initiative and creativity of the young people.

I shall try to briefly outline our approaches, and our vision of this political platform.

The party Central Committee supports the policy of the CPSU Central Committee for making our society more democratic and more humane. The principal position of the Kazakh CP Central Committee consists of the fact that it firmly adheres to Lenin's conception of the role of the party in communist construction. The CPSU is the political vanguard of the masses, and unites all the positive forces of the people for solving the historical task of renewing socialism.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee stands for developing the processes of perestroika begun at the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, for pluralism and contrasting public opinion in society, and for the expansion of glasnost in the interests of democracy and the people. At the same time it defends the necessity of a one-party system, since the interests of consolidation of society and concentration of all its healthy forces for solution of the complex task of perestroika demands this.

The party is open to dialog and partnership, and for constructive cooperation with all social movements, associations and groups operating on a socialist basis.

The Kazakh CP is maintaining an unwavering course toward increasing the role of the Soviets, and for transferring real state power to them.

And now, concerning socio-economic policy. A turn-about has appeared in the republic's economy in favor of the needs of man.

During the years 1986-1989, the average annual growth rates in national income exceeded by more than twofold the level of the last five-year plan, and the correlation between the productive national income and its use and the funds for consumption and saving, have improved somewhat.

Such socially-significant programs as the Food Program, housing and the production of consumer goods are also being implemented consistently.

At the same time the processes of renewal in the socio-economic sphere are not proceeding apace; they are encountering serious obstacles; and they are still being delayed by the continuation of strict centralization of control both on the national and republic levels; and are for the time being not bringing tangible improvements to the lives of the republic's populace. Miscalculations which occurred in the course of implementing the radical economic reforms, the diktat of union-level authorities, the decline in discipline and responsibility in the working collectives, and the manifestation of regionalism and group egoism, are all having their effect.

As a result the situation remains tense, and is characterized by the state of imbalance in the branches of the national economy, which is intensifying the inflationary

processes and the associated shortages in the consumer market, and by the increasing acuteness of the ecological problem.

A way out of the situation which has been created can be seen in switching the republic to the principles of economic sovereignty, self-administration and self-financing; and in setting up free economic zones, which will permit accelerating the rates of socio-economic development and raising the standard of living of the populace.

At the same time Kazakhstan remains devoted to the principle of general-state unity within the framework of a union of republics, and believes that concern for development of a regional economy is the sole and principal means of strengthening a unified national-economic complex for the country.

The priority directions in the development of the national economy for the forthcoming period lie in the sphere of material production: developing the base of construction and the construction industry; in providing the populace with food and consumer goods; in organizing scientifically-intensive manufacturing in machine-building; and in solution of the ecological problems. In the non-manufacturing sphere: solving the housing problem, and strengthening the material-technical base for health-care.

Unconditional priority must be given to resource-conserving directions of scientific-technical progress; to modernization of the entire technological structure of industry; to informing [informatizatsiya] the public; to introduction of electronics [elektronizatsiya] to machine-building production; and to introduction of the latest technologies. The greatest, the principal question is ensuring that our machinery and technology come up to the world standard.

Proceeding from this, the republic is faced with implementing, in 1990, a major transfer of resources for the purposes of restoring the health of the economy and its social orientation, and improving the state of affairs in currency circulation in the consumer market as well; thereby, the material and economic prerequisites are laid down for developing the economy in the 13th Five-year Plan.

The pivotal point of all the work of the republic party organization in the socio-economic sphere remains raising the people's welfare, increasing their social protection, and multiplying their intellectual potential.

Guided by the CPSU platform, "National Policy of the Party in Contemporary Conditions," the Kazakh CP Central Committee believes that an important task for the republic party organization is to realize Lenin's principles of the party's national policy, and creation of the necessary conditions for free development of all nations and nationalities in the republic, while satisfying their constitutional rights and economic needs.

The Central Committee stands for restoration of Lenin's principle of national self-determination, regarded as an all-round process of affirming national dignity, strengthening political and economic independence, development of language and culture, achievement of genuine political, judicial and economic self-determination and sovereignty of the union republics within a framework of a renewed federation.

We are in favor of expanding the independence of the republic party organization and its party committees; for elevating their status, and for proper cadre representation in the union organs. At the very same time we are decidedly opposed to federal arrangement of the CPSU and division of communists along national lines.

Strengthening the friendship of the nations is impossible without their actual equality and the realization of social justice, based on the founding principles of socialism. In this respect, measures are being taken in the republic to provide a higher standard of living, and to satisfy the material and spiritual needs of the various categories, professional and social groups, and the residents of the cities and villages, regardless of which national group they belong to.

The concept of a language policy and language-building is being put into effect. In accordance with the law, the Kazakh language has been given the status of state language, and Russian the language of inter-ethnic intercourse. At the same time, conditions are being established for the free development and functioning of other languages. The state program on languages is subordinated to this goal, and is directed toward the material-technical, financial and cadre support of the functioning of the Law on Languages; the program is designed to continue until the year 2000.

The practice of free development of national cultures, and greater in-depth work on enriching and strengthening spiritual ties among all the nations and nationalities are to be guaranteed.

Party and Komsomol organs must be guided by the fundamental criterion, that every person, no matter which nation he belongs to, and no matter which corner of the nation he finds himself in, shall consider himself a fully-franchised citizen, enjoying all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR.

Perestroika is taking place in the republic in conditions of a rather complex socio-political situation. The republic party organization considers it necessary to direct all ideological and educational work toward consolidation of the communists, workers, and various strata of the populace on the principles and values of renewed socialism, at the basis of which there must be the concrete person, and his material, intellectual and cultural development. The Kazakh CP Central Committee will exercise its political influence on the processes taking place in the republic by means of carrying out various kinds of practical work in the masses, acting by democratic methods through the party organs and the

communists, consistently affirming the methods of political leadership and influence on the consciousness and spiritual world of man and his value-orientation.

One of the pivotal directions of the activities of the republic party organization is establishing a system of effective ideological and political-educational work, constructed on the principles of confidence and respect for the individual, and on dialog with him.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee shares the concern of the workers for the growth of lawbreaking. It considers one of the most important directions of the work of the republic party organization to be strengthening socialist legality and law-and-order, and consolidation of the forces of the communists and non-party members to ensure reliable legal guarantees for further democratization of the political and socio-economic processes taking place in society. In this cause, Komsomol members too must contribute their mite, rendering practical assistance to worker-detachments for cooperation with the militia, and provisional committees for the struggle with crime and malfeasance in the sphere of services and trade.

Even from this cursory examination of the basic problems, the solution of which is facing the republic party organization, it is clear to the workers that intensive work lies ahead. We cannot carry it out without close cohesion and unity in our ranks.

The Komsomol has always been distinguished by its readiness and ability to respond to important causes, and to come together in the name of lofty goals. In the extremely difficult work facing us, we are confident that the Komsomol will make a significant contribution and will turn it into genuine, positive deeds.

Latvian Health Official Interviewed on Suicide Statistics

90US0379A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with V. Kondratenko, chief psychotherapist for Latvian SSR Minzdrav, head of a Riga confidential hotline service, by Galina Volnova: "Who Are They, the Suicides?"]

[Text] Few know what the suicidology service is or what it does. Meanwhile, the All-Union Suicidology Center of the Moscow Scientific Research Institute for Psychiatry, headed by Professor A.G. Ambrumovoy, honored worker in science of the RSFSR, has already been operating for 17 years. People have written about his work. However, both his work and the problem itself deserve broader illumination and society's attention.

For many long years it was believed that there were no social causes of suicide in the Soviet Union. Thanks to the efforts of Professor A. Ambrumovoy, who organized the center, collections of works, monographs, and methodological recommendations and aids have begun to

appear for the first time. A manual on suicidology is being prepared for doctors, psychologists, and jurists. Confidential hotline services are being created in many republics and cities.

Such a service has also been organized in Riga. V. Kondratenko, its chief and head psychotherapist of Latvian SSR Minzdrav, readily agreed to talk to us:

According to incomplete data from the World Health Organization, more than 500,000 suicides and about 7 million attempts are committed annually throughout the world. Suicides ranks somewhere in fourth or fifth place as a cause of mortality among able-bodied population and is steadily maintaining a growth trend. In France, the number of suicide victims exceeds the number of deaths due to automobile accidents.

The highest suicide level occurs in economically developed countries with complicated interpersonal relations. The "record" belongs to Hungary: 47.3 cases annually per 100,000 people. Behind the leader, the GDR follows with 36.2; then Finland with 25.0; Denmark and Austria—24.3; Japan—24; Switzerland—23.9; the FRG—22.7; and Czechoslovakia—21.9.

Now, about the situation in our country: Throughout the USSR on the whole, there are 22-24 suicides per 100,000 people. In the RSFSR and the Baltic republics, in particular, there are 23-29.

In many regions of the country, the suicide level is higher in the countryside than in cities, and this applies to Latvia as well. The situation is calmer in Riga. This is explained in part by better medical service and the use of emergency psychotherapeutic help, at a time when only 8.5 psychotherapy offices have been allocated for all the republic's rayons. Also, resuscitation assistance is worse in the countryside.

Last year, 170 Rigans killed themselves (108 men and 62 women), of whom 112 were of working age. One cannot remain indifferent to the growth in suicides among children and teen-agers. Whereas in 1987, 4 children perished, in 1988—8 children of ages 10-14 years.

Many years have eradicated the belief that only the mentally ill put an end to themselves. In fact, they comprise only 25-27 percent, another 19 percent are alcoholics, and the remainder, the overwhelming share, are people who were never treated by a psychiatrist and had never revealed any behavioral features whatsoever that would allow them to be categorized as ill. Let us not close our eyes to the fact that economic, pedagogic, socioeconomic, legal, and other aspects have a direct bearing on suicides.

The intention to deprive oneself of life happens when a person in a situation of intra- and inter-personal conflict evaluates it as unsolvable. We have all heard of cases in which a young man who loved his wife and child, but had lost hope for improved living conditions, killed himself. A leading enterprise specialist threw himself from the

window of his own office, not knowing how to prove his own rightness. A senior student, terribly shamed by the teacher in front of his entire class and favorite friend, decided to drown himself...

In acute crisis conditions, a person may be overcome by feelings of helplessness and unbearable sorrow. It often happens that the last thread, clinging to life, is the phone call to a confidential hotline, where a doctor's sensitivity and professionalism have repeatedly saved the despairing.

The Riga confidential hotline operates under great stress. It receives up to 90 phone calls daily, 12 hours a day. However, the service intends to expand its sphere of assistance. Now, from 10 to 12 hours a day every Tuesday, a priest, Father Georgiy, also mans the confidential hotline. In addition, one can receive anonymous consultation on AIDS.

Accessibility and the guarantee of secrecy have made telephone psychotherapy the leading form of emergency aid. In the United States, telephone services for emergency psychological aid operate in more than 600 cities. In the Soviet Union, these still number in the tens.

Loneliness is not a prerogative of age, and "all ages are subject" to it. There are more suicide attempts among women by a factor of 8-10, but there are more committed suicides among men by a factor of 4. The "peak" for suicides committed in our country occurs after ages 40-50 years. There are two "peaks:" after age 40-50 years, and from 20 to 29 years of age. Many of those released from prisons attempt suicide.

A maximum number of suicides and attempts is registered in the spring months, a reduction in their number is observed in autumn, and from December—a rise up to the spring level.

Soviet society, having just barely opened the curtain of illusory well-being, is delaying in recognizing the phenomenon of suicide and controlling it. The prevention of suicides, so imminent today, is aimed primarily at helping people who are in a state of psychological maladaptation of the personality. One-third of those who have made an attempt repeat it again in the course of a year. Such people require extended, serious work.

Besides an office for sociopsychological assistance and the confidential hotline, V. Kondratenko believes, the republic needs a permanent crisis center, such as that which is working successfully in Moscow and will soon be expanded. Those whose psycho-emotional state represents a threat to their lives need a permanent center. The Latvian SSR Minzdrav has already issued an order to develop a psychosomatic department in one of the city hospitals.

In 1989, at a visiting lecture series held in Riga by the Leningrad Institute for Improving the Skills of Doctors, 63 doctors from Latvia underwent specialized training in psychotherapy. Several doctors did practical work at a seminar on suicidology in Moscow. However, for now the shifts being noted are not bringing us closer to world

levels. In the U.S., for example, there are 40,000 psychiatrists and 150,000 psychologists. In the Soviet Union, there are 20,000 and 5,000, respectively.

Psychologists not only at enterprises, but also in schools, are an ordinary phenomenon in many civilized countries. Indisputably, we need them too. We must teach children to endure conflict situations and, which is very important, teach them to relate caringly and tactfully toward coevals who are experiencing such difficulties.

Recently, there have been cases in which schoolchildren have turned to the confidential hotline with requests to resolve conflicts with teachers. Mental deafness on the part of teachers and parents is the cause of almost all teen-age suicides. Our children, who find their bearings like adults in everyday problems, alas, do not yet know how to find their way out of complex situations. For a while, they are unable to comprehend the consequences of the act: They do not understand what nonexistence is, and naively assume that they will come alive again after death. In 1985, a mass suicide attempt by an entire class was made in a Moscow school as a result of a conflict with the class leader. The teen-agers borrowed this protest from a foreign film they had seen. The accessibility to schoolchildren of various kinds of videocassettes, from "horror" to "eroticism," acquires a somewhat different slant here, than abroad.

Demonstrative and blackmail attempts at suicide also occur. This includes one-fourth of all attempts, which often end fatally as a result of underestimating real circumstances. We all know of a case when an attempt to restrain a spouse by demonstratively cutting oneself has led to undesired death. Besides protest and revenge, self-punishment as a conflict of the inner "I" can be a cause for suicidal behavior. Suicide decisions may be made by people suffering from serious cardiovascular diseases; there are also motives related to deformity of outward appearances, or to a fear of criminal prosecution and shame. One cannot list them all.

Who are they, the suicides, the people who have lost spiritual harmony and decided to acquire it by way of self-destruction? Physicians are trying to answer this question. It is time for every one of us to think about it as well. Let us turn our hearts to each other; let us listen to another's pain; let us lighten the load. The reserves of human kindness are unlimited: we need only open them.

Uzbek Education Minister on New Cotton Harvest Student Labor Rules

90US0098A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 30 Sep 89 p 1

[Interview with M.A. Zaidov, Ukrainian SSR minister of Public Education: "The Field Awaits the Student" by PRAVDA VOSTOKA]

[Text] M.A. Zaidov, Ukrainian SSR minister of Public Education, answers questions posed by a PRAVDA VOSTOKA reporter.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Mirgiyas Abbasovich, from this year's difficult spring it was clear that the cotton harvest will be a late one, and that it must be saved by the whole world, as they say. Great hopes are being placed in students.

[Zaidov] I think they have felt what was said by I.A. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek SSR Central Committee, in a recent interview for a republic newspaper. "Through sleepless labor, native wit and heroic intensity cotton farmers were able to save the harvest, but the crops have been developing behind schedule. The harvest is late. In some places the harvest is underway and the crops must be saved. We are counting on the acumen of students, on their feeling of commonality with peasants."

I wish to say right away that preparations for cotton harvesting by the republic's higher education institutions began in June. In the middle of that month the directors of Tashkent higher educational institutions travelled to Syr Darya Oblast, looked over the site of future work with local directors and showed interest in the conditions under which students would live and rest. Unfortunately, even today not everything is ready there. But we have time to correct the situation. This is required in 25-30 percent of the 2,000 field stations of Syr Darya Oblast. Students will not go where they are not expected.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Of course. After all, great efforts have been taken in this direction in order to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, of manipulating temporary workers. The current voluntary workers must have both economic and intellectual incentives.

[Zaidov] This is required by the August decree of the USSR Council of Ministers. It strictly establishes the forms of work organization for students and for those people who are studying in technical schools and PTU [Vocational-technical institutions] in agricultural jobs, as well as the time they will spend there. Recently our republic's council of ministers, Uzsovprom [Uzbek Trade Union Council] and the Central Committee of the Uzbek Komsomol confirmed the resolution, "On the Order and Conditions for Sending Students of Higher Educational Institutions, Secondary Special Educational Institutions and Vocational-Technical Institutions to Perform Agricultural Work." Moreover, this was done openly, with the participation of the students.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Can you characterize the basic directions of this document?

[Zaidov] It was simply necessary to do this so that the young people and their parents would be advised about the special features of the current participation of students and workers in harvest work. It has precisely established the interrelations of educational institutions and enterprise in terms of the organization and implementation of agricultural operations on the basis of agreements. Students can be recruited for agricultural work on a voluntary basis for a period not to exceed 1 month. Students of academic schools, technical schools

and the PTU younger than age 16 and all those with a medical excuse are not permitted to work in the fields. For the first time a regimen and work and rest conditions have been determined for them in accordance with the Uzbek SSR KZoT [Codex of Labor Laws]. The work week will not exceed 41 hours and includes one day off. If the day off is proclaimed to be a work day, wages will be at double pay. The payment for a kilogram of raw material is 20 kopecks. Those who have not yet reached the age of 18 will work according to the piecework rates established for adults. I will say immediately that under such conditions students will be able to considerably improve their budgets, for which young people always have a need.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Who must do what in order to greet the young people as has been stated?

[Zaidov] Agricultural enterprises and Agroprom [Agroindustrial associations], with the help of local soviets of people's deputies, are simply obligated to prepare living facilities prior to the start of agricultural work. This includes providing beds, electricity, heat, toilets and sinks, dryers for clothing and shoes, televisions and radios. Newspapers and magazines must be available. Sanitation-hygiene facilities for young women are essential. Of course in the fields potable water and high-quality food must be available.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] This means that all of the responsibility for the preparations for the meeting of students lies on managers and on deputies of local soviets?

[Zaidov] Those responsibilities I have mentioned. In general under the new conditions the tasks of Minzdrav [Ministry of Health], Minkultura [Ministry of Culture], and Mintorg [Ministry of Trade] related to medical and cultural services for students, to supplying them with basic items, with underclothing, clothing and footwear have been spelled out precisely. In our ministry we have issued the order which has determined the tasks for our educational institutions. We have created a staff for the coordination and control over the fulfillment of the obligations of our co-contractors with regard to providing the necessary conditions for students.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Time is rushing us. At what stage is work today?

[Zaidov] We are concluding preparations for moving into the fields. Students are receiving medical check-ups. Informational work is going on concerning the need to help the village harmoniously and in a well-organized manner and concerning the special features of the current year. Agreements have been concluded with many enterprises. If the agreement is violated by either party it can be revoked. It is possible to move on to another enterprise or to simply return home.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] And what will people do in the cities when the volunteers begin to help the villagers?

[Zaidov] We are sure that there will be few of these, and that these will be mainly the result of necessity. But even they will find things to do in their departments. Most of the young people, I am sure, understanding all the complexities of perestroyka, will help villagers, their republic and our homeland. They will aid perestroyka itself. No one will remove them from this goal.

[PRAVDA VOSTOKA] Mirgiyas Abbasovich, all that is left is to wish the young men and women labor zeal, good wages, and excellent spirits in the fields and during rest. We will certainly write about them in PRAVDA VOSTOKA. And we invite their teachers to write to the newspaper about their work, leisure, and their problems.

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